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1Introduction
This Ph.D. thesis is an attempt to analyze the deeper causes of territorial disparities
in Italy (north-south), adopting a quantitative historical approach. The reason for this
choice derives from the observation of the persistence of these imbalances over time,
which still remain in vogue nowadays. Indeed, there is no consensus on their rooted
causes among scholars, nor on the timing of the origin of gap widening. Therefore,
the adoption of a historical-quantitative approach seemed to be inevitable in such a
circumstance to delve into this issue.
The manuscript is composed of three articles addressing three specific and fundamen-
tal aspects of the regional gaps. In the first article, I focus on the disparities in human
capital accumulation in the Post-Unification period (1871-1921). The work contributes
to the debate on institutions and economic development by assessing the relationship
between landownership concentration and education levels in the italian provinces and
districts. Indeed, land inequality is a measure of wealth dispersion per se`, and its ob-
servation contributes to shed new light on the level of concentration of resources among
the population. Second, in a prevalently agrarian economy, it constitutes the main pro-
ductive input that, if highly concentrated in the hands of few landowners, can lay the
foundations for the creation of an oligopsony in local labor markets. In such a situation,
the mass of rural labourers loses bargaining power and is left with the only alternative
to migrate, looking for better conditions outside agriculture. Finally, land inequality is
an indicator of de facto political power in the hands of local notables. Under the as-
sumption that large landowners take over local municipalities, when there is autonomy
of decision to invest in human capital, as in the case of Italy in the Post-Unification
decades, their interests lay on the vote against the expansion of public spending on mass
schooling. Hence, I believe it is highly informative to uncover whether land inequality,
proxying the presence of latifundia in the italian countryside, limited the adoption of
human capital promoting institutions.
Using historical data both at a district- and province-level, I find evidence of a
2negative effect of land inequality on literacy rates, the main indicator of education
levels at that time. IV estimates at each point in time, using the presence of malaria as
a source of exogenous variation in latifundia creation, allow me to temperate concerns
regarding potential endogeneity. Indeed, the presence of malaria may have contributed
to define the settlement pattern of rural workers, acting as a fundamental driver of
latifundia creation in the italian countryside. Once I explore the panel dimension of
the dataset, further evidence is provided to support the negative association between
land inequality and education levels, albeit it seems to vanish over time, in line with
the “passive modernization process” Italy was facing at that time. Further, I explore
the mechanism of transmission behind the observed relationship in order to distinguish
between the impact of supply and demand factors. Thus, I evaluate the impact of land
inequality on several outcome-based variables capturing supply and demand factors
in education. I argue that landownership concentration may have adversely affected
literacy rates not only by influencing the supply of schooling through political process,
but also by affecting the private demand for education of landless peasants.
In the second article, I focus on another variable widely considered at the root of
the North-South divide in Italy, i.e. social capital. Nevertheless, rather than analyzing
its impact on economic development, I mainly focus on the conditions that shape it in
the first place. By analyzing once more the rural economic structure of Italy during the
“liberal age” (1861-1911), I challenge the view that social capital is uniquely determined
by the communal experience in the Middle Ages. This is a thesis put forth by Putnam
and then tested by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales in a quantitative way, who stress the
long-term persistence of the effect through centuries. I advance the hypothesis that the
prevalence of short-term tenancy agreements in agriculture, here represented by a huge
mass of day workers (braccianti) and associated with the presence of large estates called
latifundia, discouraged cooperation between landowners and peasants, then translating
into lower levels of civic engagement and participation. By contrast, long-term contracts,
possibly containing a risk-sharing component, by providing agents with iterated games,
discouraged opportunism and created cooperation, an attitude ingrained in the cultural
traits of the population and associated with higher civic capital measures. Such a
cultural trait is then transmitted over generations, and it persists within the community,
even after a change in the incentives structure has taken place.
Hence, I test the long-term effect of the diffusion of daily and seasonal laborers in
agriculture in 1881 on various indicators of social capital in the present day, some of them
3previously unexamined. The measures of social capital are divided into two distinct
groups: i) civic capital measures identifying a prosocial behaviour in civil society; ii)
measures indicating a less proactive behaviour associated with civic mindedness and
compliance with rule of law (tax compliance). I find that short-term tenancy agreements
in the past negatively affected civic capital measures in the present-day. Furthermore,
the results seem to be robust both to different indicators employed in the empirical
analysis and to different model specifications. These findings raise two considerations.
On the one hand, changes in social capital might be the consequence of institutions
more recent than the experience of self-government in the Middle Ages. On the other
hand, this work has the merit to switch the attention given to pre-industrial economies
from urban centers to the social life in the countryside in order to explain disparities in
civic engagement.
IV estimates using the presence of malaria as a source of exogenous variation rule out
further concerns regarding the presence of potential endogeneity. Moreover, I address
the issue of spatial dependence, potentially deriving from different sources, such as
emulative behaviours and spillover effects in a sort of diffusion process. The share
of short-term contracts still retains its significance, accounting for different sources of
spatial correlation notwithstanding.
Once having determined such a robust correlation, I try to provide an explanation
of the transmission of this cultural trait over time. I indicate the so-called ”industrial
districts”, developed after the second world war in some areas of the center-north, as
the main channel of transmission of the aptitude of cooperation from preindustrial Italy
to the present-day. A culture of mutual cooperation, sedimented in communities where
sharecropping activities were mostly diffused, i.e. in the places now known as ”third
Italy”, laid the foundations for the subsequent creation of the industrial districts. Using
as outcome a dummy variable that takes on value 1 whether the municipality is part
of an industrial disctrict and 0 otherwise, I test the hypothesis that their adoption is
negatively correlated with the prevalence of short-term tenancy agreements in liberal
age. The results confim my conjecture and are robust to different estimators employed
to assess their relationship. OLS, IV and spatial regressions are all consistent with a
negative association between them.
In sum, short-term relationships in the labour market with a distorted bargaining
power in favor of one of the two agents induce an opportunistic behaviour of the other.
While this aptitude can persist through time and rarely be changed, a new institutional
4setting reproducing a different incentives structure should suddenly have the opposite
effect.
The results are particularly interesting, especially in light of the nature of the typical
human behaviour accounted for in neoclassical economics models. Indeed, this work
puts the accent on a different concept of the cultural trait then translating into higher
civic engagement. As the anthropologist Sahlins argued, the idea that our personal
interest is embodied in the common interest has been transformed into its opposite, i.e.
common interest thrives if everybody behaves as a utility- or profit-maximizing economic
agent. Similarly, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales point to the way people rationalize
success and failure (self-efficacy) to explain how civic capital handed down through
centuries. They assert that people with high self-efficacy are more likely to attach
success to effort and failure to bad luck and, conversely, people with low self-efficacy
exert little effort because they will attribute success to luck and failure to lack of effort.
By contrast, the mechanism of transmission based on the role of the industrial districts
lies on the conjecture that the maximizing behaviour of the private agents hinges on the
network of interdependent social relations and cooperation among private agents in the
same community and between them and the local public institutions. Had cooperation
and social relations been non-existent, not only trust among people would not have
flourished, but also the small and medium firms of a district would not have been as
competitive as they are today.
While far from reaching exhaustive conclusions, the present paper aims to stimulate
the debate and spur future research on the origins of social capital imbalances and
its transmission through time. Further attempts are needed in order to have a better
comprehension of the transmission of civic capital, whether it occurs via socialization
and education or by means of the creation of new institutions.
In the third and last article, I carry out an accurate data reconstruction to present
estimates for the provincial population at borders in 1871 in the pre-unification pe-
riod (1765ca.-1861). The main aim is to link them with the population data coming
from censuses in the post-unification period, and finally extend the time series back-
wards. Indeed, the reason why many scholars have restricted their analyses to the
post-unification period has undoubtedly to be found in the greater availability of data.
Consequently, I believe that the pre-unitary period has not been much explored in lit-
erature, and certainly little attention has been devoted to quantify economic and social
phenomena before Unification. Further, having detailed demographic information for a
5period whose data are scarce is highly informative for economists and historians, and
the demographic trend of a country represents a crucial tool to analyse its process of
development and growth. Indeed, whether population is positively or negatively corre-
lated to the scale of the economy is still an open question and no consensus has been
reached among scholars yet. Moreover, local population data, especially at province-
level, permit to study within-country variability of different demographic patterns. The
reconstruction of the provincial population represents the first attempt for building new
quantitative evidence on the pre-unitary period, providing an adequate representation
of the demographic trends at a detailed territorial level. Finally, and I believe this repre-
sents the most important contribute of the present work, I present estimates for Italy’s
provinces at borders in 1871, in order to make them comparable with provincial data for
the post-unification period. I employed a bottom-up approach, consisting in gathering
information on the population at a municipal or district-level, whenever possible, and
then assembling the respective values considering provincial borders at Unification, and
taking into account all the administrative changes in boundaries occurred throughout
the period under analysis.
The new provincial data unveil the existence of different patterns of population
growth that neither the overall figures for Italy nor regional data unfold. My estimates
confirm the existence of a positive trend in the italian population throughout the whole
time span considered. Furthermore, my estimates of the total italian population and of
the population for macroregions are consistent with estimates coming from alternative
sources. Nevertheless, once we move to a more disaggregated territorial level, large
provincial disparities emerge, showing specific long-term demographic patterns. The
main findings of the analysis suggest that: 1) Italy’s population growth in the period
1791-1861 can be divided in two different demographic regimes: the low growth regime
from 1791 to 1821 and the high growth regime 1821-1861; 2) a handful of provinces,
notably the ones in the core Tuscany and Milan, grew faster than the Italian average
in the low growth regime; 3) some provinces grew slower in the high growth regime; 4)
convergence in growth rates is effective before 1821 and undetected from 1821 to 1861.
I interpret these results as evidence of new advances in agrarian technology and
more innovative institutions in those areas registering population growth rates above
average. While the former constitute an important element of crop variety and a new
way of insurance against excessive weather variability, the latter mainly refer to the role
of provision authorities to better balance the risks of bad weather.
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This paper contributes to the debate on institutions and economic development by
assessing the relationship between landownership concentration and education in Post-
Unification Italy (1871-1921). Using historical data both at a district- and province-
level, I find evidence of a negative effect of land inequality on literacy rates. This result
is confirmed when a large set of control variables is included in the analysis. IV esti-
mates using the presence of malaria as a source of exogenous variation rule out further
concerns regarding the presence of potential endogeneity. Further evidence is provided
once I explore the panel dimension of the dataset. In addition, by analysing the impact
on intermediate outputs such as enrolment rates in primary school, child-teacher ratio,
school density, child labor and municipality expenditures, this paper provides insights
on the mechanism behind this relationship. Land inequality may have adversely affected
literacy rates not only by influencing the supply of schooling through the political pro-
cess, but also through the private demand for education.
Acknowledgments: I am grateful for the supervision of this paper to Mauro Rota,
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1.1 Introduction
Countries characterized by extractive institutions and by the concentration of political
power in the hands of small elites tend to display pattern of limited long-term economic
growth (Acemoglu et al. [2001, 2005]). Recent studies have also shown that the role
of human capital is essential in explaining the link between institutions and economic
development (Gennaioli et al. [2012], Glaeser et al. [2004]). Under the assumption that
political power is linked to landownership concentration in pre-industrial economies,
assessing the role of land inequality becomes fundamental for understanding the path
of development of countries and regions. Galor et al. [2009] built-up a theoretical model
where capitalists, on the one hand, push for policies aimed to promote the education
of the masses to have a skilled labour force, whereas landowners, on the other hand,
support policies that deprived the masses of education. The interest of landowners was
indeed to reduce labor mobility to keep wages low and to have available labor force in the
countryside. This is especially true in later stages of development, once the industrializa-
tion process has already occurred, increasing the return to education and the incentives
to invest in human capital (Galor [2011]). At the same time, Engerman and Sokoloff
[1997], Sokoloff and Engerman [2000] assert that Latin America elites blocked the ex-
pansion of mass schooling and suffrage to retain their political power. More recently,
another body of literature has called this view into question, as incentives to invest in
human capital that enter individuals’ utility functions, as well as concerns regarding
their limited budget constraints, may be considered non-mutually exclusive channels
of transmission of the effect. A more equally distributed land ownership, indeed, may
have contributed to facilitate access to resources to be invested in acquiring literacy and
numeracy skills (Cinnirella and Hornung [2016], Tapia and Martinez-Galarraga [2018]),
apart from the supply-side mechanism, linked to the political process1.
This paper aims to analyse the relationship between land inequality and literacy
rates in the late nineteenth century and in the early twentieth century in Italy2. I built-
up a new dataset both at a district- and at a province-level in Italy for the 1871-1921
time-span, which allows me to exploit both the time and the cross-sectional dimension of
the relationship between landownership concentration and education. I conduct several
1Andersson and Berger [2019] document that educational expenditure was higher where the distri-
bution of political power was more unequal in nineteenth century Sweden.
2For a more comprehensive view of the idea of scarcity of human capital as a drag to modern
economic growth in Italy, see Di Martino and Vasta [2017].
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regressions at each point in time during the period taken into consideration, showing
how this relationship seemed to be fairly stable over time. Only once I explore the
panel dimension of the dataset, evidence of the vanishing effect of this relationship oc-
curs. This was likely due to different institutional shocks, such as the enfranchisement
of the population and polity regime changes in the decision to implement public policies
(i.e. decentralization vs centralization). The most important was the introduction of the
Daneo-Credaro law, in 1911, which transferred the decisions to invest in public schooling
from municipalities to the central government, thus limiting the political power of local
notables. By letting interact landownership concentration with time shocks, I employ a
stepwise diff-in-diff strategy to account for those institutional changes potentially mod-
ifying the size of political power. Both in the cross-sectional and in the panel structure
of my dataset I have an advantage in terms of identification. The panel dimension allows
me to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, whereas the cross-sectional
dimension permits to exploit the advantages of an instrumental variable approach that
helps identifying a causal relationship between landownership concentration and edu-
cation levels. More specifically, I use the presence of malaria as a source of exogenous
variation in landownership concentration. This was a thesis put forth by Celli [1933],
who linked malaria endemicity with the creation of large estates, a pattern that has been
observed for centuries in the Pontine marshes, a plain in the surroundings of Rome.
I find the following results. Separate cross-section estimates at different points in
time reveal a negative impact of my measure of land inequality on literacy rates. IV
estimates, using the presence of malaria as a quasi-experiment, allow me to rule out
concerns regarding potential endogeneity. Once I explore the panel dimension of the
dataset, further evidence is provided to support the negative association between land
inequality and education levels, albeit it seems to vanish over time, in line with the
“passive modernization process” Italy was facing at that time (Felice [2013]).
My contribution is twofold. First, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first
attempt to document the impact of land inequality on human capital accumulation
in Post-Unification Italy. Although a bunch of literature has documented its impact
on economic development both in Italy and in global perspective, I provide a reliable
proxy to measure its impact in a quantitative way. Second, following a recent branch
of research, I explore the mechanism of transmission behind the observed relationship,
so as to distinguish between the impact of supply and demand factors. I argue that
landownership concentration may have adversely affected literacy rates not only by
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influencing the supply of schooling through political process, but also by affecting the
private demand for education of landless peasants. A vast literature has primarily
focused on the role of landowning elites to prevent the poor majority from gaining
education and power. Under the assumption that large landowners take over local
municipalities, when there is autonomy of decision to invest in human capital, as in the
case of Italy in the Post-Unification decades, their interest lay on the vote against the
expansion of public spending on mass schooling. I gather information on people enrolled
in primary schools, on the number of public schools and the corresponding appointed
teachers, and on municipal expenditures, and I test the relationship between these
variables and land inequality. My results document that while supply factors mattered,
it seems that even demand factors played a role. These findings are also corroborated by
using child labor at district-level in 1881 and literacy for people aged between 15 and 19
as additional outcome variables. Indeed, in agrarian economies such as Italy in liberal
age, the poor majority facing tightening budget constraints and limited opportunities
both for upward mobility and to offer their labor outside agriculture, had less incentives
to invest in human capital.
My empirical findings are also consistent with alternative but mutually non-exclusive
explanations of human capital accumulation in rural and southern regions of Italy.
Cappelli [2016] asserts that fiscal capacity, rather than political voice, was the main
driver of public schooling supply. Again, Cappelli [2015], in another study, highlights
the role of centralized primary schooling to foster education and escape a human capital
trap, after the implementation of the Daneo-Credaro law, in 1911. Although public
policies seemed to be fundamental in determining a steeper trend in human capital
accumulation and then activating a convergence process for the most disadvantaged
areas (Cappelli and Vasta [2019]), still little is known about the relevance of demand
factors to explain imbalances in education levels. Generally, the forces that led to the
end of the gap in education between North and South can be correlated with the process
of modernization and industrialization of Italy, ended after the World War II, which in
turn may have caused a higher demand for education (Felice [2012]). In summary, land
inequality affected human capital accumulation through diverse ways. This influence
not only operates through the role of “extractive institutions” blocking the supply of
public schooling infrastructures, but also via demand effects.
I proceed as follows. In Section 1.2, I report a literature review. In Section 1.3, I
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briefly provide a theoretical and historical background of Post-Unification Italy. Sec-
tion 1.4 describes the data, whereas Section 1.5 outlines the econometric methodology
and reports the main empirical results, focusing on the role of malaria as a source of
exogenous variation of latifundia, allowing the identification of a causal relationship be-
tween land inequality and education. A particular attention is also devoted to panel
estimates (stepwise diff-in-diff approach) and some robustness checks in order to val-
idate the identification strategy. Section 1.6 focuses on the different possible channels
of transmission of the effect. Section 1.7 provides concluding remarks.
1.2 Literature review
The literature on the role of inequality and its long-run effect on human capital is vast
and presents a wide empirical support. As already mentioned, Galor et al. [2009] assess
the inverse relationship between land inequality and education formalizing a theoreti-
cal model. They draw an empirically testable prediction by using data for US for the
1900-1940 period, finding that changes in landownership concentration negatively affect
education expenditures. Moreover, in order to demonstrate the causality of the effect,
they exploit as an instrument the interaction between changes in the relative price of
agrarian crops and in climatic characteristics across states. Ramcharan [2010] investi-
gates the effect of land inequality on redistributive policies. By looking at US census
data for the 1890-1930 period, he finds a negative association between inequality and
expenditures in education, identifying a causality relationship using geographic vari-
ables as a source of exogenous variation in land inequality3. In a similar way, Vollrath
[2013] shows a negative correlation between landownership concentration and taxes for
funding public schooling in US counties in 1890. The same results can be found in the
work by Chaudhary [2009], who links low public spending on primary schooling with
greater castes’ interests in India4.
Go and Lindert [2010] aim to explain differences in enrolment rates between the
North and the South of US looking at local autonomy and a more widespread access
to political voice for the masses in the North. They also analyze the effect of enfran-
chisement on tax levels for public schooling and in turn on enrolment rates. Along
the same line of research, focusing on estimating the correlation between schooling and
3More specifically, the author uses data for crop choice, rainfall intensity and surface elevation.
4The same results have been found for the cases of Korea and UK, respectively, by Go and Park
[2012] and Gon˜i [2013].
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education levels with inequality in political power5, Mariscal and Sokoloff [2000] find
that inequality in Latin America is negatively associated with enrollment and literacy
rates. Furthermore, they also argue that the extension of the franchise promoted mass
schooling, a result also found by Acemoglu and Robinson [2000] and Gallego [2010].
The latter also argues that the degree of democratization enhances primary education,
while the decentralization of political power has an impact only on secondary and higher
education. At odds with these latter findings, Aghion et al. [2012] argue that the role
of democratization is irrelevant to explain higher education levels, and they propose
military rivalry as a fundamental incentive for countries to invest in mass schooling.
Less research has been done on a more demand-based viewpoint as for the historical
link between land inequality and human capital. The first attempt dates back to Galor
and Zeira [1993], who highlight that in the presence of frictions in the credit market, an
unequal distribution of resources can have a long-lasting effect on lower classes’ ability
to invest in human capital. Individual underinvestment in human capital resulting
from capital market imperfections is also found by Deininger and Squire [1998]. At
the same time, Reis [2005] provides a somewhat similar explanation of disparities in
education levels across european countries in pre-industrial times. Indeed, he puts more
emphasis on the role of the opportunity cost of education for the vast majority of the
population rather than on the powerful landed nobility acting as a costraint for the
supply of schooling. Cinnirella and Hornung [2016] find that emancipated peasants
had more incentives and resources to invest in education after the abolition of serfdom
in nineteenth century Prussia. The negative relationship between land inequality and
literacy rates was thus accentuated in prussian counties with a greater number of cases of
land and labor redemptions, indicating the achievement of complete independence from
the feudal landlord. More in line with the present work, Tapia and Martinez-Galarraga
[2018], under the assumption that girls were not fully engaged in agricultural tasks, show
that while the fraction of farm laborers had a significantly negative impact both on male
and female enrolment rates, land access inequality only has an impact on the supply
of male school teachers. In the same direction, they also argue that inequality affects
boys’ schooling enrolment more than the provision of male teachers. Lastly, the results
seem to be unaltered when the analysis is restricted to a rural sample, where plausibly
landowner’s power would even be greater. Similarly, Tapia and de Miguel Salanova
5Henceforth, political power, political voice and electoral franchise will be used with the same
meaning.
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[January 2019], relying on a newly assembled dataset on individuals living in Madrid in
1880 and in 1905, find that although the supply of mass schooling improved access to
education of children from disadvantaged backgrounds, the public effort was insufficient
to offset the constraints these families were to face.
I contribute to this literature providing new insights on the role of land inequality on
human capital accumulation in Post-Unification Italy, a country characterized by huge
inequality levels and an important North-South gap. First, I provide a new instrument
linked to the creation and maintenance of latifundia in the first place: the presence of
malaria. Moreover, I show that land inequality blocked the expansion of education not
only through “institutions”, as was clear by the “extractive institutions” hypothesis, but
also through the severe budget constraints and limited opportunities outside agriculture
the vast majority of the population in the countryside was facing at that time.
1.3 Historical context
1.3.1 Human capital in Post-Unification Italy: an overview
Italy registered on average (Census data) literacy rates equal to 35% in 1881, a level
higher than Guinea’s literacy rate of 30,4% and immediately lower than 36% of Burkina
Faso in 2015. Hence, it is relevant to understand the determinants of human capital
accumulation in the decades immediately after the Unification of the country, occurred
in 1861, in order to have a better comprehension of the mechanisms behind economic
growth and human development. This will also allow me to draw new insights and policy
implications for developing countries in the present-day, mainly in light of prompting
education and raise human capital accumulation.
Italy was also characterised by wide educational disparities: for instance, in the
same year, 1881, literacy rates ranged from an average value of about 18% in the South
to almost 50% in the North. The wide scope for convergence generated overall literacy
growth rates at ten-year intervals sistematically higher in the South, reaching a level of
about 30% in 1891, while in the same year in the North they grew at a pace of about
21%. Even after the implementation of Daneo-Credaro law, literacy growth rates in 1921
were sistematically higher in the South, showing levels of about 68%, much higher than
the 40% registered in the North. The centralization of decisions of public investment
in mass schooling, then, accelerated the speed of literacy growth rates, especially in
the South. Indeed, even though disparities in literacy rates between North and South
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persisted until the second postwar, centralized education policy seemed to have played
an important role to prompt mass schooling, acting as a “substitute for prerequisites”
(Allen [2011];Gerschenkron [1962]; Cappelli and Vasta [2019]). Yet, questions referred to
the deep-rooted causes of differences in literacy levels between North and South remain
still open. The literature has focused mainly on the supply-side of the story, either
stressing the role of fiscal capacity or the role of political voice, by testing whether the
process of democratization was effective to boost human capital and economic growth.
I believe that other factors may have triggered incentives to invest in education, both
from a supply and a demand side. Moreover, Felice [2012] argues that human capital was
the main key factor behind the divergence in GDP growth rates in the late nineteenth
century and in the first decades of the twentieth century, namely between the onset of
the Second Industrial Revolution and the second postwar6. Therefore, it is essential to
study the determinants of human capital regional inequalities from Unification until the
rise of the Fascist Party in order to shed new light on the North-South gap in Italy, and
draw new implications for developing countries in the present-day.
1.3.2 Italy’s education system, 1859-1821
During the process of Unification, the Casati law (1859), firstly operating only in the
Kingdom of Sardinia, was extended to the annexed regions that became part of the
Kingdom at a later stage. The subsequent education system consisted in first-grade
primary school free of charge, offered by municipalities according to their fiscal capacity.
The first two years of primary school were mandatory both for boys and girls, but
households were not expected to pay sanctions in case of no compliance with the rule.
Municipalities with more than 4000 inhabitants were the only responsible for setting-up
second-grade schools, characterized by other two additional years of primary schooling.
Each municipal council was then authorized to build schoolhouses, hire teachers, pay
their salaries and enforce the attendance.
In 1877, the Coppino reform amended the electoral system established by the Casati
law, the main contribution of it consisting in raising the compulsory years of schooling
from two to three. In addition, it introduced the possibility for municipal councils to
receive subsidies for building schoolhouses and furnish didactic material, it established
sanctions for households not complying with the rule of law and, more in general, it
enhanced the power of local councils to enforce compulsory attendance, above all in the
6See also Vasta [1999].
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rural and less developed areas of the country. This reform was followed by the Nasi
and Orlando laws, approved respectively in 1903 and 1904, which further raised the age
of mandatory education and increased teachers’ salaries, blocked since 1886 (see Cives
[1990]). In 1906, the Special law for the South of Italy was enacted, including a set of
reforms concerning schooling, aimed to bridge the socioeconomic gap between northern
and southern regions. Although all these reforms contributed to improve the education
system since the introduction of the Casati law, none of them dramatically boosted
human capital in a decisive way.
A further crucial step ahead was taken with the introduction of the Daneo-Credaro
law in 1911, following the Corradini Inquiry published one year before. This reform sig-
nificantly changed the education system in Italy, centralizing the funding of schooling to
a large extent. The main characteristic of the reform was constituted by the creation of
the provincial school boards, the so-called Consigli Scolastici Provinciali (CSP), which
worked as a link between municipalities and the central government. Indeed, on the
one hand, they limited the power of the municipal councils, whereas on the other hand,
they allowed a certain degree of administrative decentralization in the management of
public resources. While municipalities could apply for free loans in order to fund the
management of the construction of schoolhouses, the state was responsible for paying
teachers’ salaries. Moreover, municipalities included in the CSP system were obliged to
transfer an amount of money equal to the previous years’ budget to the Treasury. The
state would in turn retransfer these funds to the CSP, which were charged with the task
of financing public education (see Cappelli [2015], for further details).
1.3.3 The agrarian structure of the italian economy
Italy, soon after Unification, was a predominantly rural economy. In 1911, according to
the Population Census, the share of agricultural employment over the total labor force
was about 60%, and it remained relatively unchanged until the Second World War (see
Felice [2018]). A slow process of industrialization was taking place in the surroundings of
the so-called “industrial triangle”, perhaps due to better resources endowments, higher
literacy rates and a better access to European markets7, but it was only confined to few
cities and it did not trigger the development process for the rest of the country. Since
the first years after Unification, land inequality has always been considered one of the
7For a more comprehensive study on the origins of the industrialization process in the North-West
of Italy, see A’hearn [1998] and Missiaia [2016].
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main issues at the core of political projects aimed at improving the conditions of the
southern economy. The debate around latifundia involved prominent scholars such as
Gramsci, Nitti, Sereni, Croce, ecc., at least as late as the implementation of the land
reform after the Second World War.
First of all, land inequality is a measure of wealth dispersion per se`, whose obser-
vation contributes to shed light on the level of concentration of resources among the
population. Second, in a prevalently agrarian economy, land constitutes the main pro-
ductive input that, if highly concentrated in the hands of few landowners, can lay the
foundations for the creation of an oligopsony in local labor markets. In such a situation,
the mass of rural laborers loses bargaining power and is left with the only alternative to
migrate, looking for better conditions outside agriculture. Large landowners’ interest,
then, will be to keep wages low, trying to impede the migration process and to maintain
a huge mass of labor force at disposal. It was in this context that agricultural workers
began to adhere to unions and political organizations in the beginning of the twentieth
century, demanding higher wages and improved job conditions. A parliamentary inquiry
on the conditions of Southern peasantry (Faina [1909]) raised concerns on the role of
seasonal and chronic underemployment, attributed to the extensive agriculture based
on grain cultivations in latifundia areas. The social conflict in the countryside increased
after the first World War, leading to frequent occupations of idle land in many large
estates. One of the main requests of workers’ turmoil was a minimum level of yearly
employment, called imponibile di mano d’opera. The protest movement drew to a close
with the rise of Fascism in October 1922, after two years of violent upheaval.
Traditional historical literature considered latifundia negatively, attributing them
one of the profound causes of the backwardness of the South. Large landowners were
considered absentee and not rational economic agents, being more concerned with rent
extraction than undertaking productive investments on their land. The Marxist scholar
Sereni summarized the traditional view in his seminal work (Sereni [1971]), highlighting
the detrimental role of “feudal” heritage and persistent underdevelopment in southern
agriculture. Sharecropping agreements in the central part of the peninsula also reflected
a low level of productive agriculture in the italian countryside. Only the capitalist
farming in the Po Valley reflected a higher level of modern and advanced productivity
in the primary sector, even though not sufficient to support modern economic growth
for the country as a whole.
A more recent brunch of literature revised the traditionalist view. Specifically, the
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hypothesis of southern large landowners’ irrational behavior has been called into ques-
tion (Petrusewicz [1989], Placanica [1990]). Their decisions were attributed to the ex-
istence of specific non-removable constraints they were facing, different from the ones
landowners were to address in the Po valley. Even contractual agreements defining la-
bor relations between peasants and landowners are now considered efficient solutions
to specific principal-agent problems, stemming from different environmental conditions
typical of southern countryside, such as drought in the summer, lack of rain and the
presence of malaria (Galassi and Cohen [1994], Bevilacqua [1989], Lupo [1990]).
Although the existence of an entrenched controversy and long-term debate on the
role of land inequality in the North-South divide in Italy, there have been no attempts
to integrate the discussion with quantitative evidence for the Post-Unification period.
I try to fill this void by relying on a proxy for measuring it, that I employ to assess its
correlation with human capital accumulation. Hence, I focus on one specific component
of the development process, leaving aside other possible channels through which land
inequality is capable to influence long-run economic growth, such as efficiency in agri-
culture (Deininger and Squire [1998]), excessive taxation (Persson and Tabellini [1994]),
trade policy that protects rent extraction (Adamopoulos [2008], extractive institutions
(Acemoglu et al. [2002]), and market power (Martinelli [2014]).
In the next section I describe the main variables employed in the empirical analysis.
1.4 Data
I rely on a newly assembled dataset that includes information on both a proxy for the
level of land inequality and for human capital in Post-Unification Italy. I digitized data
from various sources and referred to six points in time (1871, 1881, 1891, 1901, 1911,
1921) for the 69 provinces and to only three points in time (1881, 1901 and 1921) for
205 districts (the latter allowing me to have a more detailed information), in order to
test whether the concentration of landownership is associated with the expansion of
education8. Data coming from Population Censuses contain a great deal of available
information, including literacy rates, all tenancy contracts employed in agriculture and
their percentage over the total labor force, territory surface and population. I integrated
8The Population Census was not conducted for the year 1891 because of financial issues. Therefore,
I have estimated data for this year by means of linear interpolation.
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this available information with other data coming from alternative sources. In partic-
ular, data on municipal expenditures, literacy rates for population aged more than 15,
between 6 and 10 and between 15 and 19, the number of children and teachers, enroll-
ment ratios in primary school and the number of schools divided by gender come from
Bozzano and Cappelli [2019] and Cappelli and Quiroga Valle [2019], and are kindly
provided by the authors.
Since Population Censuses provide information on contractual agreements employed
in agriculture, without including information on the size of landholdings, I cannot
build up a proper measure of land inequality. Therefore, I follow Tapia and Martinez-
Galarraga [2018], who argue that in this case the most adequate measure of the variable
of interest is the fraction of farm laborers divided by the total labor force engaged in
agriculture. In particular, the numerator includes the number of daily laborers, the so-
called braccianti, and wage workers, generally hired at annual basis. These two agrarian
figures constitute the mass of landless peasants opposed to the large landowners settled
in the countryside. Hence, I expect the fraction of farm workers to be negatively asso-
ciated with literacy rates. Furthermore, in order to show that my choice is correct, I
also gathered data from the first Agricultural census, carried out for the first time by
the Fascist Party in 1930, containing data on the number of farms divided by their size,
from which I can construct a Gini index, the “true” measure of land inequality. Thus,
I can compare it with my proxy for the same year, coming from the Population Census
of 19319.
Figure 1.1 shows the variation of the two variables at stake. Both measures display
a similar pattern and are highly correlated.10. A high share of farm laborers and land
inequality for the interwar period is clearly evident in the plains of Maremma, in Tus-
cany, and Pontine marshes, in Latium, as well as in the well-known belt of southern
latifundia, going from Apulia, passing through Basilicata and Calabria, and reaching
some geographic areas of Sicily. The south of Sardinia and some parts of the Po Valley,
especially near the Po delta, register high levels too. Thus, the evidence is much more
mixed than expected, and there is a substantial variation throughout the peninsula.
The positive association between the two measures is also shown in Figure 1.2. The
9This is the same measure obtained by Martinelli [2014] for 1940 at the very disaggregated level of
“agrarian regions”.
10In the absence of significant agrarian reforms, the unexplained variance of landownership concentra-
tion might be due to market forces that redistributed land. Nonetheless, land market remained steadily
stuck until the Second world War, and no major changes occurred in landownership redistribution (see
Petri [2002]).
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Figure 1.1: Farm workers (share over total labor force in agriculture)
[left] and Gini index for land inequality [right] in 1930.
Source: Author’s elaborations on data coming from 1930 Agricultural Census and
1931 Population Census.
correlation index is about 0.48, and it reaches the level of 0.58 once I rule out from the
sample Bolzano, Trieste, Trento and Gorizia, consistently with the sample size in liberal
age, and Sondrio, Belluno, and Aosta, the three outliers that appear in figure 1.2, along
with Trento. Indeed, typically in alpin areas, the Gini index is higher than the fraction
of landless peasants working land. This could be due to the presence of big woods and
forests owned by few large landowners. Consequently, measuring land inequality with
my proxy may be misleading in similar areas.
Further, there might be some unobserved macroregional characteristics potentially
distorting the correlation between the two variables, and ultimately making it lower than
its true value. For this reason, I plot the same graph showing the level of correlation
for each macroregion, in order to evaluate the association between the two variables
within each macroarea of Italy (see figure 1.3). One concern can be raised regarding
the circumstance of not capturing, using this proxy, the diffusion of land inequality if
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Figure 1.2: Correlation between the share of farm workers and the Gini
index for land inequality, 1930.
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other forms of agrarian regimes were prevalent, i.e. sharecropping activities, above all
widespread in the central and north-eastern part of the country. Hence, one expects
to find a lower association precisely in those geographic areas. Surprisingly, figure 1.3
seems to reject these hypotheses, highlighting the absence of macroregional features able
to divert the relation between the presence of landless peasants and the Gini indicator
of land inequality. On the contrary, the correlation is accentuated precisely in the center
and north-eastern part of the peninsula, reaching, respectively, levels equal to almost
0.7 and 0.611. Therefore, the comparison with the Gini index for land inequality in 1930
allows me to conclude that my proxy is suitable and it provides a reliable measure for
landownership concentration.
Figure 1.3: Correlation between the share of farm workers and the Gini index for land
inequality in 1930 for each macroregion. Bolzano, Trieste, Trento and Gorizia are not included
within the sample, consistently with the sample size in liberal age. The sample does not even
count the other three outliers: Sondrio, Aosta and Belluno.
11In another exercise, I also regress the gini index and the fraction of farm workers on the percentage
of sharecroppers and the macroregional dummies. The resulting residual predicted values remain highly
associated. Results are available upon request, whereas the associated scatterplot is reported in figure
1.9, in the Appendix.
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Figure 1.4: Farm workers (share over total labor force in agriculture)
in 1881. Author’s elaborations on data coming from 1881 Population
Census.
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In Figure 1.4, I report the share of farm laborers in 1881 (one of the years included
in my sample). This map shows a pattern similar to the one displayed for the interwar
period, confirming the slowly-changing nature of this variable and its stickiness over
time. Although Figure 1.4 reflects what I expected to find about land inequality in
Italy, it could be possible that those registered as landless actually owned some small
plots of land, however not sufficient to ensure them to reach the subsistence level.
Nevertheless, this type of rural worker was more prevalent where braccianti were less
widespread, balancing the disparities in land inequality among regions. Moreover, farm
workers had to rely on wage work and child labor in order to meet their needs, further
incentivizing them not to invest in education, because of its opportunity cost. Generally,
incentives to acquire education are associated to occupations that attach economic value
to literacy skills, mostly widespread in urban areas. Indeed, towns and cities offered an
easier access to schools and provided inhabitants with more opportunities to bump into
market exchanges and frequent encounters with the law and the authorities. Therefore,
it was indispensable to read and write bills of exchange and other trade documents. In
contrast to urban areas, the countryside was mainly characterized by a less dynamic
environment and it is likely that only local notables had access to education and the
possibility to acquire literacy and numeracy skills.
Figure 1.5 plots literacy rates for Italy’s provinces for a reference year in liberal
age, 188112. Literacy rates were much higher in the northwestern part of the country,
coinciding with the so-called “industrial triangle”, in the surroundings of Turin, Gen-
ova and Milan, the three most industrialized cities in Italy. Actually, although some
disparities already existed between the North-West and the rest of the country at the
Unification and in the first decades following 1861, the industrialization process was just
beginning at that time and there were not noticeable disparities yet. Differences in the
industrialization index would have enlarged from that period on, creating an even larger
gap, particularly accentuated in the interwar period13. Remarkably, the North of Italy
was not urban at all, with the exception of Turin, Milan and Genova, but was mainly
constituted by sparsely-settled small towns, with a high number of small municipalities.
These were characterized by the settlement pattern of the cascina irrigua, the typical
12Unfortunately, I do not have available shapefiles for the italian districts, which would have portrayed
a more detailed representation of education levels.
13It is still debated whether the second wave of industrialization created incentives to invest in
human capital or it was the other way around, namely that higher education levels paved the way for
the industrial revolution in the circumscribed area of northwestern Italy. For further details, see A’hearn
[1998] and Felice [2018].
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Figure 1.5: Literacy rate (1881). Author’s elaborations on 1881 Popu-
lation Census.
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Po Valley agrarian regime, which favored the settlement of peasants close to their land.
The highest urbanization rates are registered in some southern areas, mostly coinciding
with the so-called agro-towns, composed by a huge mass of agrarian laborers settled on
top of the hills and far from cultivated lands (Malanima [2005]).
Figure 1.6: Literacy rate by macroregion (trend for the period 1861-
1921)
Figure 1.6 displays the variation of literacy rates over time for the four main italian
macroregions. Whereas the graph shows a clear North-South gap, it seems that literacy
rates grew steadily at the same pace throughout the period under analysis. Neither
divergence nor convergence seem to occur (or modest convergence rates), at least until
the implementation of the Daneo-Credaro law. From that moment on, it seems that
the speed rates for all italian regions would be enhanced, although the southern regions
with a slightly more emphasized pace14.
I test the hypothesis that the degree of landownership concentration is negatively
associated with the level of human capital. A preliminary overview seems to confirm my
14In Appendix, graph 1.10, the trends over time for literacy divided by gender and the share of farm
workers are shown.
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conjecture, but the results can obviously be driven by some other omitted or unobserved
factors related to both variables. Hence, in the next section, I try to rule out similar
concerns by including additional controls and by implementing an identification strategy
based on an instrumental variable approach. Further, I exploit the panel dimension of
the dataset, by employing a stepwise diff-in-diff strategy. This allows me to account
for structural reforms potentially related to the level of land inequality. The descriptive
statistics referred to all the variables employed in the empirical analysis are reported
in Tables 1.1 and 1.2, both for districts and provinces. For a thorough definition of the
variables, as well as their source, see Table 1.17, in the Appendix.
Table 1.1: Summary of the variables: district-level
District-level Mean Median Std.Dev. 10th perc 90th perc
Literacy 0.50 0.49 0.24 0.19 0.85
Literacy (rate) 0.56 0.54 0.22 0.27 0.88
Literacy (female) 0.45 0.44 0.26 0.12 0.84
Farm workers (share over total 0.51 0.53 0.21 0.21 0.80
labor force in agriculture)
Population (log) 11.75 11.71 0.65 10.97 12.61
Urbanization rate 0.32 0.25 0.26 0 0.73
Latitude 47.14 47.77 2.90 42.23 50.49
Landlocked 0.56 1 0.50 0 1
Sharecroppers (share over total 0.16 0.08 0.19 0.01 0.52
labor force in agriculture)
Agrarian labor force (share over 0.39 0.39 0.12 0.24 0.53
total population)
Malaria 1880 0.30 0.21 0.29 0 0.77
Agrarian child labor (male) 0.24 0.23 0.08 0.13 0.34
Agrarian child labor (female) 0.16 0.15 0.10 0.03 0.30
Agrarian child labor 0.20 0.20 0.08 0.09 0.30
Obs. 615
Notes: Descriptive statistics at district-level (average over the cosidered time span).
Data for child labor and malaria are only available for 1881.
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Table 1.2: Summary of the variables: province-level
Province-level Mean Median Std.Dev. 10th perc 90th perc
Literacy 0.39 0.34 0.22 0.13 0.71
Literacy (male) 0.44 0.41 0.21 0.19 0.73
Literacy (female) 0.33 0.28 0.23 0.07 0.68
Farm workers (share over total 0.52 0.53 0.20 0.24 0.79
labor force in agriculture)
Population (log) 12.89 12.87 0.55 12.28 13.60
Urbanization rate 0.17 0.12 0.17 0 0.42
Latitude 42.69 43.43 2.60 38.06 45.33
Landlocked 0.41 0 0.49 0 1
Sharecroppers (share over total 0.19 0.10 0.21 0.02 0.57
labor force in agriculture)
Agrarian labor force (share over 0.36 0.37 0.11 0.23 0.49
total population)
Malaria 1880 0.30 0.24 0.24 0.02 0.69
Child-teacher ratio 0.16 0.12 0.13 0.06 0.30
School density 0 0 0 0.00 0.00
Enrolment rate 0.35 0.31 0.16 0.15 0.60
Enrolment rate (male) 0.38 0.32 0.17 0.17 0.63
Enrolment rate (female) 0.32 0.29 0.15 0.14 0.56
Municipal expenditures (p.c.) 1.81 1.47 1.19 0.77 3.20
Domestic market potential 1331.63 1151.5 678 701 2550
Industrialization index 0.91 0.795 0.35 0.59 1.42
Mortality rate due to malaria 4.74 1.6 9.14 0.2 12.6
Agricultural productivity 87.40 78.5 28.24 59.9 145.5
Obs. 483
Notes: Descriptive statistics at province-level (averaged over the considered time
span). Data for enrollment rates and malaria are only available for 1881, malaria mortality
only for 1901, agricultural productivity at regional level only for 1891.
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1.5 Empirical strategy
In this Section, I evaluate the relationship between landownership concentration and
literacy rates. First, I present OLS results from separate cross-sections at different
points in time, both for districts and provinces in Post-Unification Italy. I proceed
the analysis introducing an instrumental variables approach based on the presence of
malaria, which aims at addressing the issue of potential endogeneity. Then, I corrob-
orate findings presenting panel estimates that allow me to account for time-invariant
unobserved heterogeneity. Next, I conduct a robustness check analysis by including
further controls and trying to validate the instrument. Finally, I explore the mecha-
nism of transmission of the effect by focusing on the effect of land inequality on some
intermediate outcome-based measures of supply and demand of schooling.
1.5.1 OLS estimates
I estimate a standard OLS model where literacy rates are a function of the share of
farm laborers in each district or province i:
Litit = α1 + β1LandIneqit + γ1X
′ + it; (1.1)
∀t ∈ 1871, 1881, 1891, 1901, 1911, 1921, where Lit is the literacy rate, LandIneq is the
share of farm workers and β1 the coefficient of interest.  is the error term and X is a
vector of socio-economic and geographical covariates which permits to control for other
factors that may drive the results, being related both with education levels and with
land inequality. These variables, indeed, capture other aspects of demand and supply of
schooling potentially associated with landownership concentration. I include the level
of population (in log), the urbanization rate, the share of sharecroppers over the total
labor force in agriculture, and the fraction of people engaged in agriculture over the
total labor force. In the absence of disaggregated data for GDP and GDP per capita
for the period under analysis, the inclusion of these variables permits to account for
opportunities outside agriculture that create an incentive to invest in human capital.
Indeed, urban areas are typically more prosperous, as a more productive agriculture is
able to sustain other activities where literacy skills are required. Following the same
argument, the share of agricultural labor force is also included in order to distinguish
between rural and urban geographic areas. Then, I expect it to be negatively associated
with literacy rates. The proportion of sharecroppers allows me to control for areas in
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which it is likely to register high land inequality levels that I do not take into account,
given the way my proxy is constructed15. Furthermore, I also control for a dummy that
takes on value one whether the district or the province is landlocked and zero otherwise,
the latitude and four dummies for the italian macroregions. The first variable allows
to capture the openness of local environment to trade and cultural flows, commonly
due to a better access to sea, whereas the latitude controls for a diverse climate and
temperature throughout the peninsula, potentially driving different agrarian regimes.
Finally, the four departmental dummies allow me to capture most of the unobserved
heterogeneity at a macroregional level.
The OLS results are presented in Tables 1.3 and 1.4, respectively at district- and
province-level. The coefficient of interest is negative and statistically significant for all
points in time in the period under analysis, both for the district and for the province
estimates16. Furthermore, with regard to the estimates based on a more detailed level
of territorial disaggregation (district-level), the magnitude of the coefficient appears
to decrease over time, meaning that ongoing changes associated with landownership
concentration had a role to reduce its impact on education levels. Therefore, even
though OLS results are not conclusive, they suggest that the relationship between land
inequality and literacy rates was likely to be more accentuated in the first stages of
development. The share of the agrarian labor force, distinguishing between rural vs
urban areas, shows a negative and statistically significant coefficient, as expected. The
share of sharecroppers over the total labor force in the primary sector is negatively
associated with literacy too, in line with the fact that only northwestern regions had
higher levels of education. Latitude is positively associated with literacy, while other
controls seem to be less relevant, apart from the dummy for being landlocked, positively
associated in the provincial estimates.
Overall, while OLS estimates highlight a robust association between land inequality
15At each point in time, I find a negative correlation between the share of farm workers and the
share of sharecroppers, meaning that they represent almost mutually exclusive tenancy contracts. At
the same time, Martinelli [2014] highlights the presence of a high level of landownership concentration
even in the case of the adoption of sharecropping agreements. In order to avoid any doubt, I opt for
including the share of sharecroppers among baseline controls, given its ambiguous relation with the
variable of interest.
16The low level of significance for 1871 may be due to measurement error, given the difference in
the construction of the variable of interest. Indeed, tenancy contracts in 1871 Population Census are
collected differently from other Censuses, and they may overlap with each other, producing different
results.
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Table 1.3: Literacy and farm workers, OLS (district-level)
District-level 1881 1901 1921
Farm workers -0.2877*** -0.2009*** -0.1339***
0.055 0.0378 0.0334
Agrarian labor force -0.2798*** -0.4817*** -0.3057***
0.0531 0.0482 0.0459
Population (log) 0.0266*** 0.0165** 0.0086
0.0098 0.0083 0.0076
Urbanization rate 0.0225 -0.005 -0.0144
0.0203 0.0176 0.0213
Sharecroppers -0.3130*** -0.2387*** -0.1437***
0.05 0.0312 0.0408
Landlocked 0.0198** 0.0220** 0.008
0.0097 0.0091 0.0095
Latitude 0.0174*** 0.0208*** 0.0200***
0.0029 0.0033 0.0041
Departmental dummies YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES
N 205 205 205
adj. R-sq 0.903 0.943 0.913
F 170.3 372.3 349.3
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for separate cross-sections.
***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.
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Table 1.4: Literacy and farm workers, OLS (province-level)
Province-level 1871 1881 1891 1901 1911 1921
Farm workers -0.1146* -0.2943*** -0.3199*** -0.2539*** -0.2398*** -0.1476***
0.0679 0.0938 0.0733 0.0502 0.0496 0.0462
Agrarian labor force -0.1351 -0.2219** -0.3699*** -0.3872*** -0.4131*** -0.3111***
0.1131 0.0868 0.0772 0.0725 0.0789 0.0737
Population (log) 0.0109 0.0125 0.0058 0.0013 0.0026 0.0051
0.0143 0.0143 0.0119 0.0108 0.0106 0.01
Urbanization rate 0.1493*** 0.1001* 0.0596 0.0683* 0.0442 0.0054
0.0553 0.0501 0.0384 0.0369 0.043 0.0437
Sharecroppers -0.1564*** -0.3198*** -0.3149*** -0.2691*** -0.3286*** -0.1980***
0.0535 0.0721 0.0484 0.035 0.0444 0.0435
Landlocked 0.0314* 0.0375** 0.0384** 0.0401*** 0.0427*** 0.0209
0.0165 0.015 0.0144 0.0143 0.0135 0.016
Latitude 0.0152*** 0.0136*** 0.0130*** 0.0145*** 0.0153*** 0.0201***
0.005 0.0045 0.0041 0.0041 0.0041 0.0061
Departmental dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 69 69 69 69 69 69
adj. R-sq 0.88 0.906 0.937 0.949 0.944 0.939
F 54.2 85.66 120.6 163.5 160.1 206.9
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for separate cross-sections.
***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.
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and human capital in Post-Unification Italy, they still present several sources of endo-
geneity to be addressed, and the estimated coefficients cannot be interpreted as causal
relations.
1.5.2 IV estimates: the role of malaria
The empirical evidence of the OLS regressions is mixed and inconclusive. The found
coefficients do not reproduce a causal effect, as omitted unobserved factors correlated
both with landownership concentration and literacy rates might bias the results. On
the one hand, more educated peasants may be more able to rent plots of land that they
can redeem, and then obtain better tenant conditions. This could be particularly true
in a fixed-rent regime, ultimately resulting in a more equally distributed landownership.
Conversely, more educated peasants may decide to sell their lands to seize better rents in
occupations outside agriculture, with a higher payoff for high-skilled workers. This may
lead to an increased level of land inequality. While in this latter case I eventually find
a downwardly biased coefficient, in the first case the estimates may become upwardly
biased toward zero. Thus, I address endogeneity by adopting an instrumental variable
approach. Specifically, I exploit a new measure related to the presence of malaria in
liberal age as a source of exogenous variation in land inequality.
Malaria and latifundia in the italian countryside
”Malaria is the basis of all social life. It determines relations of pro-
duction and the distribution of wealth. Malaria lies at the root of the most
important demographic and economic facts. The distribution of property, the
prevailing crop systems, and patterns of settlement are under the influence
of this one powerful cause.”
Francesco Saverio Nitti
Malaria-endemic countries exhibit lower economic growth rates. The channels through
which malaria prevents a country from undertaking a process of development are mul-
tiple, including effects on fertility, poverty, population growth, saving and investment,
worker productivity, mortality rates and medical costs (Sachs and Malaney [2002]).
Malaria is also seen to reduce labor force and impede the adoption of new technologies
and practices in agriculture (see Asenso-Okyere et al. [2011] for a review). In Italy,
during the last decades of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth
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century, malaria was considered one of the main political and socio-economic issues,
because of its association with rural poverty and underpopulation (Amorosa Jr et al.
[2005]). Malarial zones in Sardinia, in the Pontine marshes (Agro Romano), and along
the coasts of Mezzogiorno were all characterized by low agricultural productivity and
low population density (Celli [1933], Missiroli [1949]). Scarcely-populated and low-lying
fertile areas stood in marked contrast to overcrowded and ecologically overexploited
mountainous zones. With the fight against malaria, social planners aimed at triggering
population growth and resettlement schemes in historically malarial zones. This strat-
egy is a variation of the ”vicious circle” argument which can be labeled the ”Malaria
Blocks Development” model (Brown [1983]). This model is based upon a theoretical
backbone found at the turn of the twentieth century in the Italian public health lit-
erature on the interrelationship between malaria, population density and agricultural
productivity. The effect on the settlement pattern of the population was therefore highly
influenced by the presence of malaria. Even during the fascist period, Arrigo Serpieri,
former Minister of Agriculture, asserted that a different geographical and social environ-
ment was needed in order to switch from an extensive to an intensive agrarian regime.
He also added that “(...)intensified cultivation systems are not possible where good and
tolerable hygienic conditions are not determined before or in parallel with their intro-
duction: many large estates are now infested with malaria, in front of which the current
system has the great merit of not requiring the permanence in the countryside of several
people, especially during the period of the most serious infection” (my own translation
from Boccini and Piccialuti [2003]).
The hypothesis that malaria endemicity is a driver of latifundia creation was orig-
inally suggested by Celli [1933]. More recently, it was tested by Chaves [2013], who
uses Markov chain models to study the dynamics of latifundia creation in 1930 Spain.
According to Celli, a high correlation between malaria endemicity and the creation of
large estates is a pattern that has been observed for centuries in the Pontine marshes,
a plain in the surroundings of Rome17. More specifically, it has been suggested and
documented by the historical archives for the Roman Pontine marshes, that the debil-
itating effects of malaria on farmers do not allow them to harvest crops and properly
cultivate lands. This induces peasants to sell their land, which will be then abandoned
and purchased by few healthier and wealthier landowners. Then, large landowners will
exploit land as latifundia, based on extensive and land-intensive agriculture, requiring
17The same pattern was observed in Spain in 1930s by Beauchamp [1988].
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landless peasants’ workforce. During harvest time, farm workers were then forced to
settle in towns located on top of hills and far from infested areas. Idle lands reinforced
the presence of latifundia, ultimately resulting in a vicious circle that maintained such
a feudal agrarian regime for centuries.
In order to exploit information on the presence of malaria at a very disaggregated
territorial level, I digitized the map “Carta della Malaria dell’Italia”, drawn by Luigi
Torelli in 1882 (see figure 1.7), obtaining a proxy for its diffusion at province- and
district-level18. To my knowledge, there exist no other similar historical data on malaria
prevalence at such a high spatial resolution for pre-industrial Italy.
Figure 1.7: Digitalization of the ”Carta della malaria dell’Italia”,
Torelli map (1880).
The figure shows more than one similarity with the pattern observed for farm workers
in the same year. As well as in the South and in the two islands, I find malaria
18A similar index was proposed by Buonanno et al. [September 2019] on the grounds of Torelli report.
The authors compute a dummy variable taking on value 1 whether a municipality is affected by malaria
and 0 otherwise. The digitalization of the map allowed me to obtain an even more detailed measure for
malaria prevalence, computed as the share of geographic territory covered by the disease. The territory
was divided in grid cells, then the variable has been reaggregated first at municipal and then at district-
and province-level.
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widespread in the areas of Maremma and Pontine marshes, in Tuscany and Latium,
and in some provinces of the Po Valley. I claim that this measure is representative
of the diffusion of malaria throughout Italy in all the time span of liberal age, even
though it is observed in only one point in time and I am not able to exploit its panel
dimension. Indeed, according to Snowden [2008], no remarkable changes occurred in
the South until the Second World War, despite the introduction of quinine at the turn
of the twentieth century, which somewhat reduced mortality due to malaria, especially
in the North19. Moreover, I believe that mortality rates from malaria do not represent a
proper proxy for the extension of the phenomenon. Indeed, like other parasitic diseases
which are adapted to their hosts, malaria generally is associated to a low case-mortality
ratio. Therefore, while the disease can contaminate a substantial percentage of the
population, the number of deaths directly attributable to malaria endemicity account
for only a small fraction of the overall annual mortality rate. For instance, in Sardinia
before 1920, about 80% of a community suffered from malaria annually, whereas only
at most 7% of deaths resulted from the disease (Brown [1983]).
I use the variable as an excluded instrument in all cross-sectional IV regressions at
different points in time, both for districts and provinces. The first-stage regression is
expressed by the following equation:
LandIneqit = α2 + β2Malariait +X
′
itγ2 + uit (1.2)
where LandIneq is the proxy for landownership concentration, Malaria is the share
of geographic territory covered by malaria, and X is the same vector of covariates
included in the second-stage equation. The identification strategy hinges on the as-
sumption that malaria endemicity affects literacy rates only through the level of land
inequality. Nonetheless, if malaria is capable to influence agricultural productivity and
crop mixes requiring different skills intensities, this would violate the exclusion restric-
tion. Following the same argument, malaria could affect households’ fertility decisions
and variations of child labor in agriculture, keeping children out of school. This latter
phenomenon might even be reinforced by the adoption of crops requiring high levels of
skills and monitoring, inducing households not to invest in the education of their chil-
dren. In light of these considerations, my estimates should be interpreted with caution,
19Malaria was finally eradicated with the introduction of DDT by American troops after 1944. Before
its application between 1945 and 1950, a pattern of the diffusion of malaria endemicity similar to the
one displayed for 1881 has been registered.
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as a violation of the exclusion restriction may still occur. The results are reported in
table 1.5 and in table 1.6 20.
Table 1.5: IV estimates, district-level
District-level 1881 1st stage 1881 1901 1st stage 1901 1921 1st stage 1921
Farm workers -0.4159*** -0.2426*** -0.2210***
0.1414 0.0551 0.058
Agrarian labor force -0.2944*** -0.0926 -0.4963*** -0.3451*** -0.3225*** -0.2493***
0.0519 0.0672 0.0475 0.0753 0.0462 0.0822
Population (log) 0.0286*** 0.0073 0.0162** -0.0265** 0.0097 -0.0051
0.01 0.0082 0.0081 0.0121 0.0073 0.0119
Urbanization rate 0.0252 0.0406 -0.0013 0.1287*** -0.0081 0.0762*
0.0206 0.0311 0.0174 0.0434 0.0216 0.0414
Sharecroppers -0.4097*** -0.7040*** -0.2614*** -0.4314*** -0.1860*** -0.3348***
0.1051 0.0293 0.0341 0.0418 0.0458 0.0584
Landlocked 0.0215** 0.0175 0.0220** 0.01 0.0072 0.0009
0.0101 0.0115 0.009 0.0178 0.0092 0.0179
Latitude 0.0156*** -0.0114** 0.0196*** -0.0209*** 0.0191*** -0.0042
0.0036 0.0045 0.0033 0.0069 0.0039 0.0079
Malaria 1880 0.1303*** 0.2780*** 0.2634***
0.0217 0.0317 0.0371
Departmental dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 205 205 205 205 205 205
adj. R-sq 0.9 0.783 0.943 0.755 0.909 0.574
F 167.7 141 371.1 89.66 287.3 35.3
Notes: 2SLS estimates. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for sepa-
rate cross-sections. First-stage regression is reported for each year. *** Significant at 1%;
** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
The share of the surface covered by malaria is significantly and positively correlated
with the fraction of farm workers both at province- and at a more refined district-level.
The first-stage F-statistic is constantly high, confirming the validity and the power of
the instrument, significantly related to the land ownership structure. Indeed, the values
exceed the threeshold of 10 as a rule of thumb, ranging from a value of 10.01 to 22.52
for the case of provincial estimates and from 35.88 to 76.86 for districts21. Then, the
20See Figures 1.11 and 1.12 in the Appendix, in order to have a visual representation of the residual
variation between land inequality and literacy rates and between malaria and land inequality, conditional
on the baseline controls employed in the empirical analysis.
21Stock and Yoko tests and Sanderson-Windmeijer test confirm that the model is not weakly identi-
fied.
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results confirm the significant negative relationship between the value of landownership
concentration and human capital at the end of the nineteenth century and in the first
years of the twentieth century in Italy. In terms of magnitude, if I increased by 1% the
share of farm workers for the italian districts, I would find a literacy rate 0.41 percentage
points lower in 1881, 0.24 percentage points lower in 1901 and 0.22 percentage points
lower in 1921. In particular, consider the difference between the farm workers share in
the districts of Noto and Lugo in 1881. In Lugo LandIneq = 0.556 (which is at the
25th percentile of the distribution of LandIneq across districts in Italy) and in Noto
LandIneq = 0.8026 (which is at the 75th percentile). Using the estimates in the first
column of table 1.5, this implies that Noto’s literacy rates in 1881 would have been
almost 1% higher if it had a farm workers share as small as Lugo’s. The coefficient
magnitude is high for the provincial regressions too, ranging from 0.356% in 1911 to
about 0.27% in 1921, even though inferior to the case of districts, plausibly due to the
presence of unobserved factors I do not take into account, that make the parameters
downwardly biased22. Overall, the IV coefficients are higher than the OLS coefficients
at all points in time. The magnitude of the bias goes in line with the results obtained
by Cinnirella and Hornung [2016] and Ramcharan [2010]. In fact, the authors find that
IV results are more than three times larger than OLS estimates. The bias toward zero
referred to the OLS results might arise because of several reasons, all summarized by
the presence of unobservables only partially captured by the identification strategy.
As to the other control variables, the share of the total agrarian labor force, cap-
turing opportunities outside agriculture and distinguishing between rural and urban
areas, shows a negative and statistically significant sign, as expected. Interestingly,
the negative relationship between sharecropping activities and human capital remains
robust, although more modest in magnitude with respect to the variable of interest,
unlike in the OLS framework. The macroregional coefficients (not reported for the sake
of brevity) are alternate in significance, with northern areas positively associated with
literacy rates, as well as latitude. Finally, the remaining control variables do not seem
to be particularly related to literacy. Specifically, urbanization rates are not associated
with more education, perhaps because of high levels registered in the South, due to the
presence of the so-called agro-towns, as already mentioned in Section 1.4.
In Section 1.5.4, I also report the same estimates with the inclusion of the industri-
alization index, mortality rates due to malaria, agricultural productivity and the role
22The coefficient referred to 1871 is not statistically significant. See note 16 for a possible explanation.
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of domestic market access. The latter may have favored education expansion thanks
to closeness with markets and a more flourishing trade. Changes in the results are
not significant, confirming the goodness of the model specification and the robustness
of my identification strategy to potential factors invalidating the exclusion restriction
hypothesis. Moreover, I go even further by undertaking two falsification tests: the first
consisting in a reduced form regression of literacy rates on the indicator for malaria,
and the second one allowing for a deviation from the perfect exogeneity assumption.
Before doing so, in the next subsection I exploit the panel dimension of the dataset.
1.5.3 Panel results
Once the panel dimension of the dataset is explored in order to estimate the within-
province and within-district relationship between changes in land inequality and literacy
rates, the results I find are very similar. The advantage I have is twofold: the possi-
bility to take into account all the unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity potentially
correlated with the land ownership structure (fixed effects), and all the time shocks
common to all units of observation that can potentially produce changes in the variable
of interest and then affect education levels (time shocks). Further, I let interact land
inequality with time dummies to account for institutional shocks common to all units,
which could have determined a change in the political power of the landowning elites,
in the vein of a stepwise diff-in-diff approach. The corresponding equation assumes the
following form:
Eduit = αi + δt +
∑
t
βLanditδt +
∑
t
γX ′itδt + υit (1.3)
where Edu are literacy rates (overall and by gender), αi and δt are, respectively, fixed
effects and time shocks, while X ′itδt represent the interaction between baseline controls
and time dummies. My variable of interest is represented by the interaction term
∑
t×
βLanditδt; finally, υit is the error term. I am primarily interested in β’s.
Results are reported in Tables 1.7 and 1.8, both for districts and provinces. As
mentioned above, I opt for a model specification in which all regressors are interacted
with time dummies, in order to account for their marginal effect to change over time (see
Cinnirella and Hornung [2016] and Cappelli [2016]). This is due to the different nature
of my variables: literacy rates follow a constant increasing trend, while the fraction
of farm workers appears to be slowly-changing, only showing remarkable geographical
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Table 1.7: Panel results: district-level
Panel results: district-level
Dep.var.: Literacy Literacy (male) Literacy (female)
Farm workers x 1901 dummy -0.0989*** -0.0239 -0.1658***
0.0355 0.0316 0.0436
Farm workers x 1921 dummy 0.0471 0.1418*** -0.0048
0.0462 0.0422 0.0576
Controls (interaction terms) YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES
Fixed effects YES YES YES
N 615 615 615
adj. R-sq 0.953 0.951 0.942
F 425.5 344.7 379
Notes: Fully-flexible district-level panel estimates. The share of farm workers is inter-
acted with time dummies for the years 1881, 1901 and 1921. The omitted reference year
is 1881. Baseline controls are interacted with time dummies. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.
differences between regions23. The sign of the coefficient referred to land inequality is
negative and statistically significant in 1901 and not different from zero in 1921. As
for the province case, with a longer time series, it begins to be significant in 1891,
reaching a peak in 1901 and then decreasing subsequently. When I consider literacy
by gender, the evidence is more mixed, and somehow inconclusive. In the district
regression, while the impact on female literacy rates seems to follow the same path,
the effect on male literacy rates is surprisingly positive and significant in 1921. On
the contrary, in the province-case I find a negative and statistically significant effect
throughout the considered time span bor both male and female literacy rates, despite
the magnitude of the two coefficients becoming smaller over time. Overall, a comparison
of the coefficients for the interaction terms indicates that districts and provinces exhibit
a change over time in the relationship between landownership concentration and literacy,
with the former becoming less and less influential, probably due to a weakening of the
political power of local notables.
23For a visual representation of the trends in the main variables, see graph 1.10 in the Appendix.
1.5. Empirical strategy 41
Table 1.8: Panel results: province-level
Panel results: province-level
Dep.var.: Literacy Literacy (male) Literacy (female)
Farm workers x 1881 dummy -0.0648 -0.0473 -0.0874
0.0433 0.0358 0.053
Farm workers x 1891 dummy -0.1559*** -0.1025*** -0.2123***
0.0428 0.0377 0.0519
Farm workers x 1901 dummy -0.2223*** -0.1355*** -0.3092***
0.0554 0.0468 0.0694
Farm workers x 1911 dummy -0.1937*** -0.0731 -0.3136***
0.0574 0.0496 0.0717
Farm workers x 1921 dummy -0.1317* -0.0327 -0.2305**
0.0784 0.0682 0.0934
Controls (interaction terms) YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES
Fixed effects YES YES YES
N 414 414 414
adj. R-sq 0.972 0.977 0.962
F 187.4 246.7 158.4
Notes: Fully-flexible district-level panel estimates. The share of farm workers is inter-
acted with time dummies for the years 1881, 1901 and 1921. The omitted reference year
is 1871. Baseline controls are interacted with time dummies. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.
Similar results go in line with the “passive modernization process” Italy was expe-
riencing at that time, with the imposition of a bunch of top-down public policies that,
along with small changes in the land ownership structure, may have reduced its impact
on education through time. If my conjecture is correct, the reforms of the end of the
nineteenth century and of the beginning of the twentieth century changed to some ex-
tent the relationship between the landed nobility and the peasantry, and their incentives
to invest in education. Indeed, the process of democratization and the achievement of
political equality in Western European countries during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century was generally followed by rapid public policy changes. Lindert [2004]
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defined it as “the 1880-1930 laboratory”, and documents the historical proximity be-
tween franchise extension and public provision of education, increased spending in social
transfers, labour market reforms and creation of income tax systems. Post-Unification
Italy is part of this laboratory, as local governments were in charge of providing many
pro-growth public goods, including education and healthcare, and their decisions were
likely to have determined long-lasting regional variation in income per capita. The
Daneo-Credaro bill, enacted in 1911, is only one example of similar top-down policies.
Another fundamental structural break is the piecemeal enfranchisement process expe-
rienced in Italy at different stages, with the stepwise enlargement of the franchise for
male people as late as 1919. As said, all these institutional shocks might have weakened
the political power of landowning elites, thus limiting their ability to intervene in public
choice in later stages of development. In this case, it is reasonable to expect such a
variable to have had lesser explanatory power as regards human capital accumulation.
1.5.4 Robustness checks
Additional controls
In this Section, I address the problem of potential time-varying confounding factors
that can bias previous results. By doing so, I carry out some robustness checks of
the IV baseline specification including some additional controls that can affect literacy
rates through their interaction with landownership concentration, again proxied by the
fraction of farm workers over the total labor force in agriculture. The results are reported
in Table 1.9 at provincial level24. For simplicity, I only report regressions for 1901,
as all variables are available at this point in time and a comparison among different
specifications is possible.
24Unfortunately, I do not have at my disposal these controls at district-level for each point in time.
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Table 1.9: Robustness checks, 1901
Representative year 1901
Robustness checks 1901 1901 1901 1901
Farm workers -0.3263*** -0.2897*** -0.2908*** -0.2958***
0.0936 0.0766 0.0828 0.0814
Agrarian labor force -0.4031*** -0.4010*** -0.3571*** -0.3868***
0.0750 0.0707 0.0983 0.0776
Population (log) 0.0017 0.0018 -0.0011 0.0021
0.0101 0.0106 0.0107 0.0101
Sharecroppers -0.2945*** -0.2851*** -0.2907*** -0.2886***
0.0491 0.0455 0.0472 0.0470
Urbanization rate 0.0813* 0.0547 0.0653* 0.0716*
0.0415 0.0374 0.0335 0.0366
Landlocked 0.0420*** 0.0382*** 0.0395** 0.0396**
0.0154 0.0142 0.0149 0.0149
Latitude 0.0120** 0.0165*** 0.0114** 0.0133**
0.0056 0.0052 0.0052 0.0055
Mortality rate 0.0006
due to malaria 0.0005
Agricultural productivity 0.0003
(Federico) 0.0003
Industrialization index 0.0231
(Ciccarelli Fenoaltea) 0.0233
Domestic market potential 0.0000
(Missiaia) 0.0000
Departmental dummies YES YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES
N 69 69 69 69
adj. R-sq 0.946 0.949 0.948 0.948
F 145.9 146.2 149.1 149.1
Notes: 2SLS estimates. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for sepa-
rate cross-sections. ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.
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In the first column, I add mortality rates due to malaria, coming from “Statistica
delle cause di morte” in 1900, the first year in which this information is available.
According to Malaney et al. [2004], in areas characterized by high levels of malaria
endemicity, its mortality burden generally falls most heavily on children less than five
years of age. In such an environment, women devote most of their time and productive
life to child-rearing activities. Not only does this exclude them from the active labor
force, but more often it even discourages incentives to invest in human capital because
such an investment is less likely to produce economic returns in the future. Such a cost
is particularly substantial when relatively few of the children a household has invested in
survive and progress through adolescence to adulthood. Nonetheless, including mortal-
ity rates due to malaria does not affect the results, revealing that differences in children
mortality caused by malaria morbidity were not relevant in explaining literacy rates.
Further concerns regarding the exclusion restriction are addressed in column 2, by
including a regional measure of labor productivity in agriculture, in order to control
for heterogeneity in agricultural productivity25. Indeed, the presence of malaria can
undermine land suitability, ultimately affecting crop mixes and the adopted agrarian
regimes. The magnitude and significance of the coefficients are very similar to the
estimates for 1901 in the IV baseline specification26.
Moreover, a shift from an agricultural to an industrial economy, creating a suitable
environment for commerce and trade, might cause heterogeneity in the incentives to
invest in education. Then, I include a provincial industrialization index in column 3,
coming from the work by Ciccarelli and Fenoaltea [2010]. In fact, high industrialized
areas, coinciding with the provinces of the so-called “industrial triangle”, are plausibly
negatively associated with high land inequality levels, potentially capturing its effect on
literacy rates. Nevertheless, once again, the coefficient of the variable of interest retains
its significance and remains almost unaltered.
The same holds true once I add a measure of regional market access, coming from
Missiaia [2016], to account for heterogeneity in opportunities to trade which require
greater literacy skills. In her work, the author argues that only domestic market po-
tential, representing the home market, shows a traditional North-South divide, whereas
25The regional measure of agricultural productivity is borrowed by Federico et al. [2007]. They com-
pute it by dividing gross saleable production over total labor force engaged in agriculture. Unfortunately,
values of agricultural productivity are not available at provincial or district-level.
26In an alternative specification (not reported for the sake of brevity), I also gathered information for
provincial per-hectare yields for wheat and corn in 1871. Including crop yields to account for differences
in agricultural productivity produces similar results.
1.5. Empirical strategy 45
once international markets are introduced, the South does not show remarkable dispar-
ities with the rest of the country. Therefore, I only use her proxy for domestic market
potential, by adding it within the set of covariates. The estimates presented in column
4 with its inclusion reveal that the magnitude and significance of the main coefficient
are virtually unchanged.
In sum, results from IV specifications provide evidence that areas with a high pres-
ence of farm workers, proxying a more concentrated land ownership structure, present
low levels of literacy rates in Post-Unification Italy. Moreover, this empirical evidence
seems to be robust to the inclusion of different controls and to a different set of obser-
vations (districts and provinces). Nonetheless, other omitted time-varying factors I do
not observe may still violate the exclusion restriction hypothesis. Indeed, the effects of
malaria on school attendance and performance may affect even more directly human
capital accumulation. Bleakley [2010] finds a positive effect of eradication campaigns
in terms of income and an increase in years of schooling, whereas Cutler et al. [2010]
find support of a mixed but indicative effect only for female education, with no im-
pact on male income and education values27. Substantial dropout rates are generated
by high rates of school absenteeism, which are the result of the diffusion of the dis-
ease. Furthermore, a new and increasing brunch of research also points toward ways in
which malaria can permanently affect cognitive performance of children (see Al Serouri
et al. [2000], Holding and Snow [2001]). According to these studies, parasitemic chil-
dren, for instance, score lower grades on certain tests than do non-parasitemic children.
The long-term cognitive performance of a child may also be inhibited by its previous
in-utero experience during the pregnancy of the malaria-infected mother (McCormick
et al. [1992]).
Therefore, for all these reasons, I cannot conclude by arguing that the impact of land
inequality on literacy is perfectly causal, as potentially unexplored factors violating
the exclusion restriction hypothesis could still be at stake. Nonetheless, in the sext
subsection I run some falsification tests in order to test the validity of my assumption.
27A further attempt to evaluate the direct role of malaria on human capital is the work by Kere et al.
[1993], who estimated the lost of educational investment expenditures as a result of lost school days
in Solomon Islands. With reference to the consequences of malaria eradication on education outcomes,
Percoco [2013]provides further estimates at regional level in Post-War Italy, finding a positive effect.
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Validating the instrument: falsification tests
As is common in an IV framework, although it is easy to assess whether an instrument
is relevant, less obvious is the satisfaction of the exclusion restriction hypothesis. I try
to provide the reader with some insight of the validity of my instrument, by undertaking
a number of falsification tests.
The first is to run a reduced form regression of the literacy rates, the main outcome
variable employed in the empirical analysis, on my instrument, i.e. the indicator for the
presence of malaria in a territory28. Results are reported in table 1.10. Not surprisingly,
the presence of malaria has a negative and statistically significant correlation with lit-
eracy rates in 1881. To verify that the effect is not spurious, I replicate the exercise by
running other two regressions, dividing the sample in two subsamples with high and low
values of the farm workers over total labor force in agriculture. Specifically, I consider
the median of the variable of interest as the threshold value, which is 0.695 in 1881.
Then, I run two regressions, one with values of the share of farm workers below 0.695,
and another one with levels above the chosen cutoff value. In the former case, I find
that the correlation between malaria and literacy rates is negative but not significantly
different from zero. By contrast, the regression conducted over the subsample with high
values of farm workers shows a negative and statistically significant correlation between
the indicator of the presence of malaria and literacy rates. Moreover, the magnitude of
the effect almost reaches the one shown for the whole sample (-0.04 against -0.005), this
meaning that the significant correlation displayed in the baseline case is mainly driven
by districts exhibiting a substantial landownership concentration. In other words, when
the conditions for latifundia creation are not met, the presence of malaria is not a
sufficient condition to have lower human capital levels.
The second and most reliable falsification test comes from the relaxation of the
assumption that my instrument is strictly exogenous. As widely argued, several con-
cerns can be raised on the validity and the strictly exogenous nature of my instrument.
Hence, I relax the hypothesis that the presence of malaria is not correlated with other
unobservables influencing literacy rates, that is, I argue that malaria is plausibly exoge-
nous. Such a definition comes from the work by Conley et al. [2012], who present a
simple and tractable test of conducting inference that is consistent with the hypothesis
that the exclusion restriction does not hold exactly. Specifically, the authors assume
28For the sake of exposition, I only report the regression for the year 1881 at district-level, as it is
possible to evaluate the contemporaneous correlation between malaria and literacy rates.
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Table 1.10: Reduced form relationship between literacy rates and
malaria indicator for high and low levels of land inequality (1881)
Validating the instrument Reduced form Reduced form with Reduced form with
Dep.var.: literacy low land inequality high land inequality
Malaria 1880 -0.0542*** -0.0070 -0.0436**
0.0192 0.0498 0.0171
Population (log) 0.0256** 0.0208* 0.0243
0.0103 0.0114 0.0159
Urbanization rate 0.0083 -0.0032 0.0305
0.0216 0.0346 0.0284
Sharecroppers -0.1169*** -0.1282*** -0.0929
0.0371 0.0349 0.1818
Landlocked 0.0142 0.0363** -0.0076
0.0101 0.0150 0.0123
Latitude 0.0203*** 0.0416*** 0.0171***
0.0030 0.0091 0.0038
Agrarian labor force -0.2559*** -0.3086*** -0.2076***
0.0575 0.0746 0.0786
Departmental dummies YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES
N 205 102 103
adj. R-sq 0.893 0.884 0.904
F 161.4 91.42 85.09
Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***Sig-
nificant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.
that the instrument enters linearly the second-stage regression as a further control, and
that it has a direct effect on the outcome variable. Hence, the associated coefficient,
which is the parameter on which they make inference, is allowed to have a non-zero
value, in contradiction with the exclusion restriction hypothesis. Based on two distinct
approaches, the union-of-confidence intervals (henceforth, UCI), and the local-to-zero
approach (Henceforth LTZ), they make prior assumptions on the true value of such a
parameter, that I will call γ. In the first case, the support for γ is restricted to be an
interval between two values, whereas in the second case further hypotheses are advanced
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with respect to its distribution function29.
Obviously, priors over γ centered at 0 may be inappropriate in this case, as the
related literature suggests a negative effect of malaria on education. Further, the es-
timates of the reduced-form relationship between the presence of malaria and literacy
rates where the percentage of farm workers is low provide consistent estimates of γ30.
The results displayed in Figure 1.8 evidence that there is still a significant effect of
landownership concentration on literacy rates, even allowing for plausible amounts of
imperfect exogeneity. In the UCI approach (left-side), if I allow for γ to be negative
and ranging from -0.01 to 0, the corresponding confidence set for β is approximately
[−0.6931;−0.0661], and remains negative at each value in the support of γ. As for the
LTZ approach, we can clearly see that as soon as I let the direct effect to be greater
than -0.01, the bounds of the confidence intervals for β go across 0, in line with the
estimated value of -0.007 found in the reduced form regression, with low levels of land
inequality. This means that priors consistent with beliefs above this threshold value
are sufficient to lose confidence in the finding of a significantly negative effect of land
inequality on education. By contrast, below this prior belief for γ, I find evidence that
β still represents an economically important impact.
1.6 Mechanism of transmission: supply vs demand
Literacy rates represent a so-called equilibrium measure of human capital. Although I
found a negative and statistically significant relationship with the share of farm work-
ers, here proxying the level of land inequality, I do not know whether this impact runs
through either a demand or a supply channel. On the one hand, an unequal landown-
ership structure implies a more concentrated economic and political power in the hands
of few large landowners. This is particularly interesting for my purpose, since local
notables, who took over municipal councils, had the power to influence the decisions to
invest in mass schooling (certainly until 1911) and prevent the majority of population
from gaining power. On the other hand, a high fraction of annual and daily workers
in agriculture, a social class owing few economic resources and facing a binding budget
29For a broader and more detailed discussion, see Conley et al. [2012].
30Generally, the reduced-form captures both the effect of β and γ. But if we are confident that β
is zero, then it captures only the effect of γ. In this context, reliable values for γ are provided in the
reduced-form with low levels of land inequality, that is, when β is almost-zero.
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Figure 1.8: Plausibly exogenous test: 95% interval estimates
Notes: The figure presents 95% confidence intervals for the effect of farm workers
(share over total labor force in agriculture) on literacy rates in 1881, at district-level. The
definition of γ differs between the support-only intervals (UCI, left side) and the interval
that uses the full prior (LTZ, right side). In the first approach, I let γ to assume a range
of values between -0.01 and 0, while in the LTZ approach, I impose a normal distribution
with mean equal to -0.025 and variance 0.00001.
constraint, had lower incentives to invest in human capital, given its low payoff and
their uncertain long-term returns.
As discussed in Section 1.1, Galor et al. [2009] assert that human capital is comple-
mentary to industry-related tasks, mostly widespread in urban and industrialized areas,
whereas rural labor force is not required to possess literacy skills. Thus, large landown-
ers’ stake was to reduce and possibly oppose human capital-enhancing institutions, in
order to limit migration and maintain agricultural wages low. By contrast, capitalists
were in favour to support institutions promoting education. Since landed nobility in ru-
ral areas was liable for the construction of schooling infrastructures, the appointment of
school teachers and the management of municipal fiscal resources, I employ these inter-
mediate outputs proxying the supply of schooling in order to test whether landowning
elites were able to block expanding the provision of education where they had a greater
political power. Specifically, I exploit information on the child-teacher ratio, school
density, and municipal expenditures per capita aggregated at provincial level.
In addition, I gather information on enrolment rates and child labor, in order to
assess the role of rural households’ demand for education. Since I only observe this
information in 1881, I can barely run IV regressions, without the possibility to exploit
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the panel dimension of the dataset. Furthermore, information at a more detailed district-
level are only available for child labor, while enrolment rates are uniquely observed at
provincial level31.
The baseline specification reports IV estimates, employing malaria as an excluded
instrument and including the set of baseline controls32. Despite the fact that these vari-
ables aim to proxy supply and demand factors, they are somehow endogenous. In fact,
a larger number of teachers appointed to school and a higher level of school density may
induce children to attend school. Conversely, higher enrolment rates, capturing children
demand to go to school, may boost the supply of schooling. The same argument ap-
plies to municipal expenditures per capita, which may be greater where the demand for
education is higher. Nonetheless, assessing the impact of inequality on these schooling
outputs remains highly informative per se`.
The results are reported in tables 1.11, 1.12, 1.13 and 1.15. I find a positive and
statistically significant association between the level of land inequality and the ratio
between children and teachers. This suggests that where landownership was more con-
centrated, the number of teachers appointed to schools was lower, perhaps as a result of
a minor effort to expand education. More importantly, the significance does not vanish
over time, meaning that the positive correlation is robust to changes occurred in the
considered time span. When I deal with school density, I find a negative association,
though not statistically significant33. This means that disparities in the construction
of schoolhouses between areas with greater and lower levels of landownership concen-
tration had been almost non-existent as late as the rise of the Fascist party. The effort
spent to build them up appears to be the same across Italy’s municipalities34. Again,
when it comes to investigate the relationship between my measure of inequality and the
value of municipal expenditures per capita in every province at each point in time, I
find no evidence of a systematic significant correlation35.
The sufficient cross-sectional and time variation allow me to conduct panel estimates
for all the three variables. Although I am not allowed to consider the presence of malaria
31For further information about the definition and measurement of the variables referred to the
supply and demand of schooling, see Table 1.17, in the Appendix.
32I use the same specification as in table 1.5.
33I do not have available data referred to school density in 1871 and in 1921.
34Nevertheless, further concerns may be risen if the role of road infrastructures is taken into consid-
eration. Indeed, following this argument, in the most disadvantaged and montainous areas they may
have prevented a greater part of the population from easily reaching schoolhouses.
35I do not have available data referred to municipal expenditures referred to 1921.
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Table 1.11: Mechanism of transmission: child-teacher ratio
Panel A
Dep.var.: child-teacher ratio 1871 1881 1891 1901 1911 1921
Farm workers 0.442 0.5097* 0.3128** 0.2259* 0.2947** 0.1567**
0.3659 0.2584 0.1556 0.1173 0.1413 0.0736
Agrarian labor force 0.3796 0.3630* 0.2706 0.2446 0.2097 0.1554*
0.3732 0.2154 0.1928 0.1485 0.1532 0.0906
Population (log) -0.0581** -0.0477*** -0.0323*** -0.0285** -0.0233** -0.0206**
0.0258 0.0152 0.0117 0.0121 0.011 0.0094
Urbanization rate 0.2055 0.1998* 0.1109 0.0565 0.0456 0.0539
0.1987 0.1191 0.1055 0.0888 0.0919 0.0578
Sharecroppers 0.3206 0.4506** 0.2379** 0.1593** 0.2531** 0.0702
0.2406 0.2012 0.1023 0.0762 0.1085 0.0691
Landlocked -0.0097 -0.0168 -0.0112 -0.0103 -0.0087 0.0057
0.0338 0.0215 0.0197 0.0219 0.0227 0.0197
Latitude -0.0349 -0.0118 -0.0006 0.0028 0.008 0.0018
0.0237 0.0123 0.0114 0.0116 0.011 0.0067
Departmental dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 68 69 69 69 69 69
adj. R-sq 0.341 0.304 0.177 0.177 0.015 0.062
F 6.155 4.968 4.251 4.277 2.86 2.204
Notes: 2SLS estimates. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for sepa-
rate cross-sections. *** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
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Table 1.12: Mechanism of transmission: school density
Panel B
Dep.var: school density 1881 1891 1901 1911
Farm workers -0.0066 -0.0053 -0.004 -0.0021
0.0078 0.0065 0.0049 0.0052
Agrarian labor force -0.0127* -0.0132 -0.0103 -0.0097*
0.0072 0.0086 0.0063 0.0054
Population (log) 0.0003 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004
0.0007 0.0006 0.0005 0.0006
Urbanization rate 0.0057*** 0.0048** 0.0056** 0.0054*
0.0021 0.0021 0.0024 0.0028
Sharecroppers -0.0047 -0.0017 -0.0004 -0.0002
0.005 0.0031 0.0022 0.0032
Landlocked 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
Latitude 0.0007** 0.0006* 0.0005 0.0007**
0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004
Departmental dummies YES YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES
N 69 69 69 69
adj. R-sq 0.353 0.283 0.301 0.306
F 4.361 5.233 5.969 3.507
Notes: 2SLS estimates. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for sepa-
rate cross-sections. *** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
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Table 1.13: Mechanism of transmission: municipal expenditures
Panel C
Dep.var.: municipal exp. (p.c.) 1871 1881 1891 1901 1911
Farm workers -2.0457* -0.2416 -0.1125 0.0216 -1.945
1.1072 0.8706 0.7788 0.8669 4.1235
Agrarian labor force -2.3869** -0.0108 -0.4249 -0.6882 1.1905
0.9633 0.6661 0.6479 0.5729 3.4919
Population (log) -0.0788 -0.0822 0.0036 0.0869 -0.1026
0.1163 0.0842 0.0981 0.1386 0.6679
Urbanization rate 0.0126 0.7303** 0.8521** 0.9879*** 2.8745
0.4569 0.3417 0.3314 0.3547 1.7959
Sharecroppers -0.8741 -0.7895 -0.8071 -0.8035 -4.4107
0.7962 0.6906 0.5461 0.5594 2.6667
Landlocked -0.0947 0.0998 0.011 -0.0783 -0.0902
0.1026 0.0766 0.0763 0.102 0.3674
Latitude 0.0077 0.0192 0.0309 0.0461 0.0087
0.0389 0.0233 0.0298 0.0499 0.1466
Departmental dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES YES
N 69 69 69 69 69
adj. R-sq 0.23 0.572 0.658 0.632 0.113
F 6.989 15.53 17.95 13.76 3.466
Notes: 2SLS estimates. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for sepa-
rate cross-sections. *** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
54
Chapter 1. Landownership concentration and human capital accumulation in
Post-Unification Italy (1871-1921)
Table 1.14: Mechanism of transmission: panel estimates
Mechanism of transmission: panel
Dep. var.: Child-teacher Municipal expenses p.c. School density
Farm workers x 1881 dummy -0.1693*** 0.9177
0.0610 0.6797
Farm workers x 1891 dummy -0.2916*** 0.9883 -0.0002
0.0655 0.8289 0.0010
Farm workers x 1901 dummy -0.2778*** 0.1431 -0.0007
0.0636 0.8913 0.0010
Farm workers x 1911 dummy -0.3224*** -1.8672 -0.0001
0.0663 1.6828 0.0010
Farm workers x 1921 dummy -0.3556***
0.0759
Controls (interaction terms) YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES
Fixed effects YES YES YES
N 413 345 276
adj. R-sq 0.588 0.679 0.483
F 11.55 45.58 11.13
Notes: Fully-flexible district-level panel estimates. The share of farm workers is inter-
acted with time dummies for the years 1881, 1901 and 1921. The omitted reference year
is 1871. Baseline controls are interacted with time dummies. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.
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as exogenous instrument due to its lack of time variation, it is possible to account
for unobserved provincial heterogeneity (fixed effects) and the presence of temporal
shocks common to all provinces (time dummies). Further, I employ the same model
specification as in table 1.8, with all regressors interacted with time dummies, in the
vein of the already employed stepwise diff-in-diff estimation.
The results are reported in table 1.14. In the first column, they show a negative and
statistically significant effect of farm workers on the child-teacher ratio. In addition,
the impact displays an increasing trend in magnitude, ranging from -0.17 in 1881 to a
value of -0.35 in 1921. At a first glance, the economic interpretation of such a result
appears surprising and to some extent counterintuitive. This means that the effect
of changes common to all the observations, potentially inducing an alteration in land
inequality, is stronger in the provinces presenting a higher percentage of farm workers.
Besides, its magnitude is even reinforced moving forward in time, thereby suggesting
a remarkable and increasing role of the supply process in expanding public schooling.
By contrast, columns 2 and 3 display results using municipal expenditures per capita
and school density as outcome variables, showing a non statistically significant impact
of the interaction between farm workers and time shocks. While in the latter cases the
findings corroborate the results already shown in the IV specification, in the specification
with the child-teacher ratio as outcome variable they are somehow in contrast to what
previously found. Further research is needed in order to find out more on which supply
factors mattered most in the transmission of the effect, if anything.
As said, while measures for outcome-based supply factors of schooling are available at
different points in time for all the provinces, data for enrolment rates are only available
for 1881. They are constructed by dividing people enrolled in primary schools over the
total population aged between six and fifteen. In addition, it is possible to disentangle
the variable by gender. Although the existence of a high level of correlation with
literacy rates, enrolment rates should capture more accurately decisions to attend school,
and then the demand for education. Indeed, while literacy skills are referred to the
population as a whole, people enrolled in primary schools are prevalently children, thus
only representing a population cohort. Therefore, at a first glance, they should mirror
the decisions of the families to invest in their children’s education. For the same reason,
literacy endowment of a specific territory may represent the result of private agents’
decisions undertaken years, or even decades before.
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Table 1.15: Mechanism of transmission: enrollment rates
Panel D (1881)
Dep. var.: enrolment rates enrolment rates M enrolment rates F
Farm workers -0.7531** -0.6304** -0.8771**
0.3145 0.3048 0.3503
Agrarian labor force -0.2651 -0.2347 -0.2971
0.1697 0.1720 0.1812
Population (log) 0.0169 0.0068 0.0263
0.0194 0.0207 0.0215
Urbanization rate -0.1747** -0.1114 -0.2361***
0.0696 0.0721 0.0788
Sharecroppers -0.6893*** -0.6171*** -0.7646***
0.2196 0.2118 0.2467
Landlocked 0.0429 0.0476* 0.0386
0.0273 0.0252 0.0318
Latitude 0.0153* 0.0146* 0.0161
0.0089 0.0084 0.0100
Departmental dummies YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES
N 69 69 69
adj. R-sq 0.826 0.813 0.810
F 43.85 35.38 43.17
Notes: 2SLS estimates. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for sepa-
rate cross-sections. *** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
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Unlike estimates with school density and municipal expenses as outcomes, land in-
equality negatively affects enrolment rates for every specification (overall and by gender).
Moreover, the magnitude of the effect is stronger than the one on the outcome-based
variables proxying supply of schooling. For instance, with respect to the regression
with the child-techer ratio as outcome variable for the same year (table 1.11, column
2), the coefficient is 1.5 times higher. Unfortunately, differently from the case of the
child-teacher ratio, here we cannot investigate the robustness of the correlation between
the two phenomena by evaluating whether the effect vanishes over time.
Nevertheless, most often, the number of children enrolled at school does not coincide
with the true proportion of children attending school. Absenteeism rates were high in
depressed areas and law enforcement was not guaranteed. Since attendance rates are
not observed for the period under analysis, I collected data at district-level on child
labor in 1881 by gender, in order to proxy for the decision of families to send their
children to work36. Indeed, child labor is the alternative to education. Doepke and
Zilibotti [2005] propose a theoretical approach in which unskilled workers compete with
children in the labor market, facing a tradeoff. On the one hand, unskilled workers
support child labor regulations with the aim to raise their own wages. On the other
hand, they oppose it when their own working children provide a large fraction of family
income. Historically, it has been observed a preference for child labor regulations where
the industrialization process already occurred, due to an increasing return to educa-
tion. Hence, I expect a higher proportion of child labor to be associated with greater
landownership concentration.
Table 1.16 reports the results using agrarian child labor as the main outcome vari-
able, overall and divided by gender. When I do not distinguish by gender, regression
outputs do not show any significant result. The positive and statistically significant im-
pact is found once I account only for male child labor. This goes in line with the fact that
only boys were completely devoted to working the land, albeit sometimes girls’ involve-
ment in agricultural tasks was likely to take place (see Tapia and de Miguel Salanova
[January 2019]).
Finally, literacy rates are referred to the whole population aged more than six,
thereby including people who could have acquired such a skill years before. In this
36Population Census in 1881 reports data on children performing all work duties. Nevertheless, I
collect data only on children engaged in agricultural tasks, because of the fact that the total child labor
coincides with the whole population aged between 9 and 15. Hence, it is not possible to distinguish
between children enrolled in primary school and children involved in work duties outside agriculture.
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case, the contemporaneous correlation with land inequality would say nothing about
the presence of literate within a district or a province. For this reason, I move one step
forward, by taking into account only people aged between 15 and 19 who have acquired
literacy skills. In this case, the pattern of literate should represent the contemporaneous
result of the decisions of households to invest in education, alternative to their decision
to send their children to work. Following a similar argument, I expect land inequality to
be negatively correlated with literacy rates computed for people aged between 15 and
19, as opposed to what I found for the agrarian child labor. Hence, I run regressions
using this variable at provincial level as main outcome variable, finding a negative and
significant effect of land inequality. Moreover, the results are robust to a different
model specification (OLS, IV and panel regressions) and to different considered points
in time37. In the panel regression, employing the usual stepwise diff-in-diff approach, it
can be easily noticed how the effect of landownership concentration vanishes over time,
along with its significance, in line with the modernization process of Italy.
Therefore, although these results do not sweep away the role of supply of mass
schooling and of decisions of landowning elites in promoting it, they show evidence of
the existence of other factors explaining the negative relationship between landowner-
ship concentration and education. These demand-based incentives may be linked to
opportunities outside agriculture, to which payoff of literacy skills are attached, as well
as to binding budget constraints of the rural population during this stage of develop-
ment. Further research would enhance knowledge on the proper definition of such a
mechanism.
1.7 Conclusions
Relying on an adequate proxy of land inequality in Post-Unification Italy, a uniquely as-
sembled database both at district- and province-level offers the possibility to investigate
whether and how landownership concentration affected literacy rates. I find that areas
that exhibit higher levels of landownership concentration show systematically lower liter-
acy rates throughout the period under analysis. Once the panel dimension of the dataset
is explored, the magnitude and the significance of the effect decrease over time, in line
with the “passive modernization process” hypothesis. Concerns referred to the omitted
37The results are reported in the appendix, tables 1.18, 1.19 and 1.20.
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Table 1.16: Mechanism of transmission: child labor
Panel E (1881)
Dep.var.: Agrarian child labor M Agrarian child labor F Agrarian child labor
Farm workers 0.3375** -0.0603 0.1506
0.1312 0.1063 0.0921
Agrarian labor force 0.5235*** 0.7096*** 0.6146***
0.0478 0.0463 0.0336
Population (log) 0.0093 0.0154** 0.0117**
0.0089 0.0064 0.0059
Urbanization rate -0.0215 -0.0097 -0.0163
0.0246 0.022 0.0161
Sharecroppers 0.3294*** -0.1500* 0.0998
0.1026 0.0861 0.0735
Landlocked -0.0301*** -0.0234*** -0.0273***
0.011 0.0087 0.0077
Latitude -0.0026 0.0056 0.0015
0.0044 0.0038 0.003
Departmental dummies YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES
N 205 205 205
adj. R-sq 0.404 0.712 0.695
F 17.28 61.49 52.07
Notes: 2SLS estimates. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for sepa-
rate cross-sections. *** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
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variables and reverse causality are addressed by adopting an instrumental variable ap-
proach based on the presence of malaria morbidity. Under the strong assumption that
malaria is exogenously determined, IV estimates corroborate OLS results, confirming
a negative relationship between landownership concentration and literacy. Moreover,
the results seem to be particularly robust to the inclusion of further controls, whose
omission might have violated the exclusion restriction hypothesis, and to a different size
of the sample (districts and provinces). Further, some falsification tests confirm the
hypothesis of the causality of the impact.
Another important result is obtained when analyzing the mechanism of transmission
of the effect. Although it is difficult to distinguish between supply and demand factors,
land inequality may have adversely affected literacy rates not only by influencing the
supply of schooling through the political process, but also through the private demand
for education. Results employing several outcome-based measures of intermediate out-
puts of schooling supply and enrollment rates in primary schooling confirm this conjec-
ture, showing that demand factors played an even major role in determining disparities
in human capital accumulation. The results are confirmed once data on child labor in
1881 and literacy rates for people aged between 15 and 19 are employed in the empirical
specification, showing that rural households preferred utilising the workforce of their
children to perform work duties, rather than sending them to school. Thus, where land
ownership was highly concentrated, the economic situation of the vast majority of rural
population was extremely precarious and incentives to invest in education were beyond
the binding budget constraints of large segments of the population. Furthermore, the
opportunities to acquire literacy skills were limited because the possibilities of upward
mobility were almost non-existent.
Therefore, although other explanations are not discarded, the findings of this work
shed new light on the mechanism through which land inequality shapes different human
capital accumulation paths, highlighting the role of malaria in creating and maintaining
latifundia in the first place.
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Figure 1.9: Correlation between the residual predicted values of the share of farm workers and the
Gini index for land inequality in 1930, after controlling for macroregional dummies and the percentage
of sharecroppers. Bolzano, Trieste, Trento and Gorizia are not included within the sample, consistently
with the sample size in liberal age. The sample does not even count the other three outliers: Sondrio,
Aosta and Belluno.
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Figure 1.10: Literacy rate by gender and by macroregion, and share of farm workers over total labor
force in agriculture (trend for the period 1861-1921)
Figure 1.11: Each dot indicates a district in the sample. The y-axis in the three panels plots the
residual variation in literacy rates in 1881 (left panel), 1901 (middle panel) and 1921 (right panel),
after controlling for the baseline controls and the excluded instrument employed in the empirical
analysis (see Tables 5 and 6). The x-axis plots the residual variation in land inequality, proxied by
the fraction of farm workers over the total agrarian labor force, conditional on the baseline controls
and the excluded instrument.
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Figure 1.12: Each dot indicates a district in the sample. The y-axis in the three panels plots the
residual variation in land inequality, proxied by the fraction of farm workers over the total agrarian
labor force in 1881 (left panel), 1901 (middle panel) and 1921 (right panel), after controlling for the
baseline controls employed in the empirical analysis (see Tables 5 and 6). The x-axis plots the residual
variation in the presence of malaria, conditional on the baseline controls.
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Table 1.18: Literacy and farm workers, OLS (province-level)
Literacy 15-19: OLS 1871 1881 1891 1901 1911
Farm workers -0.2223*** -0.5288*** -0.4635*** -0.3158*** -0.2691***
0.0810 0.1183 0.0867 0.0571 0.0615
Agrarian labor force -0.1854 -0.2663** -0.4536*** -0.4423*** -0.3970***
0.1425 0.1168 0.0992 0.0921 0.1025
Population (log) 0.0115 0.0236 0.0131 0.0101 0.0014
0.0180 0.0187 0.0132 0.0123 0.0120
Urbanization rate 0.1715** 0.1133 0.0633 0.0575 0.0482
0.0672 0.0730 0.0529 0.0500 0.0553
Sharecroppers -0.2679*** -0.5650*** -0.4816*** -0.3892*** -0.3617***
0.0618 0.0945 0.0628 0.0494 0.0650
Landlocked 0.0515** 0.0527** 0.0547*** 0.0584*** 0.0580***
0.0212 0.0214 0.0191 0.0192 0.0213
Latitude 0.0203*** 0.0175*** 0.0190*** 0.0239*** 0.0237***
0.0064 0.0064 0.0050 0.0052 0.0076
Departmental dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES YES
N 69 69 69 69 69
adj. R-sq 0.908 0.921 0.947 0.949 0.910
F 92.11 140.8 159.7 169.7 106.1
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for separate cross-sections. ***Significant at 1%; **sig-
nificant at 5%; *significant at 10%.
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Table 1.19: Literacy and farm workers, IV (province-level)
Literacy 15-19: IV 1871 1881 1891 1901 1911
Farm workers -0.4933** -0.7945*** -0.5881*** -0.4524*** -0.5132***
0.2045 0.2455 0.1591 0.1232 0.1807
Agrarian labor force -0.3339** -0.3592*** -0.5106*** -0.4901*** -0.4458***
0.1396 0.1257 0.1053 0.0948 0.1158
Population (log) 0.0149 0.0285 0.0137 0.0091 0.0038
0.0198 0.0194 0.0128 0.0114 0.0130
Urbanization rate 0.1146 0.0847 0.0519 0.0593 0.0386
0.0728 0.0740 0.0509 0.0497 0.0637
Sharecroppers -0.4407*** -0.7530*** -0.5519*** -0.4533*** -0.5075***
0.1477 0.1856 0.0988 0.0748 0.1229
Landlocked 0.0488* 0.0550** 0.0554*** 0.0591*** 0.0564**
0.0258 0.0225 0.0197 0.0203 0.0222
Latitude 0.0159** 0.0133* 0.0154** 0.0176** 0.0147
0.0079 0.0078 0.0067 0.0082 0.0099
Departmental dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES YES
N 69 69 69 69 69
adj. R-sq 0.888 0.914 0.944 0.944 0.894
F 74.57 84.31 132.8 162.9 81.73
Notes: 2SLS estimates. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for separate cross-sections. *** Significant
at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
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Table 1.20: Literacy 15-19 and farm workers, panel (province-level)
Mechanism of transmission: panel
Dep. var.: Literacy rate 15-19
farm workers x 1881 dummy -0.2466***
0.0714
farm workers x 1891 dummy -0.2042***
0.0756
farm workers x 1901 dummy -0.1821*
0.0916
farm workers x 1911 dummy -0.0291
0.1060
Controls (interaction terms) YES
Time dummies YES
Fixed effects YES
N 345
adj. R-sq 0.932
F 86.16
Notes: Fully-flexible district-level panel estimates. The share of farm workers is interacted with time dummies for
the years 1881, 1901 and 1921. The omitted reference year is 1871. Baseline controls are interacted with time dummies.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.
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Chapter 2
Tenancy contracts, land
inequality and social capital at
the origins of the North-South
divide in Italy
This paper investigates the historical determinants of social capital in Italy, widely seen at the
root of the North-South divide. By focusing on the rural economic structure of Italy during
the “liberal age” (1861-1911) and using several measures of social capital in the present-day,
I find that areas that had a higher share of short-term contracts in agriculture exhibit lower
civic capital today. The results are robust to the inclusion of a set of control variables. IV
estimates using the presence of malaria as a source of exogenous variation rule out further
concerns regarding the presence of potential endogeneity. I carry out also a spatial analysis to
account for spillover effects, and the share of short-term contracts still retains its significance.
Therefore, the effect is robust even after controlling for the fact that short-term leases were not
randomly determined. Finally, I explore the role of the industrial districts as a mechanism to
transmit the cultural trait of cooperation through time. As they took shape where short-term
contracts were relatively rare, I find a positive association between municipalities exhibiting
high civic capital and those being part of an industrial district.
Acknowledgments: I am grateful for the supervision of this paper to Mauro Rota and
David Chilosi, whose comments and suggestions greatly improved the quality of the research.
I have also benefited from comments and feedback from Sascha O. Becker, Fabio Sabatini,
Alessandro Belmonte, Daniel Gallardo Albarran, Petros Milionis, Stefan Nikolic, Emanuele Fe-
lice, Jacob Weisdorf and two anonymous referees. I would also thank the seminar participants
at Groningen University and at the internal seminars at Sapienza University, in Rome.
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Chapter 2. Tenancy contracts, land inequality and social capital at the origins of the
North-South divide in Italy
2.1 Introduction
The debate around the deep-rooted causes of the North-South divide is still in progress and seems
to have had a new renaissance in the last decades, both in italian and international studies, in the
fields of economics, history, sociology and anthropology. The so-called “Questione Meridionale”
was brought to light in the late nineteenth century by Franchetti and Sonnino [1877] (”La
Sicilia nel 1876”). Their work shed light on prohibitive living standards of the rural mass of the
population in the South in the Post-Unification period (post-1861)1. In the subsequent years,
the political debate involved prominent italian figures; yet, there is no consensus among scholars
around the ultimate causes at the origin of South backwardness. Several explanations have
been proposed by italian and international academics in the past and in more recent years, and
they coincide with those emphasized in the global debate around the origins of the “wealth of
nations”: technology, geography, external exploitation, culture and institutions.
In the second half of the twentieth century, a growing number of foreign scholars partic-
ipated in the literature around regional disparities in Italy, and gave more emphasis on the
“cultural” explanation. Banfield [1967] and Putnam et al. [1994] stood out among them. They
highlighted the role that social capital and different civic orientations played for the backward-
ness of the South. More specifically, Banfield, with his “amoral familism” hypothesis, believed
that people living in the southern villages preferred self-interest (and the interest of the family)
rather than public good. This attitude was “the moral basis of a backward society” (Banfield
[1967]). Some decades later, Putnam, observing significant differences in civic participation lev-
els between North and South, claimed that social capital territorial imbalances were conducive
to divergence in economic performance. Specifically, social capital was a causal factor of social
policy, institutional efficiency and economic growth. Further, he conjectured that differences in
institutional efficiency and social capital values originate from the free city-states (communes)
experience during the late Middle Ages- the self-government experience of some wealthy cities in
central and northern Italy, opposed to the absolutist state experience of the southern part of the
country in the same centuries. This institutional framework fostered political participation and
civic engagement only in these central and northern cities, an effect that outlives the event that
generated it and becomes persistent over time. Hence, high social capital levels can produce
long-lasting effects, even inducing the adoption of institutions that transmit the same cultural
attitude through time, in a path-dependent process.
This paper follows this line of research. I investigate the historical determinants of social
capital levels in Italy providing a somewhat different but complementary explanation of the
underlying factors that shape it in the first place, not necessarily in contradiction with Putnam’s
argument. Following more recent studies (Cappelli [2017], Felice [2013]), social capital levels
1Henceforth, post-Unification period and liberal age will be used with the same meaning.
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seem to be more recent than Putnam suggested, and they might be the result of different formal
and informal economic institutions operating in the eighteenth and the nineteenth century.
For this reason, I focus the attention on the rural structure of the italian economy in the late
nineteenth century, and on different agrarian regimes widespread throughout the Italian territory
in that period (for instance, latifundium in the South and sharecropping activities in the Center-
North). I advance the hypothesis that the prevalence of short-term tenancy agreements in
agriculture, here represented by a huge mass of day workers (braccianti) and associated with
the presence of large estates called latifundia, discouraged cooperation between landowners and
peasants, then translating into lower levels of civic engagement and participation. By contrast,
long-term contracts, possibly containing a risk-sharing component, by providing agents with
iterated games, discouraged opportunism and created cooperation, an attitude ingrained in the
cultural traits of the population and associated with higher civic capital measures. Such a
cultural trait is then transmitted over generations, and it persists within the community, even
after a change in the incentives structure has taken place.
Hence, I test the long-term effect of the diffusion of daily and seasonal laborers in agriculture
in 1881 on various indicators of social capital in the present day. Following Guiso et al. [2016],
I use the number of no-profit organizations and an indicator assuming value one if a city has
an organ donation organization as measures of civic capital. In addition, I complement the
analysis employing three new variables. As for the case of blood organ donations, an outcome-
based measure, to qualify as a reliable index of social capital, should be directly linked to
the input (civic capital) that produces it and be unaffected by other omitted factors. Two
similar outputs are represented by the number of vehicles presenting a regular inspection and
the number of vehicles with a regular insurance over the total number of registered vehicles in
a given municipality. With respect to the number of no-profit institutions the two variables
do not require a proactive behaviour by the citizenship, providing an immediate indicator of
the internalization of the common good. For their peculiar nature, I will refer to them also
as measures of compliance with rule of law. Finally, I use the logarithm of per capita social
expenses at municipality level to approximate the sensitivity of a community to supply social
facilities.
I find that short-term tenancy agreements in the past negatively affected civic capital mea-
sures in the present-day. Furthermore, the results seem to be robust both to different indicators
employed in the empirical analysis and to different model specifications. These findings raise
two considerations. On the one hand, changes in social capital might be the consequence of
institutions more recent than the experience of self-government in the Middle Ages. On the
other hand, this work has the merit to switch the attention given to pre-industrial economies
from urban centers to the social life in the countryside in order to explain disparities in civic
engagement.
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My results are robust to to the presence of potential endogeneity. Certainly, concerns related
to reverse causality cannot be raised, as the italian occupational structure dramatically changed
throughout the last century. Yet, there might be some other geographical characteristics not
controlled for that are correlated both with the share of daily farm workers in liberal age and
with civic capital in the present-day. I investigate this contingency employing a newly assembled
measure related to the presence of malaria in liberal age and using it as a source of exogenous
variation in short-term contracts. Thus, I use this variable to instrument the fraction of daily
and seasonal workers in the agricultural sector in order to mitigate the concern that we are
capturing a somewhat spurious correlation.
Several scholars provide evidence on the vicious circle linking together malaria, peasants’
settlement pattern, crop choice and short-term tenancy agreements (Celli [1933], Curtis [2013],
Rossi-Doria [1958], Snowden [2008]). Specifically, malaria affects the settlement pattern of the
agricultural workers, forcing them to settle on top of town hills. Hence, idle lands on the plains
cannot be properly cultivated, and extensive monoculture on large estates becomes the best
response to adopt. These latifundia rely on the work of labourers hired at seasonal or even daily
basis2.
I find that IV results confirm what found with OLS estimates. The coefficient of short-term
agreements is negative and statistically significant in all specifications, and it is even strength-
ened in magnitude, presenting as twice as the size. Thus, the negative observed relationship
between short-term contracts and civic capital is not randomly determined.
Moreover, I address the issue of spatial dependence, potentially deriving from different
sources, such as emulative behaviours and spillover effects in a sort of diffusion process. I estimate
three distinct specifications: a spatial error model, a spatial lag model and a more conservative
general spatial model. Although spatial dependence emerges as a remarkable determinant of
social capital, the share of daily farm workers retains its significance in all specifications (with
some exceptions).
Once having determined such a robust correlation, I try to provide an explanation of the
transmission of this cultural trait over time. Contrary to the hypothesis advanced by Guiso
et al. [2016], based on what they call ”self-efficacy”, the belief a person holds with respect to
his or her power to affect situations positively, I argue that a new institution carrying on a
past cultural trait is needed in order to hand it down for generations and generations. Specif-
ically, a new institution reproducing the same incentives structure that allows the subjective
belief (civic capital) to put in place a cooperative action (social outcome) is necessary when
2Francesco Saverio Nitti, prime minister and prominent figure of Italian Parliament in liberal age,
asserted: “Malaria is the basis of all social life. It determines relations of production and the distri-
bution of wealth. Malaria lies at the root of the most important demographic and economic facts. The
distribution of property, the prevailing crop systems, and patterns of settlement are under the influence
of this one powerful cause.”
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the incentives structure of the past institution has long disappeared. I indicate the so-called
”industrial districts”, developed after the second world war in some areas of the center-north,
as the main channel of transmission of the aptitude of cooperation from preindustrial Italy to
the present-day.
A vast literature documented their relationship with sharecropping activities, incompatible
with the adoption of short-term tenancy agreements (Ascoli and Paci [1983], Becattini [1989],
Becattini et al. [2003], Fua` [1983], Zanotelli [2012] among others). A culture of mutual coop-
eration, sedimented in communities where sharecropping activities were mostly diffused, i.e. in
the places now known as ”third Italy”, laid the foundations for the subsequent creation of the
industrial districts. I use data from ISTAT reporting municipalities belonging to an industrial
district in 2001 and I exploit their variation across Italy to test this hypothesis. When using
the indicator as outcome variable, I find that short-term tenancy contracts negatively explain
their future adoption. This result is robust to different estimators employed to assess their rela-
tionship. OLS, IV and spatial regressions are all consistent with a negative association between
them. Further, I employ the same indicator as the main explanatory variable (either alone or
along with the set of baseline controls) in order to evaluate their effect on measures of current
civic capital, which is the missing link not yet explored. While I do not expect to find causation,
the empirical exercise is valuable and highly informative per se`. Municipalities being part of an
industrial district exhibit higher civic capital levels. The correlation seems to be robust to every
specification and to all the variables used to proxy for social capital.
Finally, I divide the sample in two sub-samples in order to assess whether the observed rela-
tionship between short-term agreements and civic capital is mainly driven by certain macrore-
gions. I estimate IV regressions considering only municipalities within the Center-North and
those only within the South. The results show a negative relationship in the former case, while
variation in the share of daily workers within the Mezzogiorno is not able to explain disparities
in social capital. This goes in line with the proposed mechanism of transmission, as industrial
districts were clearly predominant in the center-north. Without their creation, the culture of
cooperation would not have transmitted through time as late as today.
Overall, my paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it provides a new
explanation for imbalances in social capital levels in Italy, focusing on agrarian contractual
agreements in liberal age. This is, to my knowledge, the first study that explores this mechanism
in a within-country analysis, where formal political institutions are presumably identical across
the territory. Second, I employ several measures of current civic capital distinguishing between
indicators of prosocial behaviours and compliance with rule of law to test this hypothesis. Third,
I argue that the adoption of short-term leases in the Italian countryside constitutes the best, or
at least the inevitable, response to some non-removable constraints that large landowners were
facing at that time. Malaria is found to be the most important among them. Specifically, it
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influenced the settlement pattern of rural workers and the decisions to adopt short-term tenancy
agreements in Italy as late as the land reform in 1950s, ultimately creating the conditions for
current low civic capital. Finally, I propose and evaluate an original mechanism that may be
responsible for the persistence of the effect through time: the role of the industrial districts.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, I briefly present a literature overview
of the topic; in Section 2.3, I outline an historical background of Italy’s rural economy in the
late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, and I examine the theoretical
debate around the role of latifundia in the economic development of Italy; in Section 2.4, I briefly
describe social capital and the distinction between pro-social behavior activities and measures
of tax compliance. In Section 2.5, I describe the data used to conduct the empirical analysis,
while in Section 2.6 I present the econometric strategy used to test the main hypotheses and I
show the main results (OLS, IV and spatial estimates). In section 2.7 I describe the role of the
industrial districts as a channel of transmission of civic engagement in the long run. Section
2.8 concludes the article, providing an interpretation of the main findings, as well as possible
implications for future research.
2.2 Literature review
Extensive research has documented the role of institutions on long-term economic development.
Acemoglu et al. [2001] claim that environment can influence economic performance by setting
the conditions in which growth-enhancing institutions are shaped. Sokoloff and Engerman [2000]
assert that higher inequalities in income and wealth, by concentrating de facto political power
in the hands of few people, generate institutions that perpetuate these inequalities, resulting
in a path-dependent process3. Within the framework proposed by Acemoglu et al. [2001], for
instance, different agrarian regimes may be considered as formal institutions that can have a
persistent impact on current social capital. According to this view, institutional differences are
the result of historical heritage and natural endowments and can directly affect, through the
consequent incentives structure, economic agents’ behaviour and long-term economic growth.
This work is also linked to the literature on the impact of social capital and of trust on eco-
nomic performance. Tabellini [2008, 2010] find a positive effect of culture and institutions on the
level of economic development of the european regions. Knack [1999] finds a positive association
between measures of trust and civic norms and the well-functioning of public institutions. Gen-
erally, trust and stronger civic norms broaden government accountability, facilitate agreement
and foster innovation, all these factors resulting in a better government performance. Knack
3See also the works by Landes [1990], North [1991], North et al. [2009] to have a more comprehensive
view of the role of institutions for long-term development. This literature is vast and is beyond the
scope of this paper to survey it all.
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and Keefer [1997] and Zak and Knack [2001], in a cross-country analysis, find that trust has
an impact on economic performance and economic growth, while Helliwell and Putnam [1995]
focused their analysis on the specific case-study of Italy, finding the same evidence. Uslaner
[2002] finds a negative association between social capital and corruption, while Buonanno et al.
[2009] document a negative effect of civic norms and associational networks with crime rates
in italian provinces. Guiso et al. [2004] observe a positive relationship between social capital
and many aspects of financial development, such as more checks use, lower investments in cash
and higher investments in stocks, higher access to institutional credit and less use of informal
credit. In another work, Guiso et al. [2009] find also a positive correlation between trust and
trade levels. De Blasio and Nuzzo [2010], in an analysis at the provincial level in Italy, find a
positive relationship between historical social capital and contemporary economic development.
Nonetheless, Glaeser et al. [2002], pag. 437, observe: “while we have a theory and evidence
on the effects of social capital, we are just beginning to identify the underlying mechanisms
that create social capital in the first place”. This paper contributes to address this gap by
providing a previously unexamined explanation that links institutional and cultural attitudes in
the past to contemporaneous social capital levels. The evidence presented here contributes to
the literature referred to the historical determinants of social capital and trust. After the seminal
works by Banfield [1967] and Putnam et al. [1994], only a few studies aimed at contributing
to this literature have been carried out. Guiso et al. [2016], as I previously mentioned, tested
Putnam’s hypothesis, finding a positive impact of self-government experience in the Middle
Ages on contemporaneous social capital measures. Beltra´n Tapia [2012], Montolio and Tur-
Prats [2018] highlight the legacy of the commons in Catalunya, arguing that the experience of
cooperation among villagers, repeated over the centuries, increased social capital in each local
community. In a global perspective, Nunn and Wantchekon [2011] show that current differences
in trust levels within Africa can be traced back to the transatlantic and Indian Ocean slaves
trade. Durante [2009] shows that norms of trust developed in pre-industrial times are a result of
experiences of collective action and mutual insurance triggered by the need of farmers to cope
with climatic risk. Litina [2016] advanced the hypothesis that low levels of land inequality in
the past are associated with more intense cooperation and higher levels of contemporary social
capital and development4.
Further attempts to investigate the determinants of social capital in the specific case-study
of Italy have been made in recent years. Pierce et al. [2016] find that historical social capital
4For a comprehensive literature overview on the relationship between culture and institutions, see
Alesina and Giuliano [2015]. Among other things, they are aware that culture and institutions are
endogenous variables determined by other exogenous factors such as technology, epidemics, geogra-
phy, wars and other institutional shocks. Having this in mind, they assess the presence of a two-way
causal effect between culture and institutions, by reviewing works based on a theoretical, empirical and
historical approach.
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is highly correlated with contemporaneous levels of trust and other social capital dimensions,
confirming Putnam’s hypothesis of path dependence in explaining the persisting differences in
performance across italian regions5. Ferragina [2013] challenges Putnam’s view that historical
legacies brought about low civic capital levels in the South of Italy. On the contrary, he argues
that historical heritage mitigated the negative effects of income inequalities, low labor market
participation and weak national cohesion. Cappelli [2017] follows the same argument, challenging
Putnam’s view that social capital is persistent and mainly determined by historical legacy. With
respect to previous works, he provides new provincial measures of social capital in the Post-
Unification period in Italy, finding that social, institutional and economic features are more
relevant than historical heritage in explaining civic capital differences. Among these factors,
land inequality seems to have played the major role. Nonetheless, he does not address concerns
on the plausible presence of endogeneity between the two phenomena, proving only that a
correlation between them exists.
Several studies (for instance, Cinnirella and Hornung [2016], Tapia and Martinez-Galarraga
[2018]) employed an IV approach to find a source of exogenous variation in landownership
concentration. In a global perspective, this argument follows the line proposed by Easterly
and Levine [2003], who showed how geographic endowments can ultimately affect economic
development, paving the way for the creation of inclusive or extractive institutions6. Such
instruments range from soil quality, the use of the Reconquest as a quasi-natural experiment,
soil texture, to variability in temperature and rainfalls. In line with these works, although I am
not precisely considering land inequality as endogenous variable, I focus on another so-called
“non-removable constraint” (Galassi and Cohen [1994]) which may have determined the creation
and maintenance through time of latifundia: malaria. Specifically, I argue that the adoption
of short-term contracts in latifundia estates with a huge mass of daily and seasonal workers is
highly associated with the presence of malaria. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first
attempt to link the two phenomena in the italian context.
Finally, this work also complements the literature on the consequences of different tenancy
contracts on human behavior and social norms. Provided that an opportunistic behavior stem-
ming from a moral hazard incentive, if repeated through time, can translate into lower civic
orientations, low tax compliance and lower propensity to cooperate, the adoption of short-term
contracts can have persistent effects on social capital levels of a community. In a game theory
framework, Scott [1987] explains how parties in continuing relationships can better sort out
5The authors employ Putnam’s variables to proxy for social capial in the past. For the 1860-
1920 period, they include: strength of mass-based parties, number of associations founded before 1860,
incidence of cooperatives, membership in mutual aid societies, and electoral turnout. The variables are
then examined using factor analysis and one single factor score is produced for each region.
6Remarkable examples consist of temperate opposed to tropical locations, ecological conditions
shaping diseases, and environments suitable for the cultivation of grains or certain cash crops.
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problems of information and enforcement and strengthen social and contractual norms. This
cooperative equilibrium, therefore, by invoking legal and extralegal mechanisms, can be more
easily reached in a long-term relationship between two parties. In an empirical perspective,
Erridge and Greer [2002] analyze the obstacles and opportunities for the public sector to im-
plement long-term supply relations and facilitate departmental coordination. While they find
evidence of a positive association between partnership relations and social capital, they also
show that these resources can have both positive and negative effects on public procurement.
Ravindran et al. [2015] find a positive association between structural and positional embedded-
ness of participant firms and contract duration. Finally, from a broader historical perspective,
in line with the present work, Carmona and Simpson [1999] highlight the role of the so-called
rabassa morta to prompt social capital (trust) between landlords and farmers as late as the early
twentieth century in Catalunyia7. Similarly, Simpson [2005] documents the efforts put in place
by wine merchants in France between 1870 and 1911 to contrast the major shortages caused by
the wine disease phylloxera. They exploited political power to achieve government intervention
in order to control fraud and establish producer cooperatives.
2.3 Historical background
2.3.1 Three agrarian Italie
In the late nineteenth century, Italy was a prevalently rural economy. Most of the population
was living in the widely scattered countryside and agriculture was the main economic sector.
The high rise in population growth rate that characterized the two preceding centuries only
interested rural areas and it was not accompanied by similar urbanization rates (Del Panta
and Bacci [1980]). On average, 60% of the total labor force was engaged in agriculture and
the percentage remained somewhat stable as late as 1951, when a second and more intense
wave of industrialization took place, involving also southern regions (Felice [2018]). Three main
different agrarian regimes characterized Italian agriculture in the Post-Unification period: a
proto-capitalistic agriculture in the Po Valley, sharecropping activities in central and north-
eastern regions, and latifundia in the South, along with some areas dominated by grapes, oil
and fruit trees cultivations, especially along the coastal plains (Rossi Doria [2005]).
The agriculture in Po valley has been considered the only efficient farming for a long time,
leading Bevilacqua et al. [1989] to coin the expression “emulative paradigm”, when it comes
to comparing alternative agrarian regimes. It was essentially an intensive agriculture based
on high farming practices, coming from the manchesterian experience of English agriculture.
7The so-called rabassa morta presents features similar to sharecropping activities.
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Although it was considered a modern and advanced proto-capitalistic farming, it was not suf-
ficiently widespread throughout the Italian territory to trigger modern economic growth across
the country. It was dominated by the so-called “cascina irrigua”, a little hamlet in the coun-
tryside, where wage workers and landowners used to live together, in proximity to barns, stalls,
cattlesheds and the plots of land they were cultivating. The Cascina was meant to serve pas-
ture and wheat-oriented big capitalistic farms, highly diffused in Po valley. On the contrary,
on hills and mountains, export-oriented small and medium farms were widespread, most often
managed using sharecropping agreements. One of the main cascine’s characteristics relies on
the proximity of nuclear family to the workplace. This contingency enhanced solidarity among
members of the same production unit, that after Unification led to the creation of associational
organizations such as unions, cooperatives and mutual aid societies, mostly aimed to promote
the interests of the internal members. Then, interpersonal trust translated into the creation of
social networks and associations that promoted trust outside nuclear family. As a consequence,
workers’ bargaining power was relatively higher and land inequality levels lower than in other
geographic areas of the peninsula.
Sharecropping was predominant in the regions of the so-called “third Italy”(Fua` [1983], Be-
cattini [1989]). The presence of sharecropping activities in Tuscany during the fifteenth century
is documented by Ackerberg and Botticini [2002], who make use of data coming from the Flo-
rentine Cadastro of 1427. My data show that in late nineteenth century they were prevalently
widespread across all central and north-eastern regions, such as Tuscany, Umbria, Marches and
the coastal part of Emilia and Veneto8. Sharecroppers were settled in isolated farmhouses (the
so-called poderi) with their extended family. Tree crops such as olive and grapevine trees to-
gether with husbandry for self-consumption characterized this kind of agriculture. Living close
to the workplace allowed peasants to dealing with water canalization, making terracing, moni-
toring livestock. In addition, each member of the family had to contribute with non-remunerated
work to productive activity. These elements favored solidarity among the members of the fam-
ily. Furthermore, family income was often integrated with manufacturing activities, based on
handmade job carried out inside farmhouses. They were commissioned by small merchants and
entrepreneurs who provided raw materials and work tools. Hence, new work relationships were
established which, together with interpersonal relations within neighboring families, prompted
cooperation and social trust even outside the family.
By contrast, South’s rural economy was dominated by latifundia, as these large estates were
called, based on extensive agriculture and on the presence of daily and seasonal workers. They
were diffused above all across internal areas, while tree crops were widespread along the plains of
some coastal provinces. Where large estates were prevalent, workers dwelled in small villages on
8The map of sharecropping extension is available upon request. It can be easily noticed the negative
association with the percentage of daily workers over the agricultural labor force (braccianti).
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the top of hills, far away from wheat cultivations. Some scholars (Sallares et al. [2002], Snowden
[2008]) claim this was due to malaria disease, widespread along the coastal plains. Some others
(i.e. Rossi-Doria [1948]) assert the main cause was the extreme farms’ fractionalization, inducing
peasants to settle in villages placed at an average distance from the several plots of land scattered
across the territory. Where workplace and dwelling did not coincide, nuclear family, opposed
to the extended family, is found to be the fundamental organizational unit of society at large.
Thus, in such a context, interpersonal trust struggled to thrive9.
2.3.2 The debate around latifundia
Latifundia have often been at the center of political debate upon South backwardness during the
late nineteenth century and the first half of twentieth century. Many projects aimed at improving
the conditions of Southern economy were proposed, ranging from land redistribution and land
reclamation to the construction of public infrastructures such as state-build roads and irrigation
systems. Nonetheless, none of them was successfully and significantly implemented. The Prime
Minister Giovanni Giolitti ordered in 1909 a parliamentary inquiry upon the living standards
of southern peasantry (Faina [1909]). Apart from a considerable increase in migration rates, no
changes were registered in the rural structure of the southern economy twenty years after the
implementation of the previous inquiry (Jacini [1976]). Workers’ main concern was to overcome
seasonal and chronic underemployment, due to land-intensive agriculture, in contrast with factor
endowments of the South, rich of labor and poor of land. After the WWI, social distress
dramatically increased and peasants rose up against large landowners and public institutions.
During the so-called biennio rosso, the revolutionary upsurge of 1919-1921, turmoil with several
strikes and a widespread occupation of idle lands in many southern latifundia arose. The main
aim of peasants’ revolt was to obtain from landowners a minimum level of yearly employment
(the so-called imponibile di manodopera). The insurrection ended with the violent rise of Fascism
in October 1922, with an imposition of a twenty-year dictatorship. Afterwards, attempts of land
redistribution, land reclamation and improvements of southern peasantry did not produce any
result until the land reform was eventually implemented after World War II.
Traditional historiography considered latifundia negatively, attributing them a central role
in the Post-Unification growth. This traditional view was stated by the seminal work of the
Marxist scholar Sereni (Sereni [1971]), who attributed South backwardness to the landowners’
9Banfield [1967] put emphasis on low “generalized trust” (see also Tabellini [2010]) referred to
population of the small village of Montegrano, in Basilicata. He argues that social norms only safeguard
agreements among members within the nuclear family, while they are not enforced outside the family.
This attitude goes under the name of “amoral familism”. According to his argument, such a different
family model might explain lower propensity in the South to solve collective action dilemmas in order
to provide public goods.
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absenteeism. Large landowners were declared to be the main responsible of the chronic under-
employment of labor force in the countryside and low agricultural productivity. Furthermore,
traditional literature highlighted their inability to introduce new crop mixes and rotation tech-
niques, as had been done in northwestern european countries. Short-term contracts were at the
root of low productive investments for land improvements and “feudal” heritage in contractual
agreements characterized agent’s behavior.
In recent years, a more recent branch of revisionist literature challenged Sereni’s tradition-
alist view. Some of non-Marxist scholars have tried to reconcile landowners behaviour with the
rationality hypothesis. According to some case studies (Petrusewicz [1989], Placanica [1990],
Galassi [2001]) landowners were profit-maximizing, but they faced different ”non-removable con-
straints” and choice sets than did landowners in the North of Italy. They could be summarized
by essentially different environmental and climatic conditions such as high variability in yearly
temperatures, lack of rain in summer and different soil texture and ruggedness (Bevilacqua
et al. [1989], Lupo [1990]). Many contractual agreements, widely seen negatively, have been
reconsidered and seen as a rational response to risk-bearing issues. Supervision-intensive cash
crops, frictions in credit and insurance markets, as well as high income variance due to crop
yield variability determined the underlying incentives structure, at the root of different tenancy
contracts widespread throughout Italian territory (Cohen and Galassi [1990], Galassi and Cohen
[1994])10. Furthermore, high land concentration endowed large landowners with de facto polit-
ical power, affecting the number of citizens that could participate in the political debate about
matters related to their community11. Hence, they could have easily exploited their political
position to push public policies in favour of their needs. Indeed, under the assumption that
land inequality is associated with the control of local public councils by large landowners (local
notables), the adoption of public policies aimed to promote pro-growth public goods might be
hampered by the presence of vested interests, presumably opposed to the interests of the mass
of rural population12.
In the empirical analysis I employ a measure aimed to approximate the adoption of short-
term contracts regulating bargaining power between peasants and landowners: the share of daily
and seasonal workers (braccianti) over the total labor force in agriculture.
10See Cohen and Federico [2001] for a broad history of Italian agriculture and for recent developments
of this new brand of revisionist literature.
11Italy underwent several suffrage regimes during that period, reaching the universal male suffrage
only in 1919. Previously, the right to vote was assigned based on education and income levels.
12Indeed, for instance, municipalities had empowered to manage public resources in order to imple-
ment public schooling laws as late as 1911. After that, with the Daneo-Credaro law, in 1911, the power
to manage public expense in education was transferred from municipalities to the central government.
2.4. Definition and measurement of social capital 89
2.4 Definition and measurement of social capital
There has been a great amount of economic research on social capital in the past decades, yet
its definition remains vague and elusive. Social capital is defined by the OECD as “networks
together with shared norms, values and understandings that facilitate co-operation within or
among groups” (Brian [2007]). Nevertheless, most of the time, economists mainly refer to social
capital only as trust. Glaeser et al. [2002] point out that “economists understand the role
that repeated interaction plays in solving free-rider problems and reducing opportunism”, an
insight confirmed by theoretical literature on repeated games, that explains how a collaborative
behavior is more likely to be held when individuals expect to interact more often in the future.
Kenneth Arrow underlined the importance of social trust as early as 1972 (Arrow [1972]), when
he wrote that “virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust,
certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. It can be plausibly argued that much
of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence”.
Hence, in contexts where the level of social trust is high, economic and institutional development
are enhanced because it facilitates cooperation and the solution of collective action dilemmas
among members of the same community. Nonetheless, not every social capital dimension is
conducive to improvements in economic activity. Differences between bonding, bridging and
linking social capital measures have been identified in literature (Sabatini [2009]).
Bonding civic capital measures present a negative connotation and they are generally referred
to as small circles of people, only interested to privilege the vested interests of the participants
within the group boundaries. Further, bridging social capital refers to the ability of different
heterogeneous groups to collaborate among each other. It is then associated with higher diffusion
of information, commercial transactions and economic activity. Finally, linking social capital is
a term related to ties connecting individuals and their civil society organizations with public
institutions. It is then a useful tool to overcome collective action dilemma, above all when the
aim is to perform activities based on internal cooperation and when these advocacy activities are
aimed at providing public goods for the members involved within the community at stake13. It
is straightforward to note that the last two dimensions of social capital are correlated with good
economic performance and high levels of development, whereas the former might be detrimental
for the economic activity of a community at large14. For the purpose of this work, I will only
focus on the “good” social capital dimensions, namely the ones I believe are proxying bridging
and linking social capital.
13For instance, cooperation is essential in preindustrial societies to provide agricultural infrastruc-
tures, such as storage facilities, drainage systems and irrigation systems (see Litina [2016]).
14One example is the work by Satyanath et al. [2017], who document that a dense network of
voluntary associations facilitated the rise of the Nazi Party by bringing more people into contact with
the party’s message and helping to destroy the democratic system.
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Moreover, I focus my attention on measures of compliance with the rule of law (or tax
compliance), that I believe that can be plausibly seen as an indicator of civic mindedness of
a community. Indeed, although European countries generally share the same formal rules and
public institutions, tax compliance rates vary substantially across them (Zhang et al. [2016],
Alm et al. [2004], Schneider and Enste [2013]). The literature has put forth several explana-
tions for those imbalances, all based on “institutionalist” theories (Torgler and Schneider [2007],
Cummings et al. [2009]). Such theories argue that citizens are willing to pay taxes if they be-
lieve that the government will spend public money in an effective way. Hence, they focus on
the relationship between the quality of government and the willingness of the citizens to abide
by the rules and pay taxes. A second brunch of literature focuses on the relationship between
compliance with rule of law and cultural values and beliefs. Southern European countries are
considered more “familistic”, or opportunistic, meaning that virtuous conduct is believed to
apply only within members of the same family or group, while an opportunistic behavior is nor-
mally applied towards people outside the family (Banfield [1967], Platteau [2015]). By contrast,
northwestern countries are characterized by values of individualism and autonomy, and people
are more prone to apply the same rules of conduct to all members of the community at large15.
The latter explanation justifies different tax compliance rates across countries, although sharing
the same institutional features. Hence, this implies that, in most of the cases, enhancing the
levels of monitoring and enforceability should not prevent people from cheating, as such public
policy measures may well not be an effective deterrent. This is particularly important, as the
ability of governments to properly collect revenues is crucial for successfully meet their policy
goals16.
Then, social capital measures can be decomposed in two different subgroups: i) civic capital
measures identifying a prosocial behavior in civil society; ii) measures identifying compliance
with rule of law (or tax compliance). In the first cathgory I include the number of no-profit
institutions, the dummy for cities presenting an organ donation organization and per capita
social expenses. In the second, I insert the percentage of automobiles with a regular inspec-
tion and the percentage of automobiles exhibiting a regular insurance (see section 2.5 for their
description). Then, I test the hypothesis that these current social capital measures are influ-
enced by short-term contracts in the past, defining relations between landowners and peasants
in Post-Unification Italy.
15Tabellini [2010] defined this distinction as “generalized” vs “limited” morality.
16See Haggard and Tiede [2011], who explore the mechanisms through which the rule of law can
affect economic growth, reviewing the theory underlying the different channels of transmission of the
effect.
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2.5 Data and empirical strategy
In this section, I describe the data employed in the empirical part. A synthetic description of
the variables along with their sources and definitions is contained in the appendix, table 2.13,
while in tables 2.1 and 2.2 I display the main descriptive statistics of the variables employed
in the following section in order to to test my hypothesis. Overall, my sample contains 7951
observations, corresponding to municipalities in 2001. Nonetheless, my historical variables are
collected at district-level (the 205 circondarii in liberal age).
2.5.1 Social capital measures
In order to estimate the effect of the presence of short-term contracts in agriculture on social
capital measures, I collected data at different levels of disaggregation. Social capital indicators
are referred to the present-day (2001) and are collected at municipality-level.
Following Putnam et al. [1994], I use the presence of nonprofit organizations as the main
variable of social capital. Specifically, I use the total number of nonprofit institutions over the
total population in 2000 for each municipality, a measure already employed by Guiso et al.
[2016]. Moreover, to have a more comprehensive picture of social capital disparities across the
Italian territory, I also employed other variables that can potentially be expressed as social
capital measures. Hence, I complement my empirical strategy with additional indicators.
As Guiso et al. [2016] pointed out, for an outcome-based social capital measure to represent
a reliable indicator of its presence within a community, the relationship between the input (the
subjective belief and/or value) and the registered output should not be influenced by other
omitted factors, such as legal enforcement. This is particularly true when it comes to using
indicators proxying compliance with rule of law. Although these conditions are hard to be
met, some exceptions do exist. Following Guiso et al. [2016], I use the same indicator for the
existence of an organ donation organization in a municipality. This measure represents a clear
example of individuals’ internalization of the common good. Indeed, donating organs has no
direct compensation and there is neither any economic payoff nor any legal obligation to donate.
For a similar reason, I also collected data referred to social expenditures in 2015 (in logarithm).
Once rescaled for the population, it approximates the sensitivity of a community to supply social
facilities, as well as its institutional efficiency. In Italy, indeed, the decision of the amount to be
donated in public social expenses is devoted to municipal councils. Further, to my knowledge,
it has never been used to measure civic capital levels in a within-country analysis.
Finally, I gathered information referred to the number of vehicles presenting a regular in-
spection and a regular insurance. As said, I will refer to them as the two measures proxying
compliance with rule of law. Although they do not represent a voluntary behavior to be civic
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within a community, legal enforcement is weak de facto. Surprisingly, indeed, both display re-
markable heterogeneity across the italian territory. In some municipalities I observe that, on
average, respectively 48% and 50% of registered vehicles do not present a regular insurance and
a regular inspection, while in other municipalities the percentage reaches the levels of 97% and
98% (1st and 99th percentiles of the two distributions, see table 2.1). Then, compliance with
rule of law varies substantially across italian regions, in spite of sharing the same institutional
features.
Table 2.1: Social capital measures
Social capital Mean Median Std.Dev. 1st percentile 99th percentile
N. of no profit organizations (per 1000 inhabitants) 5.484 4.261 12.087 0 24.793
City has an organ donation organization 0.0416 0 0.200 0 1
Automobiles with a regular inspection (% 0.827 0.860 0.122 0.504 0.980
Automobiles with a regular insurance (%) 0.809 0.839 0.121 0.491 0.968
Log of social expenditures (per capita) 4.151 4.219 0.914 1.099 6.180
Obs. 7847
Notes: Descriptive statistics for variables disaggregated at municipality-level.
2.5.2 Other historical and geographical variables
With the aim to provide a picture of the agrarian structure of the italian economy in the
Post-Unification period, I collected data at district-level (the so-called circondarii) on tenancy
contracts in 1881, the first year in which I observe this variable. One adequate measure of
the diffusion of short-term contracts in agriculture is represented by the fraction of daily and
seasonal farm laborers (braccianti) over the total labor force engaged in agriculture (Tapia and
Martinez-Galarraga [2018]). Such a measure is slightly different from the one employed by Tapia
and Martinez-Galarraga [2018], as it only includes farm labourers employed at daily or seasonal
basis. By contrast, the authors account for all farm labourers, without distinguishing between
short-term vs long-term contracts. The reason must be traced in their need to reconstruct a
proxy for landownership concentration rather than a measure for the presence of short-term
contracts in agriculture, given the unobservability of Gini index. The geographical pattern of
such a variable is displayed in figure 2.1, left-side17. The highest level of farm labourers hired
at a provisional basis is registered in the southern part of the peninsula and in some provinces
of the Po Valley, especially in Romagna, as well as along the Tyrrhenian coast from Tuscany
17Although the map shows a level of municipal disaggregation, data are at district-level. Unfortu-
nately, shapefiles for the ancient italian circondarii are not available.
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until the Pontine marshes. This picture basically reflects the contours of the latifundia regions
described by the literature, with some discrepancy (see Bevilacqua et al. [1989], Felice [2013]).
Data on municipality elevation, maximum difference in elevation, population, per capita
income, income and land inequality in 2001, and coastal location (dummy for cities being within
a radius of 5 km from the coast, and a dummy for a city being by the sea) come from Guiso
et al. [2016], and I will follow suit by including all these geographic controls in my regression
framework.
In order to test the proposed mechanism of transmission, I gathered information on the
presence of industrial districts. The dummy variable, taking on value one whether the city
belongs to an industrial district and zero otherwise, comes from the Census of Industry and
Services of 2001, carried out by ISTAT on the basis of Local Labour Systems (Sistemi Locali del
Lavoro, SLL).
Finally, information on the share of the surface covered by malaria come from the digitaliza-
tion of Torelli map “Carta della malaria dell’Italia”, drawn by Luigi Torelli in 1882. Data have
been collected at grid cell level, then used to construct municipal estimates, and ultimately reag-
gregated at district-level at borders in 1881. This variable represents the instrument employed
in section 2.6.2 as a source of exogenous variation in short-term tenancy agreements. Figure
2.1, right-side, shows its geographic pattern. All the southern part of Italy displays an extensive
diffusion of malaria, above all along the coastal plains, as well as in some areas of the Po valley.
It can be noticed how the presence of daily farm labourers, in most of the cases, shares with
malaria disease the same territorial extension.
Table 2.2: Historical and geographical variables
Control and instrumental variables Mean Median Std.Dev. 1st percentile 99th percentile
Day workers share 1881 30.192 30.001 14.080 7.494 64.310
Max difference in elevation 0.616 0.435 0.621 0.004 2.546
Municipality is on the coast 0.083 0 0.276 0 1
Municipality located near the sea (5 km) 0.035 0 0.184 0 1
Population 0.007 0.002 0.040 0.0001 0.069
Gini land inequality index 2001 0.599 0.600 0.170 0.154 0.940
Gini income index 2001 0.375 0.373 0.038 0.288 0.4859459
Income per capita 2001 11.920 12.058 2.867 6.637 18.56
Industrial districts 0.286 0 0.452 0 1
Malaria share (over total surface) 28.953 18.027 28.540 0 99.063
Obs. 7623
Notes: Descriptive statistics for variables disaggregated at municipality-level. Day
workers share 1881 and malaria share (over total surface) are disaggregated at district-
level.
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2.6 Empirical results
2.6.1 OLS results, weighted
In order to test whether short-term contracts are negatively associated with civic capital, I
estimate the following model:
SocCapi = α+ βshort− termj + γXi + ηm + i, j < i (2.1)
where i indexes municipalities, j indexes districts (circondarii in 1881), and ηm represents
macroregional dummies. short − termj denotes the variable of interest, here proxied by the
percentage of daily workers over the total labor force engaged in agriculture, while Xi is a set of
covariates that allows controlling for other factors that may hinder the identification strategy.
SocCapi denotes the civic capital measures alternatively employed in the empirical analysis as
outcome variables.
Table 2.3 reports regression results for estimating equation 2.1. The first measure of civic
capital used in the empirical analysis is the number of nonprofit institutions over the 2001
population for each municipality. I regress this measure on the percentage of daily farm laborers
in liberal age and on a set of covariates. While column (1) presents results with baseline
controls, columns (2)–(6) sequentially add the set of covariates described in section 2.5.2 and
complicate model specification. To be consistent with Guiso et al. [2016], I insert a number
of geographic controls to account for heterogeneity among different municipalities, which may
confound the results. I include the average elevation to control for mountain location and the
maximum difference in elevation within the same municipality to control for geographically
driven differences in interaction costs. Then, I control for the presence of cities located by the
sea or within 5 km from the sea. Finally, as a measure of size, I insert both the level of population
(in millions of inhabitants) and its square, because I do not know how it affects civic capital.
Finally, since measures of civic capital are noisier for smaller municipalities, I use the weighted
least-squared method, weighted by the population in 2001.
I find a large and statistically significant impact of the short-term tenancy contracts in liberal
age on the number of nonprofit institutions divided by the population in 2001 (coefficients and
standard errors in bold). In column I, a one standard deviation increase in the percentage of
daily farm labourers results in a 0.046 standard deviation decrease in the number of no-profit
institutions per 1000 inhabitants. In column II, I add a measure of income inequality and a
measure of land inequality in the present-day, as suggested by Alesina and La Ferrara [2002].
Although these variables allow me to account for heterogeneity in inequality within a community,
this can make my estimates worse, since inequality might be the result rather than a determinat
of persistent low civic capital values. Nonetheless, the impact of both variables remains negative
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and significant. Despite controlling for population size and its squared, still the estimates may be
distorted by the presence of more densely populated municipalities within the sample. Hence, in
column III, I exclude the largest towns (with more than 120,000 inhabitants). The effect of daily
farm workers remains unchanged. Moreover, municipalities with a prominent administrative role
could present higher civic capital measures and a lower daily laborers share due to the greater
participation of the active labor force in the industry and the services sectors, possibly affecting
my estimates. For this reason, I exclude the provincial capitals from my sample and I run a
new regression ruling them out in column IV. Again, the effect of daily farm laborers remains
invariate. Then, I follow Glaeser et al. [2002] and I include the level of per capita income in
column V. Indeed, individual investment decisions in social capital can depend on income levels.
Because districts with a higher level of daily and seasonal peasants (braccianti) were less likely to
be richer, the indicator might barely proxy for unobserved characteristics hampering prosperity.
Thus, I should include income levels in liberal age to account for prosperity at that time.
Unfortunately, I do not observe GDP and/or GDP per capita in the Post-Unification period
both at province- or district-level, nor do I have at hand a convincing proxy at municipality-
level. Therefore, I rely on contemporaneous income per capita values. This highly conservative
model specification might bias our estimates, since the relationship between social capital and
income per capita is certainly endogenous. As Knack and Keefer [1997] demonstrate, indeed,
civic capital itself fosters growth, thus covering or underestimating the impact of the share of
daily farm laborers. Hence, once I factor in income per capita, as expected, the effect of farm
laborers vanishes, presenting an even positive impact on social capital values. For this reason,
I exclude it in the last specification, in column VI, once departmental dummies (northwest,
northeast, center and south and islands) and latitude are accounted for, in order to capture
unobserved geographical heterogeneity across macroregions. These dummies are all significant
(for the sake of brevity, the coefficients are not reported). Despite their inclusion, the coefficient
of the short-term tenancy contracts remains negative and retains its significance (despite of a
loss in magnitude).
In table 2.4, I repeat the estimation using the second measure of social capital, the dummy
for the presence of an organ donation organization18. Here the results are reverted. Apart from
the conservative specification with the inclusion of income per capita within the set of controls
(column II), the share of daily farm workers is not negatively associated with cities presenting an
organ donation organization in a significant way. At a first glance, the contribute of short-term
tenancy agreements to civic capital deterioration does not seem to be robust to changes in social
capital measurement.
In Tables 2.5 and 2.6, I employ two measures of compliance with rule of law (tax compliance).
18For the sake of exposition, I only report the specification in column I, V, and VI.
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Table 2.4: AIDO venue
AIDO venue Whole sample (I) Whole sample (II) Whole sample (III)
Day workers share 1881 -0.0013 0.0033*** -0.0010
0.0009 0.0010 0.0011
Elevation -0.3260*** -0.1982*** -0.2089***
0.0746 0.0672 0.0740
Max difference in elevation 0.0422 0.0365 0.0450
0.0302 0.0267 0.0292
City is on the coast 0.0175 0.0968** 0.0598
0.0458 0.0434 0.0462
City more than 5 km from the coast -0.0592 0.0257 -0.0385
0.0467 0.0458 0.0459
Population 1.0567*** 0.8415*** 1.1173***
0.1971 0.1760 0.1895
Population squared -0.3493*** -0.3024*** -0.3757***
0.0723 0.0629 0.0693
Gini land inequality index 2001 0.3744*** 0.3097*** 0.3120***
0.0891 0.0832 0.0940
Gini income inequality index 2001 3.0142*** 1.8479*** 3.1097***
0.4510 0.4479 0.4415
Income per capita 0.0457***
0.0050
Latitude 0.0000
0.0000
Area dummies NO NO YES
Constant YES YES YES
N 7623 7623 7623
adj. R-sq 0.440 0.483 0.453
F 48.27 65.83 42.86
Notes: WLS estimates, weighted for population. Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.
2.6. Empirical results 99
Table 2.5: Cars’ inspection
Cars inspection Whole sample (I) Whole sample (II) Whole sample (III)
Day workers share 1881 -0.0035*** -0.0018*** -0.0017***
0.0005 0.0005 0.0004
Elevatione -0.0596*** -0.0146 -0.0086
0.0185 0.0161 0.0189
Max difference in elevation -0.0235*** -0.0256*** -0.0228***
0.0077 0.0076 0.0082
City is on the coast -0.0628*** -0.0349*** -0.0179
0.0120 0.0104 0.0120
City more than 5 km from the coast -0.0385*** -0.0086 -0.0045
0.0132 0.0128 0.0123
Population -0.0481 -0.1243* -0.0982*
0.0799 0.0690 0.0594
Population squared -0.0131 0.0035 0.0022
0.0310 0.0265 0.0234
Gini land inequality index 2001 0.1323*** 0.1090*** 0.1819***
0.0448 0.0365 0.0351
Gini income inequality index 2001 0.2073* -0.2084* 0.1516
0.1230 0.1124 0.1095
Income per capita 0.0162***
0.0021
Latitude -0.0000
0.0000
Area dummies NO NO YES
Constant YES YES YES
N 7583 7583 7583
adj. R-sq 0.436 0.505 0.540
F 473.7 921.3 .
Notes: WLS estimates. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***Sig-
nificant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.
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Table 2.6: Cars’ insurance
Cars insurance Whole sample (I) Whole sample (II) Whole sample (III)
Day workers share 1881 -0.0031*** -0.0015*** -0.0015***
0.0005 0.0006 0.0005
Elevation -0.0751*** -0.0322* -0.0289
0.0187 0.0165 0.0196
Max difference in elevation -0.0150* -0.0170** -0.0146*
0.0079 0.0078 0.0083
City is on the coast -0.0556*** -0.0290*** -0.0160
0.0112 0.0106 0.0123
City more than 5 km from the coast -0.0373*** -0.0088 -0.0070
0.0131 0.0126 0.0121
Population -0.0991 -0.1717** -0.1412**
0.0782 0.0689 0.0694
Population squared 0.0092 0.0250 0.0213
0.0308 0.0271 0.0274
Gini land inequality index 2001 0.0992** 0.0770** 0.1400***
0.0415 0.0341 0.0387
Gini income inequality index 2001 0.2536** -0.1425 0.2044*
0.1181 0.1215 0.1154
Income per capita 0.0155***
0.0019
Latitude -0.0000
0.0000
Area dummies NO NO YES
Constant YES YES YES
N 7583 7583 7583
adj. R-sq 0.390 0.460 0.481
F 518.9 442.6 .
Notes: WLS estimates. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***Sig-
nificant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.
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Specifically, table 2.5 shows regressions using as dependent variable the ratio of automobiles
presenting a regular inspection in 2016 over the total number of registered automobiles within
the same municipality, whereas in table 2.6 I refer to the number of automobiles with a regular
insurance. As previously mentioned, an outcome-based measure to qualify as a reliable index
of social capital should be directly related to the subjective belief livening it up. I believe
this is the case for two prevailing reasons. First, although these outcome-based social capital
measures may be biased by differences in legal enforcement across municipalities, it can be
assumed that the obligations of having a regular inspection and a regular insurance are weakly
enforced throughout all the Italian territory in the same way. Second, and most importantly,
the propensity to insure and inspect an automobile represents a more immediate indicator of the
internalization of the common good, not requiring a proactive behaviour by the citizen, as does
occur in the event of setting up a new association. Both tables show that short-term contracts
are negatively and significantly correlated with the fraction of cars’ inspections and with the
fraction of cars’ insurances. Moreover, the results appear to be robust not only to different
outcome measures, but also to different model specifications.
In table 2.7, I report results employing the level of social expenditures per capita (in log)
for each municipality in 2015 as the main outcome variable. Again, the short-term contracts in
agriculture seem to produce a negative and statistically significant effect in all the three spec-
ifications. The magnitude of the effect tends to decrease once the level of GDP per capita is
included within the control variables, meaning that omitted factors are hiding the true relation-
ship between these two measures. Taking as a reference the specification outlined in column
III (with macroregional dummies), a one standard deviation increase in the percentage of daily
farm workers over the total agrarian labor force induces a 0.157 standard deviation decrease in
the logarithm of social expenses per capita.
With exception to the fuzzy results using the dummy for cities with an organ donation
organization as outcome, all regressions point to the same direction. Whether I use civil capital
measures replicating a prosocial behavior in the society (non-profit institutions, social expenses)
or rule of law compliance indicators (fraction of vehicles with regular insurance and regular
inspection), the results seem to be highly robust19. In addition, the results seem to be robust to
different model specifications employed in the empirical analysis. Similar findings confirm the
fact that the presence of different tenancy contracts (short-term vs long-term contracts) within
an agrarian community played a prominent role in shaping civic capital orientations. Ultimately,
they provide a somewhat alternative but complementary explanation of social capital imbalances
19To be precise, public social expenses might fit into both groups, and the suggested classification is
totally arbitrary. This means that the border between the two groups is evanescent and it is better to
evaluate the impact of each variable on a case-by-case basis.
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Table 2.7: Social expenditures
Log of social expenses (p.c.) Whole sample (I) Whole sample (II) Whole sample (III)
Day workers share 1881 -0.0171*** -0.0058*** -0.0102***
0.0013 0.0012 0.0013
Elevation -0.7683*** -0.4574*** -0.3223***
0.0889 0.0761 0.0855
Max difference in elevation -0.0993*** -0.1129*** -0.0973***
0.0370 0.0342 0.0320
City is on the coast -0.2282*** -0.0342 0.0016
0.0646 0.0487 0.0550
City more than 5 km from the coast -0.2111*** -0.0024 -0.0444
0.0587 0.0557 0.0609
Population 0.6695** 0.1477 0.7223***
0.2916 0.1971 0.2254
Population squared -0.1264 -0.0128 -0.1899**
0.1090 0.0713 0.0837
Gini land inequality 2001 0.9666*** 0.8067*** 0.8733***
0.1584 0.1064 0.1453
Gini income inequality index 2001 2.9151*** 0.0675 2.8964***
0.5658 0.4541 0.4728
Income per capita 0.1114***
0.0063
Latitude -0.0000
0.0000
Area dummies NO NO YES
Constant YES YES YES
N 7464 7464 7464
adj. R-sq 0.348 0.452 0.427
F 82.46 175.5 100.2
Notes: WLS estimates. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***Sig-
nificant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.
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in Italy with respect to the experience of Free-city states in the Middle Ages, the hypothesis put
forth by Putnam (Putnam et al. [1994]) and then tested by Guiso et al. [2016].
First, my results seem to be in contrast with Putnam’s view that disparities in civic capital
values originate from the free-communal experience of the Middle Ages. Indeed, in line with ”the
compression of history hypothesis” (Austin [2008]), my estimates confirm the role of agrarian
regimes widespread after Unification, and thus still operating after almost four hundred years
since the self-government experience of some wealthy central and northern cities. Hence, from a
time dimensional viewpoint, changes in social capital values might be the consequence of more
recent institutional changes.
Second, my attention is prevalently devoted to the rural structure of the italian economy,
thus neglecting the role of social life in urban centers and their driving force in encouraging
cooperative behaviour among citizens. Of course, this choice presents some limitations, primarily
due to the assumption that from this empirical exercise we can infer indications extendable to
the whole population (a pars pro toto). Nonetheless, conferring more weight to life in the
countryside can be legitimated by observing the italian occupational structure, which shows a
share of the agricultual labor force reaching a peak of 69% in 1881. Further, in the same year,
urbanization rate was on average 28%, meaning that most of the population was living in the
countryside, and a considerable portion of it was working in the primary sector. Consequently,
all the relevant social and work relations did not take place in the urban centers, and so had it
been as late as the turn of the twentieth century, if not even further.
In sum, on the one hand, disentangling between cities and countryside and attaching less
value to the role of urban centers in favouring and spreading civic orientations in the past does
not allow me to discard Putnam’s hypothesis and to conclude that my explanation is necessarily
in contrast. On the other hand, this work suggests that a more careful attention must be paid to
alternative institutional features, especially those aimed to manage relations between different
social classes, often with opposed interests among them.
2.6.2 Why do we have short-term contracts only in some geographic
areas?
In the previous section, I showed that short-term tenancy agreements are negatively and sig-
nificantly associated with current social capital measures, both those capturing a pro-social
behavior in civil society, according to a voluntary attitude of some community population, and
those proxying compliance with rule of law. I rely on a bunch of geographic controls aimed to
mitigate the probability to capture a spurious correlation between the fraction of daily farm
workers and social capital. Nevertheless, past short-term contracts (before the land reform in
1950 took place) are likely to be associated with other omitted characteristics persisting to this
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day and enhancing greater civic capital levels. For instance, more efficient labour market insti-
tutions at the local level, customized according to the employment structure of a territory, may
have contributed to raise today’s civic capital. To address this concern, I propose an original
and unexamined hypothesis, which employs the presence of malaria as a source of exogenous
variation in the adoption of short-term tenancy agreements in agriculture.
2.6.3 Malaria and short-term tenancy agreements
Malaria affects the settlement pattern of peasants, inducing them to shun the lowlands and dwell
on top of hills. Then, lands cannot be properly cultivated throughout all the year, and extensive
monocultural cereal farmings dominate. Single-crop choice of a similar kind demands work only
at certain times of the year, involving an annual circulation of tenants (short-term leases). This
results in the abandonment of lands and in the creation of the so-called agro-towns, particularly
diffused in some southern regions (King and Strachan [1978]).
Several authors document the vicious circle putting together malaria, settlement pattern,
crop choice and short-term tenancy contracts in agriculture. Rossi-Doria [1958] notes how
instability remained everywhere the main feature of the peasants’ condition, dominated by
the precariousness of agricultural contracts. He argues that the nature of soils and climate
both pushed toward monoculture, above all in the internal areas and along the coastal plains
where malaria prevented any permanent settlement. Angelo Celli, a prominent member of the
Deputy Chamber from 1892 and engaged in the fight against the disease, believed that malaria
was the main driver of latifundia formation. According to his theory (Celli [1933]), a high
correlation between malaria and the creation of large estates has been observed for centuries in
the Pontine marshes, a plain in the surroundings of Rome. Similarly, Beauchamp [1988] observed
the same pattern in Spain during the 1930s. Chaves [2013] tested Beauchamp’s hypothesis using
Markov chain models, finding robust evidence on the causal effect of malaria endemicity on
latifundia creation in 1930s Spain. Specifically, the debilitating effects of malaria on farmers
do not allow them to harvest crops and properly cultivate lands. This leads to the sale or
abandonment of land, then purchased by few healthier and wealthier landowners. Thus, they
will underutilize land as latifundia, based on extensive and land-intensive agriculture, requiring
the labor of seasonal landless peasants. Hence, malaria affects the settlement pattern of rural
workers, ultimately laying the foundations for the adoption of short-term agreements. This is
confirmed by Curtis [2013], who argues that latifundist estates were cultivated almost entirely by
agricultural workers, often on short-term agreements and even on a day-by-day basis. Snowden
[2008] explicitly asserts that latifundism and malaria are synonymous because each one is at once
cause and effect of the other. He adds that latifundia arose as an adaptation to the conditions
imposed by malaria (Snowden [2008]). At the same time, however, the large estates consolidated
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the influence of the disease known as ”the king of the South”. Further, he reports that at harvest
and threshing time latifundia prompted extensive migrations of roaming labourers. These were
peasants working on the basis of oral agreements and sometimes for meals alone, who were
recruited in distant hill towns during the winter off-season to join work-gangs that journeyed to
fields being at the same time the most fertile and the most perilous in the region.
2.6.4 IV results
I use malaria as an excluded instrument in all cross-sectional IV regressions. These are based on
the same specification as in table 2.3, column II, and include as outcome variables, alternatively,
all the measures of social capital employed in the previous section. The first-stage regression is
expressed by the following equation:
Short− termj = α2 + β2Malariaj + γ2X ′ + ui (2.2)
where Short − term is the proxy for short-term contracts, Malaria is the share of geographic
territory covered by malaria, and X is the same vector of covariates included in the second-stage
regression expressed by equation 2.1.
Hence, our estimation hinges on the following assumption: for the spreading of malaria
vector throughout the Italian territory to be a reasonable instrument for short-term tenancy
agreements, it must affect civic capital measures in the present-day only through its effect on
the percentage of daily farm workers. I argue that this is highly plausible, since the extension
of malaria on the Italian territory depends on considerations of different nature, plausibly ex-
ogenous. Moreover, even though I do not observe a pre-trend in its expansion, I can reasonably
assume that its intensity had been the same until the first point in time in which I observe it, i.e
in 1880. Indeed, malaria is primarily influenced by the climatic pattern and by the characteris-
tics of a territory (Sallares et al. [2002]), not subject to the time variable. The malaria parasite is
transmitted from an infected individual to another individual by means of the female Anopheles
mosquito. The parasite within the mosquito vector must go through a life-cycle process, whose
duration mostly depends on ambient temperatures. The transmission becomes less likely to
occur when the temperature falls below 18 degrees. Under 16 degrees, malaria parasites cease
to reproduce definitely (Coluzzi [1999]).
IV results are reported in table 2.8. The coefficient of the share of daily farm workers on all
the measures of social capital is negative and statistically significant. It is even strengthened,
and it presents almost as twice as the magnitude effect I found in WLS estimates. For instance,
in column I, a one standard deviation increase in the share of daily farm workers induces a
0.072 standard deviation decrease in the number of no-profit institutions over one thousand
inhabitants. Moreover, at the bottom of the table I reported the F-stat for the first-stage
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Table 2.8: IV estimates
IV regression Ist.no profit AIDO venue Cars’ inspections Cars’ insurance Log soc. exp. (p.c.)
Day workers share 1881 -0.0626*** -0.0054* -0.0037*** -0.0027*** -0.0231***
0.0097 0.0031 0.0006 0.0007 0.0037
Elevation 0.4538 -0.3414*** -0.0603*** -0.0736*** -0.7875***
0.4050 0.0820 0.0185 0.0186 0.0972
Max difference in elevation 0.7372*** 0.0516 -0.0231*** -0.0159* -0.0892**
0.1789 0.0347 0.0083 0.0082 0.0404
City is on the coast 0.0433 0.0624 -0.0609*** -0.0598*** -0.1648*
0.2153 0.0685 0.0154 0.0142 0.0892
City more than 5 km from the coast 0.0296 -0.0139 -0.0365** -0.0417*** -0.1479**
0.2655 0.0560 0.0148 0.0145 0.0709
Population -0.6840 1.0754*** -0.0473 -0.1008 0.6896**
0.7022 0.2066 0.0821 0.0788 0.3031
Population squared 0.2772 -0.3501*** -0.0131 0.0092 -0.1253
0.2686 0.0791 0.0312 0.0303 0.1153
Gini land inequality 2001 1.4415*** 0.3783*** 0.1324*** 0.0988** 0.9709***
0.4591 0.0873 0.0445 0.0411 0.1510
Gini income inequality index 2001 6.5323*** 2.8651*** 0.2009 0.2676** 2.7463***
2.1705 0.5407 0.1365 0.1300 0.6610
Constant YES YES YES YES YES
N 7623 7623 7583 7583 7464
adj. R-sq 0.042 0.423 0.436 0.388 0.334
F 18.40 56.42 443.5 530.8 78.27
1st stage F-stat 54.49 54.49 53.94 53.94 49.49
Notes: 2SLS estimates with malaria employed as excluded instrument. Robust stan-
dard errors are reported in parentheses. First-stage F-stat reported at the foot of the
table. ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.
2.6. Empirical results 107
regression. All the estimates present a value well above ten, commonly known as the threshold
value below which instruments are to be considered weak. A one-percentage point increase in
the share of geographic surface covered by malaria causes a 0.21-percentage point increase in
the share of daily farm workers in agriculture (coefficients not reported). This confirms the
goodness of the choice and the relevance of the instrument, which is positively correlated with
the variable of interest: it does seem to be its exogenous source of variation!
This finding corroborates my previous assumption of causality in the relationship between
short-term contracts in preindustrial Italy and current civic capital levels, confirming that their
negative relationship is not randomly determined.
2.6.5 Spatial analysis
An additional issue to face is represented by the presence of spatial autocorrelation. Indeed, the
hypothesis that spatial clustering is a characteristic of the distribution of social capital over the
italian territory cannot be discarded. This spatial pattern might be the result of the diffusion
of social norms within a community by means of socialization or migration. In addition, the
decision to invest in educating children may be the consequence of an emulative behaviour.
Hence, the payoff attached to values like education, cooperation and solidarity may ultimately
depend on the payoff attached to the same beliefs by nearby households (keep up with the
joneses).
Spatial dependence is here addressed by employing three different specifications. First, I
estimate a spatial error model allowing social capital levels to be affected by common unob-
served factors in neighbouring municipalities. Although the previous specification includes a
variety of control variables potentially influencing the decision of the households to invest in
civic capital, other omitted variables that are correlated across space, such as institutional or
ecological features, might not be orthogonal to the error term in equation 2.1. In this case, the
disturbances would be spatially correlated. I account for this type of spatial dependence using
a weight matrix that models each municipality’s disturbances as being correlated to those of
the municipalities within a radius of 50 km20. The error term is modeled as follows and is not
correlated across space if rho = 0.
 = ρW + v (2.3)
Second, I rely on an alternative specification aimed to estimate a spatial autoregressive
model, called spatial lag model, which includes a spatial lag of the dependent variable within
20We assume that spatial dependence affects districts that are within a radius of 50 km. The weighting
matrix then is based on the inverse of the distance between locations within 50 km from each other.
The results reported here do not change if we employ a spatial matrix whose entries are equal to one
for observations that are contiguous and zero otherwise, thus linking each municipality’s disturbances
only to those of their neighbours (the results are not reported for the sake of brevity).
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the set of the explanatory variables. Civic capital is then not only explained by local features
but also by civic capital levels in close-by municipalities, thereby accounting for the possibility
of some sort of spillover effects. Once again, the level of spatial dependence is structured by a
weighting matrix that links civic capital levels in nearby municipalities (equation 2.4). Thus,
the parameter λ captures the degree of spatial effect.
SocCapi = α+ βshort− termj + γXi + λWSocCapi + i; j < i (2.4)
Lastly, I combine the two preceding models into the more comprehensive specification known
as ”the general spatial model”, and allowing for both sources of spatial dependence to occur:
both spatially correlated errors and a spatial lag of the dependent variable among the regressors
(equation 2.5).
SocCapi = α+ βshort− termj + γXi + λWSocCapi + i;  = ρW + v; j < i (2.5)
Given the endogenous nature of short-term contracts, table 2.9 reports the IV/GMM results
of estimating the previous spatial models using the presence of malaria as excluded instrument.
The same set of controls employed in table 2.8 is accounted for in the analysis.
The first conclusion that emerges is that spatial dependence plays a prominent role in ex-
plaining civic capital. Both the parameters associated to spatial omitted factors, ρ and λ, in the
spatial error model, in the spatial lag model and even in the conservative specification of the gen-
eral spatial model are positive and statistically significant. The only exceptions are represented
by the irrelevance of the parameter ρ in the specification using the dummy for the presence
of an AIDO organization and in the general spatial model employing the number of no-profit
institutions as the main outcome variables. This evidences that greater social capital endow-
ments depend also on spatial omitted variables (such as further geographical and environmental
characteristics, and shared social norms) and spillover effects. The second main finding is that
the share of daily farm workers retains its significance even accounting for different sources of
spatial dependence (except for the spatial lag model using the number of no-profit institutions
as dependent variable).
Short-term tenancy agreements in preindustrial Italy have thus affected current civic capital
levels. However, it is still not clear how in districts presenting a huge number of workers hired
on daily or seasonal basis a low sense of civic engagement has handed down for generations and
generations. Next section proposes a possible channel of transmission of the effect, trying to
uncover the mechanism behind the observed relationship.
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2.7 Mechanism of transmission
Besides the econometric analysis shown above, the question implying how an historical experi-
ence can permanently affect a community’s outcome variable and being correlated with it even
after a prolonged period of time calls for a deeper explanation. A consequence of such a long-
term analysis relating observations from preindustrial societies to present-day outcome levels
is that significant historical changes occurred in between might be overlooked. Moreover, the
relation between the two variables might not be stable over time, and in some cases the sign
could even be reverted at different stages of development (Austin [2008]).
The core of my argument is that the presence of daily and seasonal workers plays an impor-
tant role in explaining current social capital levels. This claim is empirically underpinned by
historical cross-country regressions of several proxies for present-day civic capital on my vari-
able of interest in the past (see section 2.6). Yet, the use of the comparative method might
invoke a misleading conception of ”historical persistence”, which is extensively common within
a much broader literature in economic history based on historical regressions of a similar kind.
In particular, here the natural question to ask is how short-term tenancy agreements negatively
influenced civic capital and, of course, whether the correlation observed in the formal compara-
tive analysis really points to historical causation. Indeed, by relying on a method focusing on the
isolation of alleged causal variables rather than on a strategy that investigates their interaction
with processes of long-term historical change, relevant insights might be lost.
A primary hypothesis put forth by Guiso et al. [2016] for Italy, in line with Banfield [1967], is
that an historical experience or event in the past affects the attitude of the population belonging
to the same community, and such a behaviour passes down to this day through socialization,
oral transmission and education within the family. As for the role of free-city states, they refer
to this cultural trait as ”self-efficacy”, borrowing the concept from Bandura [1995], who defines
it as “the belief in one’s capabilities to organize and execute the courses of action required
to manage prospective situations”. Another hypothesis is that formal or informal institutions
taking shape during the historical experience at stake persist over time, thus carrying on their
cultural heritage and keeping the civic engagement spirit alive. One may think, for example,
of the explanation advanced by Bolt and Bezemer [2009] based on the role of state capacity
and on the distinction between open-access vs limited-access societies (North [1991]) at the core
of Africa’s dismal growth performance in the postcolonial era. Or, again for Italy, guilds and
associations created during the self-government experience during the Middle Ages survived
their disappearance and are still present in several cities of the central and northern part of the
country, although devoid of their previous economic and political purpose.
I propose an alternative explanation, that negatively links the adoption of short-term con-
tracts to the presence of the so-called ”industrial districts”, an argument firstly put forth by
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Ascoli and Paci [1983], and then widely discussed in Becattini [1989], Becattini et al. [2003]. An
industrial district is defined as ”a socio-territorial entity characterized by the active coexistence
(...) of a community of people and a population of industrial enterprises (my own translation
from Becattini [1989]). They started to develop after the Second World War, especially in some
areas of the center and the north-east of Italy, and reaching full maturity during the Seven-
ties. In 2009 they contributed to the export by about 43% of the total production. They are
prevalently composed of an agglomeration of companies, generally of small and medium size,
located in a limited and historically circumscribed territorial area. These firms are specialized
in one or more phases of a production process and integrated through a complex network of eco-
nomic and social relations. In such an environment, local socialization becomes an opportunity
for exchange of information in business relations, not mediated by formal procedures or rules.
Within the boundary of the same community, overlapped with the boundaries of the district
itself, culture and the set of shared norms and values come into play. Indeed, the permanent
grouping of economic agents in the same place usually implies their belonging to the same social
environment, characterized by a common culture and, above all, by common implicit rules of
behaviour (customs). Custom therefore assumes a central role in the functioning of the network
of informal relationships that characterizes the life of businesses and of the district at large.
Remarkably, informal relationships regulated by social norms of this kind entail the custom
of mutual cooperation, based on reciprocal trust among private agents and between them and
public institutions. This, in turn, allowed enterprises within districts to cut down transaction
costs and to remain competitive despite their small size (Becattini et al. [2003], Trigilia [1999]).
2.7.1 Industrial districts and sharecropping
Ascoli and Paci [1983] and Becattini [1989], Becattini et al. [2003] refer to a pre-existing farming
structure and to a particular land tenure, sharecropping, in order to explain the birth of the
industrial districts. Sharecropping and small property in the countryside would have allowed the
sedimentation of a peculiar work ethic, a culture of self-employment, representing in short a sort
of preliminary entrepreneurial socialization. According to their model, subsequently criticized by
Forni [1987], the areas presenting small businesses and diffused capitalism (capitalismo diffuso)
are favored by the traditional presence of a type of agriculture characterized by small family
ownership and by sharecropping activities. In this environment, all the pre-requisites for the
diffusion of the industrial districts can be found. First, both parts of the tenancy contract, the
landowner and the sharecropper, are involved in the production process, whose semi-autonomous
organization is strongly oriented towards capital accumulation for internal investment. Second,
the tenancy agreement envisages a risk-sharing component caused by a high required level of
crop supervision due to their yield variability. Both elements contribute to mitigate social class
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tensions. In addition, the low propensity of the sharecropper to perform duties exclusively for an
external employer ensures that, at the time of urbanization, several peasant families reproduced
peasant culture in the context of small family businesses, being them very flexible and adaptable
to the ”light” industry market (industria leggera). Finally, the countryside is served by a dense
road network and the relationship between urban and rural population is intense. Solidarity
relationships thrive within the extended family, where one can benefit from a farm (podere) for
self-employed activity, and an atmosphere of collaboration favored by the limited social distance
between small entrepreneurs and employees, often relatives, who share the same work ethic.
This results in emulative behavior and working relationships inspired by cooperation rather
than conflict (see Fua` [1983] and Zanotelli [2012]).
2.7.2 Testing the role of industrial districts
Although I provided qualitative evidence of a positive relationship between sharecropping and
industrial districts, quantitative evidence confirming the proposed hypothesis is needed. I col-
lected data from ISTAT reporting municipalities belonging to an industrial district in 2001.
The variable takes on value one whether the municipality is part of an industrial district and
zero otherwise. I regress this indicator on my variable of interest, the fraction of daily workers
in agriculture over the total labor force engaged in agriculture in 1881. Of course, since the
adoption of short-term contracts was in contrast to sharecropping activities, I expect them to
be negatively related with districts (circondarii) containing a large number of municipalities
being part of an industrial district.
Table 2.10 presents results of this test. In column 1, I simply ran a WLS regression with
baseline controls; in column 2 I added dummies for macroregions; in column 3 I performed
an IV regression using the presence of malaria as instrument and adding latitude among geo-
graphic controls, while, ultimately, I estimate a general spatial model in column 4, both adding
a lagged spatial dependent variable within the set of regressors and allowing for disturbances
being spatially-correlated (inverse-distance W matrix with a band of 50 km). All the estimates
show a negative and statistically significant impact of short-term contracts on the presence of
industrial districts; that is, it is less likely to find an industrial district where daily and seasonal
workers were predominant in liberal age.
In order to show that such a mechanism of transmission is plausible, I need to show that
where industrial districts are widespread, the level of civic engagement is higher too. Indeed, if
individuals of a community are socially embedded, we should expect that they would participate
more to the public good because this is a ”customized” behaviour, entrenched in their culture.
That is precisely what I do in table 2.11. While it is difficult to find causation, I can nonetheless
test whether a correlation between the presence of industrial districts and the level of social
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Table 2.10: Mechanism of transmission
Dep.var: Baseline spec. Macroregions IV results General Spatial Model
industrial districts
Day workers share 1881 -0.0060*** -0.0039*** -0.0155*** -0.0036***
0.0009 0.0011 0.0052 0.0013
Elevation -0.2838*** -0.1405*** -0.2476** -0.0116
0.0531 0.0530 0.0999 0.0211
Max difference in elevation 0.0059 0.0073 0.0311 -0.0206**
0.0217 0.0226 0.0307 0.0097
City is on the coast -0.1792*** -0.1035*** -0.0842** 0.0014
0.0300 0.0326 0.0399 0.0124
City more than 5 km from the coast -0.1345*** -0.0826*** -0.0590 -0.0043
0.0317 0.0307 0.0367 0.0176
Population -0.4376*** -0.4326*** -0.3598 -0.2519
0.1455 0.1584 0.2217 0.1545
Population squared 0.1583*** 0.1463** 0.1568* 0.0960
0.0555 0.0606 0.0860 0.0663
Gini land inequality 2001 0.0354 0.0231 0.0251 -0.0662**
0.0862 0.0983 0.1203 0.0260
Gini income inequality index -0.0804 -0.0739 -0.2096 -0.3076***
0.3975 0.3975 0.5029 0.1038
Latitude 0.0000 0.0000***
0.0000 0.0000
lambda 31.5671***
0.9176
rho 87.0263***
2.7862
Area dummies NO YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES
N 7623 7623 7623 7623
adj. R-sq 0.160 0.185 0.071
F 73.48 54.44 42.72
Notes: WLS regression with baseline controls in column 1; WLS regression with
macroregional dummies in column 2; 2SLS estimates with the addition of latitude in
column 3; General Spatial Model with the inclusion of lagged dependent variable and
spatially correlated errors in column 4 (band of 50 km). Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses in the first three columns; spatially correlated errors are reported
in parentheses in column 4. ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.
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Table 2.11: Mechanism of transmission (part 2)
Dep. var.: Ist. no profit Ist. no profit AIDO venue AIDO venue Cars’ inspections Cars’ inspections
Industrial districts 0.3281** 0.3051** -0.1296** 0.0412 0.1168*** 0.0802***
0.1427 0.1426 0.0550 0.0269 0.0152 0.0063
Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
N 7951 7951 7951 7951 7904 7904
adj. R-sq 0.001 0.055 0.012 0.441 0.125 0.332
F 5.290 24.77 5.544 48.14 58.88 796.9
Dep. var.: Cars’ insurance Cars’ insurance Soc. exp. (p.c.) Soc. exp. (p.c.)
Industrial districts 0.1105*** 0.0751*** 0.0799 0.1489***
0.0136 0.0058 0.0676 0.0316
Controls NO YES NO YES
N 7904 7904 7790 7790
adj. R-sq 0.124 0.304 0.002 0.210
F 66.35 679.6 1.397 81.28
Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***Sig-
nificant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.
capital exists. I employ all my proxies for civic capital as dependent variables, and I run WLS
regressions whether the dummy for the presence of industrial districts is the only explanatory
variable or it is included within the set of baseline controls used in table 2.3, column 2. The
results seem to be robust to every specification. Only cities with an organ donation organization
do not present significant association with the variable of interest.
Overall, my conjecture seems to hold. The adoption of short-term contracts in agriculture
in liberal age is negatively associated with the subsequent creation of industrial districts, which
are in turn positively correlated with contemporaneous social capital. The only thing I am left
with is to uncover whether the relationship unveils contributes to explain economic imbalances
between North and South.
2.7.3 Macroregional estimates
In contrast to Guiso et al. [2016], my estimates are computed including all italian municipalities
within the sample. Conversely, the authors consider only municipalities within the center-
north. This has been possible because the experience of self-government in the Middle Ages
was concentrated only in the central and northern part of the country, allowing them to exploit
regional variation within the North to test Putnam’s hypothesis. Therefore, their differentiation
is not just North–South. In my case, however, a similar distinction cannot be reproposed in
principle, as braccianti were clearly present in all italian regions. Nonetheless, I can split the
sample in two subsamples in order to replicate the same empirical exercise. What I do is to
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estimate regressions considering observations alternatively contained in the center-north and in
the south samples (CN and S).
Table 2.12: IV estimates: split sample
IV regression: macroregions Ist.no profit Ist.no profit AIDO venue AIDO venue Cars’ inspections Cars’ inspections
CN S CN S CN S
Day workers share 1881 -0.0365*** 0.0116 -0.0084** 0.0052 -0.0036*** -0.0478
0.0121 0.1439 0.0037 0.0418 0.0006 0.0698
Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
N 5071 2552 5071 2552 5035 2548
adj. R-sq 0.023 0.080 0.426 0.434 0.576 -26.723
F 22.49 11.70 66.58 16.06 1584.0 0.467
1st stage F-stat 78.59 0.453 78.59 0.453 77.45 0.448
IV regression: macroregions Cars’ insurance Cars’ insurance Soc. exp. (p.c.) Soc. exp. (p.c.)
CN S CN S
Day workers share 1881 -0.0022*** -0.0468 -0.0150*** -0.0717
0.0007 0.0696 0.0039 0.1149
N 5035 2548 5011 2453
adj. R-sq 0.544 -27.144 0.333 -0.529
F 625.3 0.357 77.12 5.227
Fstat 77.45 0.448 71.84 0.436
Notes: 2SLS estimates with malaria employed as excluded instrument. Robust stan-
dard errors are reported in parentheses. First-stage F-stat reported at the foot of the
table. ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.
The results are shown in table 2.12, with the same model specification employed in table
2.8 (the coefficients of baseline controls are not reported). All civic capital measures are used
as outcome variables. The parameter of interest associated with the share of daily farm workers
is negative and statistically significant only in the center-north sample, while it is not different
from zero in the south sample. Similarly, malaria pervasiveness contributes to the adoption of
short-term tenancy contracts only in the center-north, as can be derived from the evaluation of
the F-stat of the first-stage regression.
This evidence corroborates the findings reported in the previous section. Without the cre-
ation of the industrial districts, the aptitude for cooperation would not have persisted to this
day. Indeed, the phenomenon of the industrial districts involves prevalently certain areas of
the center-north, while it can be found only in a few parts of the Mezzogiorno. Thoroughly,
although some places of the southern adriatic coast present small industrial districts and the in-
volved municipalities have increased in number in the last decades, the scale of the phenomenon
is still small in proportion to its counterpart in the center-north, and in any case not into an
extent able to trigger a process of social capital accumulation. The findings show that it is then
necessary the imposition of a new institutional setting that embodies such a cultural trait to
transmit it over time.
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2.8 Conclusions
Acemoglu and Robinson [2012] argue that extractive institutions in the past shaped different
paths of development across countries and can then affect economic outcomes even after a
long period of time (long-term persistence). Nevertheless, it is still not clear whether those
institutions either directly affect long-run growth or through their effect on culture. By looking
at the specific case-study of Italy and its mysterious North-South divide, I argue that the
agrarian structure of the economy and its institutions before the land reform took place in 1950
are at the origin of differences in social capital levels recently registered.
In this paper, I try to look at the proportion of daily farm labourers in Post-Unification Italy
at district-level in order to assess whether they had an impact on several indicators of social
capital in the present-day (both those proxying a prosocial behaviour and those indicating
compliance with rule of law). I find that municipalities that were part of districts with a high
share of short-term contracts in liberal age exhibit low civic capital today. The results show that
the observed relationship is causal once using the presence of malaria as an excluded instrument
and controlling for spatial dependence. This has important implications for understanding
the mechanisms behind the formation of differences in social capital levels in the first place,
regardless of the effect on economic outcomes once they are shaped.
Having established a long-term effect of my variable of interest, I try to uncover the mech-
anism behind the observed relationship. I assert that without the creation of the industrial
districts the spirit of civic engagement would not have transmitted for generations and genera-
tions. Mutual cooperation is indeed the fundamental characteristic of people and firms operating
within industrial districts. They flourished prevalently in the Center-North, where sharecrop-
ping activities, characterized by long-term and risk-sharing agreements, were mostly diffused.
Consistent with my conjecture, I find that areas exhibiting a high share of short-term contracts
are negatively related to the presence of industrial districts. Similarly, splitting the sample in the
two subsamples of Center-North and South, the negative association between short-term con-
tracts and civic capital is only found in the former case. This result corroborates the view that
industrial districts have been fundamental to transmit the values of cooperation and common
good up to this day.
In sum, short-term relationships in the labour market with a distorted bargaining power
in favor of one of the two agents induce an opportunistic behaviour of the other. While this
aptitude can persist through time and rarely be changed, a new institutional setting reproducing
a different incentives structure should suddenly have the opposite effect.
Finally, this work puts the accent on a different concept of the cultural trait then translating
into higher civic engagement. As the anthropologist Sahlins argued (Sahlins [2010]), the idea
that our personal interest is embodied in the common interest has been transformed into its
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opposite, i.e. common interest thrives if everybody behaves as a utility- or profit-maximizing
economic agent. Similarly, Guiso et al. [2016] point to the way people rationalize success and
failure (self-efficacy) to explain how civic capital handed down through centuries. They assert
that people with high self-efficacy are more likely to attach success to effort and failure to bad
luck and, conversely, people with low self-efficacy exert little effort because they will attribute
success to luck and failure to lack of effort. By contrast, the mechanism of transmission based
on the role of the industrial districts lies on the conjecture that the maximizing behaviour of the
private agents hinges on the network of interdependent social relations and cooperation among
private agents in the same community and between them and the local public institutions. Had
cooperation and social relations been non-existent, not only trust among people would not have
flourished, but also the small and medium firms of a district would not have been as competitive
as they are today.
Further research should devote more effort to disentangle between the transmission of these
crucial elements via socialization and education or through the creation of new institutions.
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Chapter 3
Stepping into the past: a
reconstruction of the Italian
provincial population (1770
ca.-1861)
We present the first ever population series at provincial level in Italy since 1770 ca. The new data
reveal, in line with national figures, two different regimes: one before 1821, characterized by low
population growth, and another after 1821 with higher rate of population growth. Low growth
regime is interpreted as the longest tail of population depression started after the plague’s waves
of 17th century and prolonged by the Napoleonic wars. By contrast, the high growth regime
shows a substantial persistence of population growth rates and no sign of convergence, perhaps
due to different economic growth patterns. Some exceptional cases of faster growth match the
consensus that these areas were at the core of the Italian economic growth before Unification,
i.e. Florence and Milan.
Acknowledgments: I am grateful for the collaboration of this chapter of my thesis disserta-
tion to Mauro Rota and Michele Postigliola, whose comments and suggestions greatly improved
the quality of the research. I have also benefited from comments and feedback from David
Chilosi, Carlo Ciccarelli, Jacob Weisdorf and two anonymous referees.
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3.1 Introduction
The understanding of Italian economic history should consider the regional imbalances of its
long-term development. For this reason, any informed analysis on the root causes of regional
inequality should be built upon a solid quantitative basis. This urgency is even more compelling
for the pre-unitary period in order to quantify economic and social phenomena before Unification.
In recent years, Ciccarelli and Groote [2017] provided nineteenth century figures for provincial
railways endowments and Ciccarelli and Weisdorf [2019] reconstructed provincial literacy rates
since 1821 onward. Population dynamics reconstruction is therefore one of the very preliminary
steps to pioneer into the past.
This paper provides the first time series of Italian provincial population since 1770 ca. up
to 1861 at some benchmark-years. Our methodology relies on both primary and secondary
sources and makes use of disaggregated data in order to account for several boundary changes
that occurred since 1765 onwards. The bottom-up approach allows us to obtain pre-unification
provincial population at borders of 1871, making it comparable with the correspondent figures
already available for the Post-Unification period. The new provincial data unveil the existence of
different pattern of population growth that neither the overall figures for Italy nor regional data
unfold. The main findings of our preliminary analysis suggest that: i) Italy’s population growth
in the period 1791-1861 can be divided in two different demographic regimes: the low growth
regime from 1791 to 1821 and the high growth regime 1821-1861; ii) a handful of provinces,
notably the ones in the core Tuscany and Milan, grew faster than the Italian average in the low
growth regime; iii) some provinces grew slower in the high growth regime; iv) convergence in
growth rates is effective before 1821 and undetected from 1821 to 1861.
There are several reasons to carry out this exercise. First, having detailed demographic in-
formation for a period whose data are scarce is highly informative for economists and historians,
as the demographic transition of a country represents a crucial tool to analyze its process of de-
velopment and growth. Second, local population data permit to study within-country variability
of different demographic patterns. Third, the reconstruction of the provincial distribution of
population before 1861 represents the first step for building new quantitative evidence on the
pre-unitary period.
History of population in Italy has motivated a wide range of researches. Preindustrial
population dynamics has been used to analyze the decline of Italian economy since the 17th
century. Guido Alfani in a series of papers (Alfani [2010, 2018], Alfani and Percoco [2019]) has
pinpointed that the episodes of plagues during the period 1629-1657 reduced the population
trapping in a low growth regime the Italian economy until 1800. Lower population did not
enhance living standards, through higher real wages, because plagues destroyed human capital
turning into a debasement of labour demand. On the contrary, Capasso and Malanima [2012]
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offer a different perspective. These authors consider the restore of population growth after
1700 as a sign of decline. Higher population depressed real wages and lowered living standards
until the Unification of Italy (1861). However, a recent reconstruction of the long run series of
real wages for Italy in the preindustrial era shows that the decline started after the epidemics
episodes, in line with Alfani’s view, and reinforced during the 18th century (Rota and Weisdorf
[2020]).
Previous studies, constrained by data scarcity, used city-level population or national and
macroregional figures for testing competing theories. Yet, little has been done in historical
research to provide continuous and systematic population time series at a detailed territorial
level. In this respect, historical research would be much more useful if quantitative information
had gathered rather than keep speculating on methods and methodologies to be used. Further-
more, since economic development is a prevalently regional phenomenon, economic historians
have been much more interested in collecting data for intermediate territorial divisions, i.e. re-
gions and provinces. In this respect, Italian demography represents an interesting case study,
as regional disparities are to be traced back to the past. Early studies on population provided
national figures and macro-regions reconstructions before the unification (see Bellettini [1973]
and Del Panta [1996]). Galloway [1994] made the first systematic attempt to estimate regional
populations for key areas in the North of Italy. Additional regional data have been provided by
Travaglini [1933], Romani [1968], Cipolla [1965]. In the present work, we improve demographic
data by providing new estimates for all the Italian provinces in the period 1770 ca.-1861 at the
borders of the Liberal Age and we discuss the preliminary implications of our new series.
The rest of the paper runs as follows. In the next section, we provide an overview of our
data reconstruction, while in Section 3.3 we assess their consistency with alternative sources. In
section 3.4, we provide some indications about the two different demographic regimes we found,
whereas we discuss the main findings in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Data reconstruction
In this section, we provide an overview of the Italian polities from 1770 ca. to 1861 and a
general outline of the process of reconstruction of the provincial population in the pre-unitary
period at benchmark years. As all macroeconomic and demographic research agenda relies on
administrative data, often coming from censuses, parish documents or tax registers, the unit
of observation in historical researches has always been subdivided according to the administra-
tive picture. For this reason, most of the time it is meaningless to compare values referred to
different political entities that have taken place throughout the entire pre-unification period,
because of the different territorial extension. Therefore, we strived to take into consideration
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all the administrative changes in boundaries occurred from the late eighteenth century to Uni-
fication. During its entire history, Italy was divided in several political entities that frequently
changed their administrative structures. During the pre-Napoleonic period, the main ancient
states were: Kingdom of Sardinia, Republic of Genoa, Duchy of Milan, Duchy of Parma and
Piacenza, Republic of Venezia, Duchy of Modena and Reggio, Duchy of Massa and Carrara,
Duchy of Lucca, Granduchy of Tuscany, Principality of Piombino, Papal State, Kingdom of
Naples, and Kingdom of Sicily. After the Restoration, the administrative subdivision dramat-
ically changed, and the Italian peninsula was reordered into the following states: Kingdom
of Sardinia, Lombardo-Veneto, Duchy of Parma and Piacenza, Duchy of Modena and Reggio,
Duchy of Lucca, Granduchy of Tuscany, The Papal states, and Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.
The heterogeneity of our sources prevents the use of a unique methodology for all the
provinces, as pre-unitary polities’ censuses were intermittent, scarce and, in some case, incom-
plete. Moreover, long phases of foreign dominations, such as the French and Napoleonic political
control, substantially complicate the picture. Hence, we proceed by past political entities ac-
counting for infra-polities territorial changes and within polities administrative relocations1. We
made use, when possible, of primary sources, mainly pre-unitary censuses2, and of secondary
sources related to specific periods and regions. When only partial information are available, we
rely upon assumptions to correct the figures, in order to make them as comparable as possible
to the rest of the values. We explain in detail how we reconstructed population values at unitary
borders for each province in the Appendix of this paper where we also present provincial time
series. The benchmark years for which we collect information are reported in Table 3.1, whereas
in figure 3.1 we report the correspondent annual provincial population growth rates, averaged
over the period under analysis.
3.3 Consistency of the new data
Several attempts to reconstruct a trend in the total Italian population have been made so far.
After the seminal works by Beloch [1888], Travaglini [1933], Carlo Maria Cipolla published a
preliminary reconstruction of the Italian demographic history of the early modern age (Cipolla
[1965]). Bellettini [1973] provided a series of the Italian population by century from the birth
of Christ, relying on Beloch’s data too. Further, some minor revisions have been made by
Del Panta [1996], who employed the same data to reconstruct a series for the Italian population
1We take into consideration the annexation of the Venetian provinces, which took place in 1866
after the Third War of Independence, and that of Rome in 1871. For this reason, sometimes we use
“borders in 1871”, “borders in liberal age”, and “borders at Unification” with the same meaning.
2Population censuses carried out by pre-unitary states have been particularly useful, as municipal
or district-level data were reported. These information have been compared to municipal figures drawn
from the 1861 Population Census in order to construct the provincial population at unitary borders.
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Table 3.1: Benchmark years by region and province existing in 1871
Regions Provinces Benchmark years
Piedmont All provinces 1774, 1819, 1824, 1830, 1839, 1828
Liguria All provinces 1788, 1797, 1819, 1824, 1830, 1839, 1848
Lombardy Sondrio, Como, Milan, Bergamo, Brescia, Cremona, Pavia 1774, 1805, 1813-14, 1820-21, 1830-31, 1840-41, 1850-51
Mantua 1771, 1805, 1813-14, 1820-21, 1830-31, 1840-41, 1850-51
Veneto All provinces 1766, 1823, 1843, 1852
Emilia Romagna Bologna, Ferrara, Forl`ı, Ravenna 1769, 1782, 1811, 1816, 1833, 1844, 1853
Modena and Reggio Emilia 1770, 1775, 1790, 1803, 1850
Parma and Piacenza 1787, 1814, 1820, 1839-45
Tuscany Siena, Florence, Arezzo, Pisa, Lucca, Grosseto 1765, 1784, 1794, 1810, 1820, 1830, 1840, 1850
Livorno 1778, 1790, 1810, 1820, 1830, 1840, 1850
Massa-Carrara 1750, 1800, 1810, 1820, 1830, 1840, 1850
Marche All provinces 1782, 1811, 1816, 1833, 1844, 1853
Perugia (Umbria) All provinces 1769, 1782, 1816, 1833, 1844, 1853
Rome (Latium) All provinces 1769, 1782, 1811, 1816, 1833, 1844, 1853
Abruzzo All provinces 1765-66, 1788-90, 1819, 1828, 1840
Campania All provinces 1765-66, 1788-90, 1819, 1828, 1840
Molise All provinces 1765-66, 1788-90, 1819, 1828, 1840
Apulia All provinces 1765-66, 1788-90, 1819, 1828, 1840
Basilicata All provinces 1765-66, 1788-90, 1819, 1828, 1840
Calabria All provinces 1765-66, 1788-90, 1819, 1828, 1840
Sicily All provinces 1748, 1798, 1816-17, 1819-20, 1831-32, 1836-1861
Sardinia All provinces 1782, 1819, 1839, 1844-45, 1848
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Figure 3.1: Annual provincial growth rates per thousand (1785 ca.-
1861)
Notes: Provincial growth rates over the period 1785 ca.-1861. The first available year
for Parma and Piacenza is 1787, while for Genova and Porto-Maurizio is 1788.
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from the Middle Ages onward. Lo Cascio and Malanima [2009] also worked out on Beloch’s
figures to provide alternative estimates, whereas data drawn by Travaglini [1933] distinguish
from the other authors as they report figures referred to borders in 1911. In this Section, we
compare our estimates with their values.
Table 3.2: Italian population: comparison with other sources
Year Our own estimates Bellettini & Cipolla Lo Cascio & Malanima Del Panta et al. Travaglini
1750 \ 15.3 15.5 15.8
1790 17.78 17.48
1800 18.1 17.8 18.1 18.3 17.86
1820 19 20.4 \ 19.5 19
1840 22.3 23.3 \ 22.9 22.35
1850 23.86 \ \ 24.7 24.16
1861 25.01 26.1 26.9 25.7 25.01
In Table 3.2, we can observe how our own estimates for the total Italian population are
in line with the values registered in the main works previously mentioned. Indeed, our own
estimates substantially coincide with the figures drawn by Travaglini [1933], referred to the
total population registered in Italy at unitary borders. By contrast, Bellettini, Cipolla, Del
Panta and co-authors, as well as Lo Cascio and Malanima consider a different area to compute
the Italian population. Specifically, their estimates refer to republican borders, while we are
consistent with boundaries in 1871, when the process of Unification was over. Indeed, the
area of the newly formed state was not destined to remain the same through time. After the
incorporation of Veneto (1866) and Rome (1870), the area of modern Italy varied from 259320
square kms in 1861 to 286610 in 1871. In 1919 it measured about 310120 square kms, while in
1947 it stabilized to an area of 301181 square kms. As Malanima [1998] noted, the practical
choice by historians has been that of assuming an extent comprised between 300000 and 315000
square km, depending on the exclusion or inclusion of border territories such as Nizza, Savoy,
Corsica, Trentino, Trieste, Gorizia, and Istria. Bellettini [1973], Cipolla [1965] declare that
their population values are calculated in relation to a standardized area of 301000 squared kms
as Del Panta and co-authors do. Such a difference can be simply verified by looking at the
figures provided for 1861. Our estimate corresponds to the total Italian population reported in
the corresponding census. More generally, our own estimates do not coincide with the values
provided by the other scholars along the whole nineteenth century, perhaps because of the
different territorial extension taken into consideration.
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Table 3.3: Macroregional estimates: comparison with other sources
Year Bellettini Del Panta Our own Bellettini Del Panta Our own Bellettini Del Panta Our own Bellettini Del Panta Our own
North Center South Islands
1750 6.5 7.7 7.8 3.1 2.4 2.6 3.9 3.9 4.02 1.77 1.8 1.9
1800 7.2 8.5 8.15 3.6 2.8 2.87 4.8 4.9 4.97 2.1 2.1 2.1
1850 \ 11.4 10.68 \ 3.8 3.95 \ 6.8 6.53 \ 2.7 2.69
Notes: Bellettini includes Piedmont, Lombardy, Venetian territories and the Duchies
in the North, the Granduchy of Tuscany and the Papal State in the Center, the Kingdom
of the Two Sicilies (continental part) in the South, and Sicily and Sardinia in the Islands.
Del Panta et al. refer measures to current borders. Our estimates for 1750 are postdated to
the first available year for each province. Hence, they ought to be slightly overestimated.
In Table 3.3, the values for macroregions are reported, along with the corresponding esti-
mates provided by Bellettini [1973] and Del Panta [1996], in order to make them easily com-
parable. Apart from some small differences, our figures fit them at each point in time. The
only relevant imbalance comes from the different construction of the macroregion “North” with
respect to Bellettini’s work. He does not include Bologna, Ferrara, Forl`ı, and Ravenna in the
North, but the corresponding population is computed within the macroregion “Center”. Both
Del Panta et al. and Bellettini’s works include Trentino and Trieste.
In Table 3.4, we report population values for the Italian regions, following the same territorial
subdivision used by Cipolla [1965], Romani [1968] and Travaglini [1933]3 Overall, our measures
coincide with Travaglini’s figures, because of the same territorial extension of the regions and
polities under analysis. Negligible imbalances emerge from the estimation of Tuscany in 1820
and 1840. Such an overestimation may be due to the presence of the district of Rocca San
Casciano, belonging to the Papal State up to Unification that Travaglini does not include. The
other relevant disparity can be observed for Sardinian population at the end of the eighteenth
century. By contrast, Cipolla and Romani do not account for internal administrative boundary
changes, allowing for frequent differences with our estimates.
3The same table is reported in Cipolla [1965], pag. 571 but with a different territorial area considered
for the regions.
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Table 3.4: Regional population estimates at different benchmark years
Author Year Piedmont Lombardy Veneto Liguria Tuscany Papal States Two Sicilies Sardinia
Our estimates 1770 2.08 (1774) 2.1 (1774) 1.7 0.52 (1788) 1.1 (1778) 2.1* 5.65 0.497 (1782)
Cipolla 1770 2.1 1.1 (different area) 2.2 (different area) 0.5 1 2.2 5.6 0.4
Romani 1770 / / / / / / / /
Travaglini 1770 2.5 (includes Liguria) 2.1 1.7 / 1.1 1.95 5.6 0.36
Our estimates 1820 2.1 2.4 1.9 0.59 1.36 2.4 6.9 0.49
Cipolla 1820 2.2 2.2 1.9 0.6 1.3 2.5 7.2 0.5
Romani 1820 2.2 2.2 2.0 (1828) 0.58 (1817) 1.2 (without Lucca) 2.4 7.2 /
Travaglini 1820 2.7 (includes Liguria) 2.4 1.9 / 1.32 2.4 7.0 (Sicily in 1825) 0.395
Our estimates 1840 2.5 2.8 2.1 0.71 1.75 2.829 8.14 0.53
Cipolla 1840 2.5 2.5 2.2 0.7 1.7 2.8 8.1 0.5
Romani 1840 2.68 (1838) 2.5 2.16 0.697 (1838) 1.495 (without Lucca) 2.77 8.2 /
Travaglini 1840 3.25 (includes Liguria) 2.8 2.1 / 1.66 2.77 8.2 0.55
Notes: Population is in millions. Values for the provinces of Marche within the Pa-
pal States are taken in 1782. The Papal States include the provinces of Rome, Perugia,
Ancona, Ascoli, Macerata, Pesaro-Urbino, Bologna, Ferrara, Forl`ı and Ravenna. All the
values are expressed at borders in 1871. Travaglini takes into account the same geograph-
ical area we do, whereas Cipolla and Romani gathered values at republican borders.
In Table 3.5, we report population growth rates resulting from our own elaborations referred
to the full set of Italian regions in the two subperiods 1775 ca.-1820 and 1821- 1861. We
compare them with the same growth rates reported in Del Panta [1984], pag. 28. Generally,
the estimates do not differ enormously, whenever the boundaries coincide, as in the case of
Piedmont, Lombardy, Veneto, Sicily, and nineteenth century Tuscany. Marche is a notable
exception, although Del Panta et his coauthors report population at boundaries in liberal age,
taken from Bonelli [1967]. In this case, the discrepancy in growth rates are due to the fact that
neither Del Panta et al. nor Bonelli provide proper data for the eighteenth century. Likewise
table 3.4 our estimates for Sardinia diverge from previous works, to the extent that they use
Corridore [1990] rather than the more accurate data provided by Beloch et al. [1994].
3.4 Two demographic regimes
The long-term Italian demography reveals two distinct regimes. The first falls in the period
1791-1821, which was a low demographic growth regime featured by growth of population below
the secular average. The second regime, instead, began in 1821 and reinforced after Unification.
In the second phase, population growth rates were fairly higher than the secular trend (see Figure
3.2). Our preliminary interpretation points to two main reasons why the period 1791-1821 is a
low growth regime for population.
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Table 3.5: Population growth rates (per thousand inhabitants)
Region Period Del Panta et al. Our Period Del Panta et al. Our
Piedmont 1824-1861 5.9 5.7
Liguria 1805-1822 3.9 4.2 1822-1861 5.6 6.6
Lombardy 1789-1821 3.9 3.6 1821-1861 7.2 7.2
Veneto 1789-1821 1.8 1.5 1821-1861 5.6 5.3
Parma-Piacenza/ 1814-1821 -2.5 2.6 1821-1861 5 5.2
Modena-Reggio Emilia
Emilia (Romagna) 1833-1861 5.6 6.9
Tuscany 1794-1814 3 3.9 1821-1861 8.9 8.8
Marche 1782-1827 3.1 4.1 1827-1861 4.4 3.7
Umbria 1782-1827 2.4 4.7 1827-1861 7.7 6.6
Latium 1782-1811 -4.4 -4.7 1833-1853 6.6 6.1
Abruzzi 1793-1828 6.1 4.2 1828-1861 4.2 4.5
Molise 1789-1821 4.9 1828-1861 3.9
Campania 1789-1821 2.7 3 1828-1861 3.8 3.4
Apulia 1789-1821 4.8 5.6 1828-1861 8.3 6.9
Basilicata 1789-1821 3.1 4.3 1828-1861 3.7 3.7
Calabria 1789-1821 5.4 4.8 1828-1861 5 4.7
Sicily 1798-1831 4.6 4.9 1831-1861 7 6.93
Sardinia 1782-1821 1.4 -2.92 1821-1861 6.1 4.5
Notes: Del Panta computed population growth rates using provincial borders in 1980.
The value for Abruzzi counts the population of Molise. We have not reported the rate for
Emilia-Romagna in the first period because Del Panta has no data.
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Figure 3.2: Italian population growth rates
Notes: Population growth rate and average growth rate over the considered time span.
First, it was the result of the long waves of epidemics started in 1630 and lasted until
1800 (Alfani [2018], Alfani and Percoco [2019]). Second, the long depression was occasionally
prolonged by the outbreaks of Napoleonic wars that depressed population growth by increasing
mortality rates and reducing food availability in Italy through the Napoleonic blockage (Federico
and Dincecco [2018]). The high growth regime began after the Restoration. At a first glance,
population grew probably as the result of a rebound effect after the long depression. Moreover,
the lack of persistent epidemics and an incipient industrialization process sustained population
increases. A further interesting fact we find is the lowering of growth rates in 1831-41, because
of a famine (Alfani [2018], Fusco [2012]), and above all of the occasional spreading of cholera
epidemics (Del Panta [1996]). Indeed, the cyclical downturn of population growth is concomitant
with the first cholera epidemic that hit Italy in 1835-1837. It was the first time cholera assumed
pervasive power penetrating all preunitary kingdoms and sparing few areas.
Provincial data provide us with some notable exceptions to the national patterns. In figure
3.3, we show the annual provincial growth rates in the two periods, compared to the secular
Italian population growth rate. On the one hand, in the left-hand side of the graph, we observe
the provinces performing worse than the Italian average in the first period. On the other hand,
in the right-hand side we can find the provinces above the average. The same reasoning applies
with regard to the second regime, with provinces above and below the secular population growth
rate (this time with respect to the y-axis).
During the low regime, we have identified a group of provinces that grew faster than the
national average. They are gathered in the core of Tuscany and in the area stretching from
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Figure 3.3: The two demographic regimes at province-level
Notes: Provincial population growth rates in the first period, 1775 ca.-1821 (x-axis),
and in the second period, 1821-1861 (y-axis) are expressed in thousands per year. The
dashed lines correspond to the Italian growth rate per thousands, averaged over 1775
ca.-1861.
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Milan to Cremona. Other areas above the national average are sparse and without any specific
geographic polarization. In the subsequent phase, 1821-1861, almost all the provinces grew
above the Italian secular average following the national growth pattern. A group of provinces,
conversely, grew slower. The provinces with lower growth rates are located in western Veneto,
eastern Lombardy, Campania and Marche. Again, the other few scattered provinces that depart
from the long-term growth do not show any exclusive spatial distribution.
To provide additional proof of the existence of two demographic regimes, we move one step
forward, and we analyze whether we register unconditional convergence in population growth
rates.
Table 3.6: Population growth rate. Dependent variable: population
growth rates at provincial level.
1775-1821 1775-1821 1775-1821 1821-1861 1821-1861 1821-1861
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(pop1775) -0.0985*** -0.1127*** -0.0974**
0.0298 0.0313 0.0398
log(pop1821) -0.0478 -0.043 -0.022
0.0319 0.0331 0.0391
Constant 1.3547*** 1.4939*** 1.2465** 0.8600** 0.7971* 0.5874
0.3703 0.3809 0.5277 0.4005 0.4229 0.5168
Macroregions NO YES NO NO YES NO
Regional dummies NO NO YES NO NO YES
N 69 69 69 69 69 69
adj. R-sq 0.194 0.322 0.286 0.044 0.025 0.227
F 10.9 6.996 . 2.241 0.813 .
Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***Signif-
icant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 1%. The value of the initial population is
taken in 1778 for the Tuscan provinces, in 1782 for the provinces in Marche and Sardinia,
in 1788 for Parma and Piacenza and the provinces of Liguria, in 1774 for the rest of the
sample.
When we consider the entire sample with 69 provinces (Table 3.6), two patterns are visible:
β-convergence is found in the 1775-1821 period, while we do not find the same evidence for the
period 1821-1861. In column 2 and 3 we control for the inclusion of, respectively, macroregions
and regional dummies, and the results do not vary. In column 5 and 6 we repeat the same
exercise for the subsequent period, and still the level of significance does not change. In Table
3.7 the sample is restricted to the inclusion of only 16 regions. We assess β-convergence for the
same two subperiods, both unconditional and with the inclusion of macroregional dummies in
order to capture unobservable heterogeneity common to macroareas. We do not find significant
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results for every specification. However, the sign of the coefficient associated with the lagged
dependent variable is negative in the first period, but it becomes positive in the second period,
meaning that a process of divergence was taking place (even though not significantly).
To have a clear vision, we reported a graph with four scatterplots associated with columns
1 and 4 of Table 3.6, and columns 1 and 3 of Table 3.7 (the regressions evaluating unconditional
convergence). It is straightforward to observe the presence of unconditional convergence in
population growth rates at province-level in the first period, culminating with the end of the
Napoleonic wars and the Restoration (see figure 3.4). The least populated areas were catching
up with the most populated ones to a significant extent. By contrast, during the “Risorgimento”,
such a pattern is not visible, if not in a non-significant way. Looking at regional scatterplots
the landscape is not different. All the Italian regions follow the dual regime with no exceptions.
A convergence process is at stake in the low regime, whereas divergence in population occurred
after 1821, mainly driven by the northwestern regions, which were likely to be at the beginning
of a phase of divergence. It is even interesting to note that Piedmont and Emilia Romagna,
two regions longer hit by Napoleonic wars, experienced among the lowest growth rates. Only
Lombardy, another region at the center of war scenarios, had comparatively higher growth rates
signaling a resurgence of agricultural and industrial activities (Sella [2014]).
3.5 Discussion of results
Population and economic development are strongly related. During the Middle Ages, a positive
view prevailed: population was considered the real wealth of a country, and the source of its
economic strength. Thereafter, D. Ricardo and R.T. Malthus (Malthus et al. [1992], Ricardo
[1821]) proposed an alternative approach, which deemed negatively the relationship between
population and economic activity. Specifically, population growth inevitably resulted in a de-
crease in productivity and resources per worker. A higher population density was also considered
one of the main causes of the spread of epidemics and death the inevitable mechanism of read-
justment of the balance between population and natural resources. The positive view regained
success after the Second World War, with the seminal work by Boserup [2014]. In her view, the
growth in population might induce innovation in technology, because of the attitude of people to
become more industrious. In this context, population pressure forces individuals to intensively
cultivate land and to exploit new rotation techniques. The intensification and innovation in
agriculture are conducive to economic progress and a more efficient exploitation of resources.
Hence, population growth and technical innovation in agriculture go hand in hand, ultimately
resulting in better living standards for poor people. During the same years, also Kuznets [1967]
investigated the relationship between population and economic growth. Although highlighting
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Table 3.7: Population growth rate. Dependent variable: population
growth rates at regional level.
1775-1821 1775-1821 1821-1861 1821-1861
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(pop1775) -0.0343 -0.012
0.0332 0.0364
log(pop1821) 0.0175 0.0298
0.0192 0.0286
Constant 0.6062 0.2513 0.0181 -0.1558
0.4674 0.5199 0.2648 0.3962
Macroregions NO YES NO YES
N 16 16 16 16
adj. R-sq -0.008 0.048 -0.032 -0.342
F 1.067 6.144 0.837 0.413
Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***Sig-
nificant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 1%. The value of the initial population
is taken in 1778 for Tuscany, in 1782 for Marche and Sardinia, in 1788 for Parma and
Piacenza and Liguria, and in 1774 for the remaining regions.
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Figure 3.4: Scatterplots of unconditional convergence in population
Notes: Unconditional convergence in population at province-level [top-side (3.6,
columns 1 and 4)] and regional level [bottom-side (Table 3.7, columns 1 and 3)] both
in the two periods 1775-1821 [left-side] and 1821-1861 [right-side].
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that the average growth rate of total product had been substantially higher than the correspond-
ing population growth rates during the post-World War II in all western countries, he is more
cautious in providing striking and conclusive results. He argued that without suitable economic,
social and technical conditions, the underdeveloped countries, although registering the highest
population growth rates and possessing a large potential for economic growth, are not allowed
to divert modern technologies and their economic resources from current product into capital.
After the studies of Esther Boserup and Simon Kuznets, the theory of economic growth has
consolidated the so-called positive view of the economy-population relationship, with the recent
revisions of the neoclassical theory through the endogenous growth models (Romer [1990]) and
the more recent unified growth theory (Galor and Weil [2000], Galor [2011]). Population is now
seen as an engine of technological progress and economic growth due to the increased diffusion
of knowledge and the formation of human capital (Kremer [1993]).
If we assumed that population growth is a sign of economic development per se`, in line
with the views of Boserup, we could infer that before 1821 the areas of central Tuscany and
Milan were at the core of the comparative economic development of Italy. This interpretation
overlaps the consolidated view that the two areas had some signs of rising industrialization (Sella
[2014]) even before Unification. On the contrary, after 1821, the provinces with lower growth
rates would suggest the existence of wide areas of relative underdevelopment until Unification.
However, we would need more information to support this view. Population growth rates should
be compared with other relevant economic variables, such as real wages, for designing a more
informed scenario on the spatial distribution of progressive and underdeveloped areas. At the
state of the art, the coverage of provincial distribution of real wages before unification is largely
incomplete.
Another perspective is offered by the correlation between technological change in agriculture
and population growth. Alfani [2010] documents the introduction of new advances in agrarian
technology due to new crops and new rotation techniques, especially in the northern regions. The
introduction of rice and maize cultivations for exports, used in crop rotations to eliminate fallow,
constituted an important element of variety in agriculture. Moreover, it represented a new way
of insurance against an excessive weather variability. This is due to the different reaction of each
crop to severe meteorological conditions, rendering crop variety a fundamental insurance against
the risk of a dearth from developing into a famine. Also institutional factors played a role, since
the characteristics of provision authorities changed over the period considered in order to better
balance the risks of bad weather. Capasso and Malanima [2012], following a similar argument,
highlight the role of “land and labour intensifications” during the same period.
All these factors made possible to break the ceiling of about 6.5 million people in the North
that had been insurmountable until the eighteenth century. The introduction of new agricultural
innovations in the northern regions spread during the nineteenth century to other provinces,
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ultimately generating surplus of food able to support a general rise in population.
3.6 Conclusions
The scarcity of solid statistical evidence before the unification hampers any informed analysis
of Italy’s long-term economic growth, especially for what concerns its provincial disparities.
We contribute to fill this gap by providing the first ever population series at provincial level
starting from 1770 ca. to Unification, which constitutes the essential statistical basis for future
historical researches. We made use both of primary and secondary sources to get information
on population figures at some benchmark years at the borders of 1871. Further, by employing
a bottom-up approach, whenever possible, we collected data at municipal or district-level, and
then we assembled those considering provincial borders in 1871, i.e. when the Unification process
ended.
This contribution is not limited to a pure data record. Our data permit the identification
of two different demographic regimes at provincial levels. The low regime, from 1780 to 1821, is
characterized by low growth rates of population. The high regime is instead the one that began
during the Restoration and lasted for the rest of the nineteenth century. Some areas escape
the previous classifications. Large part of Tuscany and the area surrounding Milan showed
a high demographic regime also during 1780-1821, while provinces in western Veneto, eastern
Lombardy, Marche and Campania grew slower than Italian average during the high regime. Our
findings about population dynamics should be compared to other notable evidence such as real
wages, migration flows and human capital accumulation to assert whether population growth
was correlated with root causes of economic development. Next researches can benefit from
provincial population data for building more solid evidence of regional patterns of economic
growth and for testing alternative theories.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Kingdom of the two Sicilies (continental part)
We account for changes occurred in 1816 and in 1861. Indeed, the administrative internal
boundaries of the entire kingdom were reordered in 1816, as a result of the emanation of Legge
fondamentale del Regno delle Due Sicilie, and in 1861, when the Kingdom was annexed to Italy,
following the administrative reform of the Rattazzi decree, issued in 1859. As for the nineteenth
century, we rely upon the work by Marzolla [1832], who reports municipal data in 1828 from
the population census for the continental part of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Figures
for 1819 and 1840 related to preunitary provinces come from, respectively, Petroni [1826] and
Napoli [1857]. We use the value referred to 1830 as a pivotal figure in order to reconstruct the
population in 1819 and 1840. As a first step, we reassigned each municipality present in the
1828 Census to the province which it belonged in 1871. Then, we obtained the relative weights
acounting for within province boundary changes occurred at Unification, and we applied them
to the figures for 1819 and 1840. As for the eighteenth century, we rely on provincial data at
pre-1816 borders coming from the work by Beloch et al. [1994], which seems to our knowledge
the most recent and comprehensive work on the evolution of the italian population up to 1800.
Even in this case, we employed the pivotal measure referred to 1828 Census.We briefly describe
for each province the method through which we reconstructed its population time series. We
mainly focus on the reconstruction of the benchmark years of the eighteenth century, as the
procedure employed to obtain figures for 1819 and 1840 is the same for all the provinces.
Foggia
Data for the population of Capitanata, the former name of Foggia, are reported for 1765, 1788
and 1794 at the borders prior to the Bourbon reform. In 1788, the ancient province of Capitanata
included some municipalities of Campobasso, the district of Larino, and some municipalities of
the district of San Bartolomeo in Galdo, after Unification belonging to the province of Benevento,
as well as two municipalities of the district of Ariano Irpino. Further, we are given with the
figure for the population net of the district of Larino (see Beloch et al. [1994], pag. 165). We
then use the data in 1828 to reconstruct the population of Capitanata in 1828 according to
pre-1816 borders, and we compute the relative weights of the areas that no longer fall under
Capitanata supervision after Unification (see also page 159 and pages 164-165). Lastly, we apply
these weights to population values of 1765 and 1788.
Salerno
Data for the province of Salerno are taken following the same procedure. Values for the ancient
province of Principato Citra are reported for 1765, 1775 and 1790 (see page 176) at the borders
pre-1816 reform. Principato Citra included the whole unitary province of Salerno, the district
of Castellammare di Stabia and the island of Capri, including some municipalities belonging to
the unitary provinces of Avellino and Potenza. Thus, we employ municipal data coming from
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the Population Census in 1828 to reconstruct the population of Principato Citra at pre-1816
borders. Then, we can compute the relative weight of the population of Salerno over the total
population living in the “virtual” province of Principato Citra. Finally, we apply this proportion
to values in 1765 and 1775.
Caserta
We applied the same procedure to construct the population of Caserta at unitary borders. First,
we sum up in 1828 the population of municipalities belonging to the province of Caserta in 1861.
Then, since we only have data for the population of the ancient territory of Terra di Lavoro in
1765 and 1788, we add the value of the population located in the territories belonged to Terra di
Lavoro (except the province of Caserta, which is already included) to the 1830 estimate. Then,
we obtain the relative weight of Caserta population over the total population living in Terra di
Lavoro. Finally, we apply this weight to the values of the true figures of the province of Terra
di Lavoro in 1765 and 17884.
Avellino
First, we utilized the pivotal figure of the Population Census in 1828 to construct the popu-
lation of the province of Avellino. We summed up the number of inhabitants living in that
municipalities belonging to the province in 1861. Then, we built up the population of the an-
cient province of Principato Ultra in 1828 as it was reported for 1790, and we computed the
fraction of inhabitants living in the province of Avellino at unitary borders5. We applied the
ensuing percentage to the true amount of the population living in Principato Ultra in 1790,
and the resulting value was finally augmented by 18.93% in order to account for the number of
inhabitants that Avellino gained at Unification. Such a weight takes into account the fraction
of people living in the territories of Capitanata, Principato Citra and Terra di Lavoro before
Unification, and then joining the province of Avellino in 1861. The value for 1765 was simply
drawn by applying the percentage of Avellino population over the total number of inhabitants
living in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in 1790.
Potenza
The population of the province of Potenza in 1828 was computed following the usual procedure.
With respect to the other provinces, negligible changes occurred in 1816. Therefore, we did not
4In the period prior to the 1816 reform, the ancient province of Terra di Lavoro was composed by:
the whole province of Caserta, except Pontecorvo, the province of Naples, without the city and its Casali,
some municipalities of the district of Castellammare di Stabia belonging to Principato Ultra, several
municipalities of the province of Campobasso, almost the entire district of Cerreto, in the province of
Benevento, and some municipalities of Avellino.
5Principato Ultra corresponds to the provinces of Benevento and Avellino at unitary borders (see
Beloch et al. [1994], pag. 156).
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apply any correction to the values reported by Beloch [1959] for 1790 and by Beloch et al. [1994]
for 17656.
Molise (Campobasso) and Benevento
We computed the population of Molise and Benevento in a residual way. We first compute
the population in 1828 from the Census. We subtract the total sum of the population living
in Benevento and Molise from the total population living in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.
Then, we compute the fraction of inhabitants living in Benevento and Molise over their sum, and
we apply these weights to the same residual difference in 1788. Finally, we add a forfeit number
of 19000, including the inhabitants of the city of Benevento and its surroundings, previously
belonging to the Papal State. The value for 1765 was simply drawn by computing the percentage
of the population of Campobasso and Benevento over the total number of inhabitants living in
the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in 1790, and applying it to 17657.
Naples
As usual, we calculated the population of the province of Naples in 1828 taking municipal data
coming from the Population Census in 1861. We exploit the level of territorial disaggregation to
compute the fraction of inhabitants located in Principato Citra until the end of the eighteenth
century (about 0.165%), which joined Naples at Unification. Finally, we apply this percentage
to the values reported for 1765 and 1788 (sum of the inhabitants of Napoli Citta`, Napoli Diocesi
and Parrocchie Regie).
Catanzaro and Reggio Calabria
We computed the population of Catanzaro and Reggio Calabria at unitary borders following
municipal data coming from the Population Census in 1828. Further, we obtain the percentage
of inhabitants living in the provinces of, respectively, Catanzaro and Reggio Calabria, and we
apply them to the value of the population of Calabria Ulteriore in 1765 and 17888.
Cosenza
The population of the province of Potenza in 1828 was computed following the usual procedure.
With respect to the other provinces, no changes occurred in 1816.
6Since it was more in line with subsequent values, we preferred the value of 361418 attributed by
Beloch [1959] for 1788, rather than the value of 325992 assigned by Beloch et al. [1994].
7Indeed, Beloch et al. [1994] report a value referred to the whole province of Calabria Ulteriore (I
and II), corresponding to the joint provinces of Catanzaro and Reggio Calabria after 1861.
8The population of Avellino, Molise and Benevento in 1765 is included in the figure provided by
Beloch et al. [1994] referred to the ancient province of Montefusco, coinciding with the borders of
Principato Ultra. Nevertheless, the value (286897) seems clearly underestimated. Hence, we opted for
the aforementioned alternative method.
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Chieti, Teramo and L’Aquila
We reconstruct the population of the provinces of Chieti, L’Aquila and Teramo in 1828 in the
usual way. Further, since no internal changes occurred involving their boundaries, we do not
apply any correction to data reported for 1765 and 1788.
3.7.2 Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (Sicily)
Data for all the provinces of Sicily come from Castiglioni [1862] and, specifically for 1830, from
Marzolla [1832]. They are only available since 1816, after the constitution of the Kingdom of
the Two Sicilies as a result of the Restoration. We have figures for 1816, 1819, 1830 and for
every single year from 1836 up to Unification. Unfortunately, we cannot provide values for
the provincial population before 1816, since Sicily did not undergo the same administrative
partition. Indeed, it was divided in three provinces: Val Demone, Val di Mazzara and Val di
Noto. Hence, it is impossible to reconstruct provincial population at unitary borders without
having municipal data at our disposal. Nonetheless, we provide two reliable estimates drawn by
Beloch et al. [1994] for 1748 and 1798, by assuming that the population was distributed within
provinces according to the same proportions obtainable from the closest available benchmark
year, namely 1816. Finally, we split the total population of Sicily among provinces by applying
this weight. In such a way it is possible to get a reliable estimate even for the eighteenth century.
3.7.3 The Papal State
Provinces previously belonging to the Papal State underwent two different administrative re-
forms that substantially changed their internal borders. On the contrary, external borders,
apart from negligible changes and relocations of a handful of municipalities, remained the same
throughout the period under analysis. The two main changes refer to the issue of the motu
proprio by Pio VII, occurred on the 6th of July 18169, which completely reordered the internal
administrative borders of the State, and the Unification process, here taking place between 1861
and 1871. Data for the pre-1816 come from various sources, while data for the subsequent years-
1816, 1833, 1844 and 1853- come from Del Panta [1996], pag.40.
Rome (Latium)
Summing the population of the ancient provinces of Lazio, Sabina, Patrimonio and Campagna
and Marittima, whose borders are laid out by Beloch et al. [1994], pag.216, and subtracting the
population of the diocese of Rieti10, it is possible to obtain the population of the province of
Rome in 1769 and 1782 at unitary borders. Data are taken from Schiavoni and Sonnino [1980],
pages 207-215. As for 1816, 1833, 1844 and 1853, we summed up the population of Roma,
Comarca, Frosinone, Velletri, Civitavecchia and Viterbo.
9The complete name of the law is “Quando per ammirabile disposizione della divina Provvidenza.
Sull’organizzazione dell’amministrazione pubblica”.
10The population of the diocese of Rieti for 1769 is obtained by linear interpolation between 1748
and 1782.
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Perugia (Umbria)
The population of Perugia for two benchmark years at the end of the eighteenth century (1769
and 1782) comes from Beloch et al. [1994], who report data for the ancient administrative
province of Umbria. We rely on the borders laid out at pag. 227 to provide a measure of
the population of Perugia at unitary borders. By doing so, we sum up the population of the
ancient territory of Patrimonio d’Orvieto, Gubbio, Costacciaro and Scheggia, and we deduct
the population of Ascoli Arquata, Ancona Sassoferrato and Camerino Visso11. These data are
provided by Corridore (1906) for 1782. Further, we compute the fraction of the population
resulting from these territorial changes, and we apply it to 1769. As for 1816, 1833, 1844 and
1853, we sum up the population of Orvieto, Perugia, Rieti and Spoleto, coinciding with the
province of Perugia in liberal age, less than Foligno and Nocera Umbra. Therefore, we calculate
the fraction of the population belonging to these two municipalities in 1861, and we correct our
estimate for its percentage.
3.7.4 Marche
We gather data for the provinces of Marche from Corridore [1906], who reports figures at mu-
nicipal level in 1782, and measures referred to the ancient provinces and districts for 1816, 1833,
1844 and 1853. Pre-unitary territorial changes due to the issue of the motu proprio in 1816 are
reported in Beloch et al. [1994], pag. 231, and in Corridore [1906], pag. 40.
Ascoli
The province of Ascoli in 1782 is reconstructed summing the population of the ancient territory
of the Presidio di Montalto, the districts of Ascoli, Fermo and Arquata, the latter being part of
Umbria in pre-unitary times. Then, we deducted the population of Gualdo, Mogliano, Petriolo,
Sant’Angelo, at the time belonging to the province of Macerata. As for 1816, 1833, 1844 and
1853, we summed the values of the districts of Ascoli and Fermo, that we augmented for the
percentage of Arquata, still in Umbria even in the post-1816 reform period.
Macerata
For the province of Macerata in 1782, we summed the population of the municipalities belonging
to the ancient territories of the Governo di Macerata, Stato di Camerino, Luoghi Baronali and
Governi Diversi. Then, we deducted the population of Castelfidardo, Corinaldo, Montealboddo,
Filottrano, Montenuovo, Osimo, Serra dei Conti, Serra San Quirico, Staffolo, Rocca Contrada,
Castelleone, San Donato and Ripalta, which moved to the province of Ancona at Unification.
Further, we added the population of Visso, at the time in Umbria, and Gualdo and Mogliano,
at the time in Ascoli. As for 1816, 1833, 1844 and 1853, we summed the values of the districts
of Mac- erata and Camerino, plus some municipalities12. Therefore, we computed the fraction
11Notice that these corrections will also be applied to the provinces of origin.
12These municipalities correspond to: Fabriano, Loreto, Sassoferrato, Filottrano, Serra San Quirico,
and San Donato.
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of inhabitants living in these municipalities in 1782, and we adjusted the population value in
subsequent years for such a proportion.
Ancona
As for the province of Ancona in 1782, we summed the population of the municipalities belonging
to the Governo di Ancona, Governo di Jesi, Governo di Macerata, Luoghi Baronali, Duchy
of Urbino, Governo di Fano, and province of Feltria. Moreover, we added the population of
Sassoferrato, at the time in Umbria. As for 1816, 1833, 1844 and 1853, we summed the values of
the district of Ancona, less than Cerreto, Fabriano, Filottrano, Genga, Loreto, Monsano, Ostra,
Ostra Vetere, Santa Maria Nuova, Sassoferrato, Senigallia, and Serra San Quirico. Therefore,
as well as the province of Macerata, we applied the proportion of the population living in these
municipalities in 1782 to the figures for the subsequent years, in order to correct the original
value.
Pesaro-Urbino
For the province of Pesaro-urbino in 1782, we summed the population of municipalities belonging
to the Duchy of Urbino, Governo di Fano, province of Feltria, Luoghi Baronali and the province
of Massatrabaria. We subtracted the population of Ripalta, Tomba, Monterado, Ripe, and
Senigallia, that are added to Ancona, the population of Gubbio, Costacciaro, Civitella Ranieri,
Coccorano and Scheggia, moving to the province of Perugia, and the population of Massanente,
Montepetra, Rontagano and Savignano di Rigo, which moved to the province of Forl`ı. As
for 1816, 1833, 1844 and 1853, we summed the values of the province of the same name, plus
some municipalities moving elsewhere at Unification. These are: Gubbio, Costacciaro, Pacilupo,
Scheggia, Senigallia, Tomba, Monterado and Ripe. Therefore, as before, we corrected the figures
for the subsequent benchmark years by applying the proportion of the population living in these
municipalities in 1782.
3.7.5 Romagna
Bologna
We report figures for the population of the Stato di Bologna in 1769 and 1782 from Beloch
et al. (1994). Since the figure does not count the population corresponding to the unitary
district of Imola, we add its population in order to obtain the total population of the province
of Bologna at unitary boundaries13. An estimate for the territory of Imola is available for 1769
and 1783 (Beloch et al. [1994], pag. 259). As for 1816, 1833, 1844 and 1853, figures are referred
to the whole province, except the municipalities of Bentivoglio, Castello d’Argile, Castello di
Serravalle, Castenaso, Sant’Agata, Castel del Rio, Dozza, Fontana Elice, Mordano and Bagni
13Some changes occur during the pre-unitary period, but they involve only few municipalities. Hence,
we can neglect them.
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della Porretta. Therefore, we compute the percentage of the corresponding population in 1861
over the total population of the province of Bologna, and we add it.
Ferrara
Beloch et al. [1994] and Beloch et al. [1994] report data referred to the ancient province of Ferrara
for 1769 and 1782. We compare the municipalities within the ancient province in 1769 and the
ones in the liberal province in 1861, and then we subtract the population belonging to the district
of Lugo, by summing up the population of the dioceses of Imola in the legation of Ferrara (terra di
Lugo, territory of Lugo, vicariate of Barbiano, territory of Cottignola, Massa Lombarda and its
countryside), as well as the population of the vicariate of Bagnocavallo, vicariate of Cottignola,
vicariate of Fusignano, vicariate of Sant’Agata, vicariate of Sant’Andrea and vicariate of San
Pietro in Lacuna. We apply the same percentage of these territories to the value in 1782, and
we get the proper value for this benchmark year. As for 1816, 1833, 1844 and 1853, we take the
values for the province of the same name, including the district of Lugo. Hence, we subtract
our estimate for the district of Lugo, coming from the linear interpolation of the corresponding
value in 1769 and the value we find in Population Census in 186114.
Ravenna
As for 1816, 1833, 1844 and 1853, we take the values related to the province of the same
name, less than the district of Lugo and including the district of Imola. We use the same
estimates of the territory of Lugo we obtained for the province of Ferrara and we sum them up
to the value of Ravenna population. Afterwards, we get an estimate of the district of Imola,
by dividing the corresponding population of the circondario in 1861 over the total population
of the province of Ravenna. Then, we apply this percentage to the figures of 1816, 1833, 1844
and 1853. Furthermore, we divide the resulting population of Ravenna by the total population
of delegazione di Romagna. Since we have at our disposal this information for 1769 and 1782,
we finally apply this percentage to the figures referred to these two years.
Forl`ı
We report estimates for the province of Forl`ı in 1816, 1833, 1844 and 1853 by Corridore [1906].
Then, we divide this figure by the total population of the delegazione di Romagna, and we apply
the resulting percentage on the measures provided by Beloch et al. [1994] for Romagna in 1769
and 1782.
3.7.6 Granduchy of Tuscany (Tuscany) and Duchy of Lucca
As for the Granduchy of Tuscany and the Duchy of Lucca, we utilized two sources of data: Ban-
dettini [1957] and Beloch et al. [1994]. In the first source, we find yearly data at municipal level
from 1810 until 1861 at 1950 borders. We exploit the detailed level of territorial disaggregation
14Our estimate approximates the figure provided by Castiglioni [1862].
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to construct provincial population at borders in liberal age15. For the sake of exposition, we
decided to report data only for five benchmark years: 1810, 1820, 1830, 1840 and 1850. In the
second source, we get estimates for some benchmark years in the end of the eighteenth century.
We adjust these measures according to data for each ancient diocese on a case-by-case scale.
Arezzo
We get estimates for 1765, 1784 and 1794 by summing up the total population of the dioceses
of Arezzo, Sansepolcro, Sestino, Montefeltro and Cortona16. Data for 1810, 1829, 1830, 1840
and 1850 are adjusted for the corresponding fraction of the population of Santa Maria Tiberina,
later on moving to the province of Perugia.
Florence
We get estimates for 1765, 1784 and 1794 by summing up the total population of the dioceses
of Florence, Fiesole and San Miniato, plus 75% of the population of the dioceses of Pistoia and
Prato17. The population of the province of Florence for the subsequent years is computed as
follows: we sum up the total population of the province at 1950 borders, we add the population
of Castelfranco di Sotto, Montopoli in Valdarno, San Miniato, Santa Croce sull’Arno, Santa
Maria Monte, being part of the province of Pisa in 1950, and the part of the circondario of
Pistoia without the municipalities converging to the province of Lucca at Unification18. Finally,
we apply the percentage corresponding to the total population of the district of Rocca San
Casciano in 1861, as it was part of the delegazione di Romagna before Unification.
Grosseto
We get estimates for 1765, 1784 and 1794 by summing up the total population of the dioce-
ses of Massa and Maremma Senese, including Grosseto, Sovana and Acquapendente, and the
population of the Stato dei Presidi19. The figures for the subsequent years have not been cor-
rected, because the province of Grosseto did not undergo any change in the boundaries between
Unification and 1950.
15As usual, we look at the municipalities within tuscan provinces in the Population Census of 1861.
16Data for Sestino are not available for 1784 and 1794 and data for Montefeltro are not available for
1794. Therefore, the population of the province of Arezzo should be slightly underestimated.
17The province of Pistoia was constituted in 1927 with some municipalities previously belonging to
the provinces of Florence and Lucca. According to Bandettini [1957] 66% of the total population of
Pistoia converges to the province of Firenze. Here, we arbitrarily apply a greater percentage (75%) to
account for the presence of Prato, that was likely to concentrate the vast majority of the population in
the diocese.
18These municipalities correspond to: Buggiano, Ponte Buggianese, Massa e Cozzile, Monsummano
Terme, Montecatini Terme, Pescia, Pieve a Nievole, and Uzzano.
19The population of the Stato dei Presidi is only available for 1794. Nonetheless, the remaining
figures have not been adjusted for the corresponding portion of the population, since it counted only a
small part of the total population. Hence, when not counted, the population of the province of Grosseto
might be slightly underestimated.
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Siena
We get estimates for 1765, 1784 and 1794 by summing up the total population of the dioceses
of Montepulciano, Siena and Colle. As for Grosseto, the figures for the subsequent years have
not been corrected, because the province of Siena did not undergo any change in boundaries
between Unification and 1950.
Pisa
The population of the province of Pisa in 1765, 1784 and 1794 comes from the sum of the
population of the diocese of the same name and the population of the Principato di Piombino.
Data for the subsequent years are obtained correcting the population referred to the province
of Pisa at 1950 boundaries. We added the population of some municipalities belonging to the
province of Livorno in 195020, and we subtracted the population of the municipalities belonging
to the province of Florence at Unification: Castelfranco di Sotto, Montopoli in Valdarno, San
Miniato, Santa Croce sull’Arno and Santa Maria Monte.
Lucca
The population of the province of Lucca was reconstructed for two benchmark years 1744/1751
and 1758/1765, by summing up the population of the dioceses of Pescia, 25% of the circondario
of Pistoia, and the amount of the population belonging to ten municipalities that were part of
the ancient Republic of Lucca, and that constituted the majority of the State (about 90%)2122.
Data for the subsequent years are obtained as follows: we subtracted the population of some
municipalities that were included in the province of Massa-Carrara in 186123 from the figure
referred to boundaries in 1950, and we added the population of the municipalities that in 1927
converged to the province of Pistoia24.
Massa-Carrara
Two estimates for the population of the province of Massa- Carrara around 1750 and 1800 are
provided (see Beloch et al. [1994], pages 340-341, taking into account the territories previously
belonging to Pontremoli, Lucca, Stato Fiorentino, Modena, and feudal domains, that were part
of the province of Massa-Carrara after Unification. For the subsequent years, we added the
20These municipalities correspond to: Bibbona, Campiglia Marittima, Castagneto Carducci, Cecina,
Collesalvetti, Piombino, Rosignano Marittimo, Sassetta, and Suvereto.
21These municipalities correspond to: Bagni di Lucca, Borgo a Mozzano, Camaiore, Capannori,
Coreglia Antelminelli, Lucca, Massarosa, Pescaglia, Viareggio, Villa Basilica. For further details on the
population and boundaries of the ancient Republic of Lucca, see Beloch et al. [1994], pag. 334.
22We believed it was inappropriate to include the population of the diocese of Lucca, due to clear
overlapping with the inhabitants of the Republic of Lucca and the city of Lucca.
23These municipalities correspond to: Camporgiano, Careggine, Castelnuovo di Garfagnana, Cas-
tiglione di Garfagnana, Fabbriche di Vallico, Fosciandora, Gallicano, Giuncugnano, Minucciano, Mo-
lazzana, Piazza al Serchio, Pieve Fosciana, San Romano in Garfagnana, Sillano, Vagli Sotto, Vergemoli
and Villa Colemandina, and coincide with the circondario of Castelnuovo di Garfagnana.
24See note 18.
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population of the municipalities deducted by the province of Lucca25, and we corrected the
resulting value for the proportion of inhabitants of Calice al Cornoviglio and Rocchetta di Vara,
later on moving to the province of La Spezia.
Livorno
The population of the province of Livorno at unitary borders for the end of the eighteenth
century is obtained by summing the population of the city of Livorno and the inhabitants of
Elba island in 1778 and 179026. For the subsequent years, we summed up the population of the
municipalities included in the province of Livorno after Unification27.
3.7.7 Duchy of Modena and Reggio Emilia
In 1741, the Duchy included the territories matching the current provinces of Modena and
Reggio Emilia. Further, it included some areas of the historical provinces of Lunigiana and
Garfagnana, as well as the Principati of Massa and Carrara. In 1844, the Duchy of Guastalla
was acquired from the Duchy of Parma and Piacenza. In order to get the size of the population
of Modena and Reggio Emilia at the boundaries of 1871, we need to subtract the population of
Lunigiana, Garfagnana, Massa, Carrara, Villafranca, and Mulazzo, that belonged to the Duchy
until 1844, and then add the population belonging to the Duchy of Guastalla.
Modena and Reggio Emilia
As for the eighteenth century, Beloch et al. [1994], pages 371-372 provides detailed figures for
the districts of the Duchy in 1770, 1775 and 1794. As to Guastalla, a figure for 1814 is reported,
that we linearly interpolate with the value of the population provided for 1861 in the Population
Census. As for 1850, we use data coming from Sabbatini [1854] ), disaggregated for the ancient
provinces within the Duchy. The population of the province of Modena at unitary borders is
obtained summing the amount of population of Frignano and Modena, while we leave aside the
inhabitants of the territories of Lunigiana, Garfagnana and Massa and Carrara. The population
of the territory of Guastalla is already included in Reggio Emilia. Finally, we compute the weight
representing the percentage of the population in 1850 of the two provinces in the whole Duchy,
and we apply it to the figure for the total number of inhabitants in 1803, provided by Beloch
[1888], pag. 491.
3.7.8 Duchy of Parma and Piacenza
The area of the Duchy had not changed significantly since its constitution in 1545. In the 18th
century, the provinces of Piacenza and Parma, at the boundaries of 1871, coincided with the
25See note 23.
26The population of Elba island is obtained by a linear interpolation between the values reported for
1740 and 1806 (see Beloch et al. [1994], pag. 300.
27These municipalities correspond to: Capoliveri, Livorno, Marciana, Marciana Marina, Porto Az-
zurro, Portoferraio, Rio Marina and Rio nell’Elba.
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Duchy but Guastalla. Indeed, Guastalla was ceaded in 1844 to Modena in exchange of Vil-
lafranca and Mulazzo from Modena and Pontremoli, and Bagnone and Filattiera from Tuscany.
Since 1833 until Unification, data on the total population of the Duchy are collected by Podesta’
[2011], pag. 44. Figures include all the changes in the territory that occurred in that period.
Hence, we should substract the population belonging to the territory of Guastalla (Guastalla,
Luzzara, Reggiolo) until 1844, and the population included in the territory of Pontremoli after
1844. By doing so, we can get the total population of the provinces of Parma and Piacenza as
they were shaped after Unification.
Parma and Piacenza
We gather data for the population of the territory of Guastalla in 1814 by Beloch et al. [1994]
and Buttafuoco [1854], whose guess is that its population had not changed since 1787. Moreover,
we collect detailed data at municipal level in 1814, 1820, 1839-1845 by Buttafuoco [1854]. There-
fore, we can obtain figures for the provinces of Parma and Piacenza using borders at 1871. On
the one hand, the province of Parma at 1871 borders includes the district of Borgotaro (former
Valtarese), except the municipalities of Bardi and Boccolo, which belonged to Piacenza before
Unification. On the other hand, Piacenza acquired the Dioceses of Fiorenzuola and Cortemag-
giore from Parma. Beloch et al. [1994], pages 343-357 provides us with the population of the
territories of Fiorenzuola and Cortemaggiore in 1787 and the population of Borgotaro in 1814.
Further, the authors assume that the population had neither increased nor decreased between
1787 and 1814. Hence, by employing the values reported in Beloch et al. [1994], we make the
same assumption and we estimate the population of the provinces of Parma and Piacenza in
1787.
3.7.9 Kingdom of Sardinia
Genova and Porto-Maurizio
We used data coming from preunitary censuses (Regia Commissione Superiore [1839]) for 1819,
1824, 1830, 1838 and 1850, reported in Castiglioni [1862] We summed up the amount of the
population of the districts of Genova, Albenga, Chiavari, Levante and Savona to reconstruct
the population of the province of Genova, while we summed up the population of Oneglia
and Sanremo to get the inhabitants of the province of Porto-Maurizio. As for the eighteenth
century, we collect data at electoral district level in 1797 from Castiglioni [1862]. Specifically,
the estimate for the province of Porto-Maurizio is given by the total amount of the population
of the historical territories of Capo Verde and Delle Palme, with district capitals, respectively,
Diano and Sanremo. Then, we use Beloch et al. [1994], who reports values for the total amount
of the population of Liguria, from which we deduct the population of the territories of Monti
Liguri Occidentali and Novi, Gavi and Ovada. The difference between the resulting amount and
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the population assigned to the province of Porto-Maurizio returns the estimate for the province
of Genova in 179728.
Turin
The population of the province of Turin is taken from the same sources for the same years. As
for the nineteenth century, it has been reconstructed summing the inhabitants residing in the
districts of Turin, Ivrea, Pinerolo, Susa and Aosta29. As for the eighteenth century, we report
population figures referred to the same ancient districts for 1774.
Alessandria
The population of the province of Alessandria is taken from the same sources, and it amounts to
the inhabitants located in the districts of Alessandria, Acqui, Asti, Casale, Tortona and Novi.
The population of the districts of Novi is not available for 1774. Hence, we decided to apply to
the total population of the province of Alessandria the relative weight of the district of Novi,
computed at 1819 values.
Novara
As before, we take data from the same sources. We sum up the population in the districts of
Biella, Novara, Pallanza and Vercelli.
Cuneo
As before, we take data from the same sources. We sum up the population in the districts of
Cuneo, Alba, Mondov`ı and Saluzzo.
Cagliari
The population of the province of Cagliari in the nineteenth century at unitary borders comes
from the pre-unitary Censuses held in 1819, 1839, 1844-45 and 1848. It amounts to the in-
habitants of the districts of Cagliari, Iglesias, Busachi, Isili, Lanusei, and Cuglieri. As for the
eighteenth century, we took the value for the whole Sardinia in 1782, coming from Beloch et al.
[1994], and we attributed to the province of Cagliari the percentage of its population over the
total population of Sardinia in 1819, the closest year for which we observe the population.
28Alternatively, we could have used estimates from Felloni [1961a], who provides population values
for the provinces of Genova, Savona, Imperia and La Spezia at 1950 borders for some benchmark years
in the nineteenth century. We observe mild differences with respect to his estimates. More specifically,
our estimates for the population of the province of Genova at unitary borders seem to be slightly smaller
than the figures assigned by Felloni [1961a], whereas only negligible disparities occur with respect to
the population of the province of Porto-Maurizio. This implies that we find, in comparison, a higher
population growth rate for Genova throughout the nineteenth century up to 1861.
29The same figures can be collected from Castiglioni [1862].
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Sassari
The population of the province of Sassari in the nineteenth century at unitary borders comes
from the same sources employed for Cagliari. It amounts to the population of the districts of
Sassari, Nuoro, Alghero, Ozieri and Gallura. As for the eighteenth century, we attributed the
complement to one of the fraction of the population belonging to the province of Cagliari in
1819.
3.7.10 Lombard-Venetian kingdom: Lombardy
Data for the provinces of Lombardy in the nineteenth century come from pre-unitary Censuses,
that are completely reported in Castiglioni [1862]. We have thorough in- formation of the
provincial population in 1805, and yearly from 1813-1814 until 1859. Nevertheless, for the
sake of exposition, we decided to report figures only for some benchmark years: 1805, 1813-14,
1820-21, 1830-31, 1840-41, and 1850-51. The values reported for 1805 (Napoleonic Census)
seem too high compared to the values of the subsequent years. Nonetheless, we use it because
it represents the unique source in which data at district-level are shown. Such a territorial
disaggregation allows us to correct the estimates for boundary changes occurred after Unification,
by comparing the internal borders of the ancient provinces of the Lombard-Venetian Kingdom
with the corresponding borders after Unification. For the late eighteenth century, we made
several corrections to population values coming from Beloch et al. [1994], in order to account
for several territorial changes occurred throughout the period under analysis.
Milan
The population of the province of Milan at 1871 borders comes from the total amount of the
population of the districts of Milano, Gallarate, Monza and Lodi, and in the Cantoni of Abbiate-
grasso, Binasco and Gaggiano in 1805. As for the subsequent years, since only the population of
the Austrian province of Milan is reported, we correct the estimates by augmenting the popula-
tion for the portion of the inhabitants located outside these borders, namely the district of Lodi
and the Cantoni belonging to the Austrian province of Pavia. For 1771, since only data referred
to partial territory of the ancient Stato di Milano are reported, we make use of the disaggre-
gated values contained in the Napoleonic Census to reconstruct the corresponding population
in 1805 (except the district of Lodi). Hence, we can obtain the percentage of the population of
the province of Milan over the total population located in the ancient state (about 63%) in the
same year. Then, we apply this percentage on the total amount of the inhabitants of the city of
Milan and the territory between Ticino and Adda rivers30 in 1771. Finally, the resulting amount
has been added to the population located within the district of Lodi, equal to the corresponding
30This territory should coincide with the areas of: districts of Lecco, Varese, Menaggio, Monza,
Gallarate, Milano, Cantoni of Abbiategrasso, Binasco, Gaggiano, and Treviglio (Ghiara d’Adda), and
some other municipalities previously belonging to the territories of Crema, Casale and Pavia (see Beloch
et al. [1994], pag. 524) in 1805. We assigned arbitrary values to count the population of these last
municipalities, (respectively, 9000, 2500 and 5000 inhab.).
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unitary circondario, but Fombio, Guardamiglio and San Rocco, at that time part of the Duchy
of Parma and Piacenza. A forfeit number of 3500 inhabitants has been assigned to these three
municipalities, and it has been added to the total amount of the population of the province of
Milan at 1871 borders.
Pavia
The population of the province of Pavia has been reconstructed as follows: we collected the
population of the Austrian province of Pavia, we deducted the population of the Cantoni that
moved to Milan at Unification, we added the amount of population belonging to Voghera, Bobbio
and some municipalities at the time in the province of Alessandria31. As for the subsequent years,
we corrected the figures reported for the ancient province of Pavia, accounting for these changes.
For 1771, we summed up the population of the territories east of Ticino river, Lomellina, Bobbio,
Oltrepo` and Siccomario, and Vigevano and its territory. In addition, we added the population
located in the ancient Stato di Milano, within an area of 90 sq. km. The same population
density of 108 inhab. per kmq has been applied to this area to compute the corresponding
population.
Mantua
The Austrian province of Mantua was slightly bigger than the same province after Unification,
due to the transfer of some municipalities to adjacent provinces. Nonetheless, these territorial
changes were negligible, and we did not produce any correction to the values reported. We
have available information on the population of the city and its territory in 1770 from Beloch
et al. [1994], pag. 490. Nonetheless, we applied some corrections to account for changes in
boundaries: the population of Ostiano and Volongo, then moving to the province of Cremona,
has been deducted (forfeit number of 2000 inhabitants), the population of Asola and Casaloldo
has been added (the former with 3644 inhab. in 1730, and the latter associated to a forfeit
number of 350 inhab.), as well as the inhabitants of Monzambano and Ponti del Mincio, at that
time in Verona (arbitrary estimate of 4000 inhab.).
Brescia
The borders of the Austrian province of Brescia coincided with the borders of the unitary
province, apart from the district of Breno, belonging to Bergamo at that time. Hence, we add
the corresponding population for 1805, and we correct the values for the subsequent years with
the respective weight. For 1771, we sum the population of Brescia and its territory and Salo`
from Beloch et al. [1994]. Then, following the indications on the boundaries at pag. 481, we
31Figures for the territories of Voghera and Lomellina are gathered from the pre-unitary Censuses
of the Kingdom of Sardinia (linear interpolation between 1774 and 1850, keeping figures for benchmark
years at ten-year intervals). We assigned a forfeit estimate of 5000 inhabitants for the population of
municipalities previously belonged to Alessandria.
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subtracted the population of Asola and Casaloldo (3644 inhab., and a forfeit number of 350
inhab. in 1730)32
Bergamo
The population of the Austrian province of Bergamo included the inhabitants of the district
of Breno. Hence, we subtracted the corresponding population in 1805 and we corrected the
values for the subsequent years with the respective weight. For 1771, we summed up the total
population of the territory of Bergamo reported in Beloch et al. [1994], pag. 491 and the
population of the territories belonging to the provinces of Brescia, Milan and Cremona that
joined the province of Bergamo at a later time. These are: Luoghi separati dal territorio (Val
di Scalve, di Averara Taleggio, Torta), at that time in Milan, and the parts of the district of
Treviglio divided between the provinces of Milan (Ghiara d’Adda) and Cremona. Unfortunately,
only one value for Ghiara d’Adda in 1730 is given. Since we do not have available data for these
two regions in 1774, we desumed their population by imputing to the population of Ghiara
d’Adda in 1730 an average population growth rate of the adjacent territories (the territory of
Milan between Ticino and Adda rivers, Lago Maggiore, Ossola and Antigorio, Milan), namely
30%. Then, since we have information on the extension of its territory, we compute its population
density, and we assume that it is the same among the territories of the district of Treviglio at
that time in Cremona. Then, we multiply it for their squared km., and we get an estimate
for this territory too. Further, we assume an arbitrary number of one thousand inhabitants
proxying the inhabitants of Costa Volpino and Rogno, belonging to Brescia. Finally, we sum all
these values and we obtain the population of the province of Bergamo in 1771 at 1871 borders.
Cremona
The population of the province of Cremona in 1805 is drawn from the sum of the inhabitants
located in the districts of Cremona, Crema, and Casalmaggiore. In the subsequent years, the
district of Crema is not included within provincial borders. Thus, we computed the relative
weight and we applied it to the values reported in the Population Censuses. For 1771, we summed
the population of Cremona and its territory, the territory of Casalmaggiore, the population of
Crema and its territory, and the inhabitants of Ostiano and Volongo, belonging to the province
of Mantua (forfeit number of 2000 inhabitants). Finally, we subtracted the part of the district
of Treviglio included within the province of Bergamo after Unification, computed as described
for the province of Bergamo.
Como
The population of the province of Como in 1805 has been reconstructed by summing the popu-
lation of the districts of Como, Varese, Lecco, and Menaggio, corresponding to the province of
Como after Unification. No administrative changes arose later. Thus, we report censuses values
32The population of Sirmione, at that time in the territory of Verona, and Costa Volpino and Rogno,
that moved to the province of Bergamo, compensate each other.
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without any correction. For 1771, as for the province of Milan, we computed the percentage of
the territories corresponding to the province of Como at 1871 borders over the total population
of the ancient Stato di Milano in 1805. These territories coincide with the districts of Varese,
Lecco, Como and Menaggio. Since an estimate of the city of Como and its territory is available,
we only put together the inhabitants of the remaining districts, and we finally calculate the
corresponding percentage (around 30%). Then, we apply this weight to the total amount of the
inhabitants of the city of Milan and the territory between Ticino and Adda rivers33, and we add
the value for the city of Como and its territory.
Sondrio
The Austrian province of Valtellina, with Sondrio as provincial capital, remained unchanged
after Unification. Then, we report the corresponding values for all benchmark years in the
nineteenth century. For 1771, since Sondrio and the corresponding district of Valtellina were
under the jurisdiction of the Grisons, we found no available population data. Hence, we assign
an arbitrary value of 80000 inhabitants, slightly smaller than the figure reported for 1805.
3.7.11 Lombard-Venetian kingdom: Veneto
Data for the provinces of Veneto in the nineteenth century come from Castiglioni [1862] and
Stefani [1854], who reports values drawn from pre-unitary Censuses in 1823, 1843 and 185234.
Moreover, the 1843 Population Census reports figures at a very detailed level of territorial
disaggregation. This allows us to reconstruct the level of the population for all the provinces at
unitary borders, as a result of several territorial changes occurred at the time of the annexation
of Venetian provinces in 1866 and during the preceding years35. As for 1766, we collect figures
provided by Beloch et al. [1994], and we correct them for some adjustment to account for changes
in boundaries occurred during the Restoration.
Venezia
The population of the province of Venezia at unitary borders has been reconstructed by summing
the inhabitants in the districts of Venezia, Mestre, Dolo, Chioggia, San Dona`, Portogruaro,
Mirano and Noale in 1843. As for the remaining years, we computed the relative fraction of
the population belonging to the districts that changed province, and we applied them to the
value of the population of the Austrian province36. The estimate referred to 1766 has been
33See note 30.
34We decided not to report estimates for the Napoleonic Census in 1807, contained in Castiglioni
[1862], because the resulting figures appear not reliable, insofar they unplausibly overestimate population
values for all the considered provinces.
35See Zuccagni-Orlandini [1861] for all the details concerning territorial changes occurred within
Venetian provinces during the nineteenth century (from 1815 until 1866).
36In 1838, the Austrian province of Venezia acquired the district of Portogruaro, in 1851 ceaded the
districts of Loreo and Ariano to the province of Rovigo, and in 1853 acquired the district of Mirano,
with Noale, from the province of Padua.
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reconstructed by summing the population of Venezia plus its territory37, the population of the
Dogado, including Chioggia, Gambarare, Caorle, Grado and some other small municipalities,
and the population of some municipalities moving from the province of Treviso, such as Mestre,
Cesana, San Polo, San Dona` and Noal.
Belluno
The province of Belluno did not undergo any administrative change during the preunitary period.
Hence, we reported the figures provided for its population province for all benchmark years
without any correction. In 1766, the value of its population comes from the total amount of the
inhabitants of the districts of Belluno, Feltre and Cadore.
Padua
The population of the province of Padua at unitary borders has been reconstructed by summing
the inhabitants living in the districts of Padua, Camposampiero, Piazzola, Teolo, Battaglia,
Montagnana, Este, Monselice, Conselve, Piove, and Cittadella in 1843. As for the remaining
years, we computed the relative fraction of the population belonging to the districts that changed
province, and we applied them to the value of the population of the Austrian province38. The
estimate referred to 1766 includes the district of Mirano and Dolo, as well as some municipalities
part of the district of Cittadella, west of the Brenta river. Hence, the population of the province
of Padua has been reconstructed by summing the population of Padua with its territory, and
then deducting the relative weight of the district of Mirano in 1843. Finally, we subtracted a
forfeit value of 2000 inhabitants proxying the population of the municipalities west of the Brenta
river.
Vicenza
The population of the province of Vicenza has been reconstructed deducting the amount of in-
habitants belonging to the district of Cittadella from the total amount of the Austrian province39,
including the districts of Bassano, Marostica, Asiago, Tiene, Schio, Malo, Valdagno, Arzignano,
Lonigo and Barbarano. As for 1766, we summed the population of Vicenza and its territory,
the forfeit value of 2000 inhabitants proxying the population of the municipalities west of the
Brenta river, and the population of the district of Bassano.
37We only have a value for the territory of Venezia in 1857. We employed it to compute the relative
fraction over the population of the city, and we applied the same percentage in 1766.
38The province of Padua ceaded the districts of Cittadella in exchange for Noale to the province
of Venezia in 1818. Then, in 1853, Noale was incorporated in the district of Mirano and it moved to
Venezia, once again in exchange for Cittadella.
39In 1818, the province of Vicenza ceaded Noale to the province of Padua, in exchange for Cittadella.
In 1853, Noale was incorporated in the district of Mirano and it moved to Venezia, and the province of
Vicenza ceaded Cittadella to the province of Padua.
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Rovigo
The population of the province of Rovigo has been reconstructed summing the inhabitants of
the Austrian province of Rovigo, including the districts of Rovigo, Adria, Lendinara, Badia,
Massa, Occhiobello, Crespino and Polesella, and the inhabitants of the districts of Loreo and
Ariano, assigned to the province in 1851. In 1766, following the indications provided by Beloch
et al. [1994], pag. 442, we computed the population of the province of Rovigo as follows: we
summed up the population of Rovigo and its territory, the districts of Lendinara and Badia, and
the municipalities of Ariano, Crespino, Trecenta, and Ficarolo. Finally, we applied the fraction
of the population belonging to the districts of Loreo and Ariano, calculated for 1843, to adjust
for the respective population.
Verona
The province of Verona, like the province of Belluno, did not undergo any administrative change
during the pre-unitary period. Hence, we report the figures provided for all benchmark years
in the nineteenth century without any correction. In 1766, the value of its population comes
from the total amount of the inhabitants of Verona and its territory, plus Cologna, at that time
independent40.
Udine
The population of the province of Austrian Udine includes the same territories of the province
of Udine after Unification, except the district of Portogruaro, that was ceaded to the province of
Venezia in 1838. Thus, we compute the weight of its population over the total population of the
province of Udine, and we deduct it in 1823. As for 1766, we sum up the population belonging
to Sacile, Pordenone and its territory, Friaul, Carnia, Cividale, Palma and Marano. Finally, we
deduct the same percentage referred to Portogruaro, as did for 182341.
Treviso
The province of Treviso, as Belluno and Verona, did not undergo any administrative change
during the pre-unitary period, and precisely from 1815 until 1861. Therefore, we report the
values contained in the pre-unitary Censuses for all the available benchmark years. As for 1766,
we sum up the population of Treviso and its territory, Conegliano and its territory, and Ceneda,
while we deduct the inhabitants of the districts of Mestre, Cesana, San Polo and San Dona`,
Mel, and Noal, moving to the province of Venezia.
40The ancient province of Verona included also Sirmione, Monzambano, Ponti del Mincio and Gam-
bellara. Nevertheless, we did not make any correction to adjust for their inclusion, as the corresponding
population is negligible.
41Beloch et al. [1994] argue that the population belonging to some Austrian enclave (Codroipo and
others), part of the province of Udine after 1861, and the territory of Monfalcone along the coast,
compensate each other.
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As already mentioned, we interpolate data between the two closest available benchmark
years, and we reconstruct the population time series for each province from the first available
value up to 1861. Data for selected benchmark-years are reported in Table 3.8 in the Appendix
B. Further, we report in figure 3.5, Appendix B, the graph for the population trends for all the
69 italian provinces.
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3.8 Appendix
Table 3.8: Provincial population in some years
Province Abbr. 1785 1791 1801 1821 1831 1841 1851 1861
Alessandria AL 467850 470330 474464 494417 543327 572163 610856 645607
Ancona AN 192958 198649 208136 227160 236750 248502 263222 254849
Aquila AQ 209280 216364 226222 247730 271281 302761 306106 309451
Arezzo AR 140142 150745 157066 163594 184964 202503 215027 219559
Ascoli AP 158429 156570 153472 155473 168773 185973 202715 196030
Avellino AV 280862 290118 297080 316917 346878 359853 357737 355621
Bari BA 288282 299938 316745 362750 429054 466946 510674 554402
Belluno BL 102920 104845 108054 114471 125856 139284 158514 167229
Benevento BN 184709 191241 197305 212409 230354 239252 229879 220506
Bergamo BG 242530 244727 248389 267690 294814 312726 335647 347235
Bologna BO 303918 302631 300486 310203 336072 363089 398678 407452
Brescia BS 322981 326987 333663 352307 378449 384232 405397 410351
Cagliari CA 299845 298281 295674 290459 307164 331418 348319 372097
Caltanissetta CL 146622 150878 155741 162349 168529 173601 182062 223178
Campobasso CB 224530 234709 249538 283023 310688 323752 337105 346007
Caserta CE 535281 538766 517890 489579 536066 581826 617645 653464
Catania CT 273366 281302 290369 303223 352927 363520 403091 450460
Catanzaro CZ 243283 248644 255334 275265 317810 364467 381421 384159
Chieti CH 256496 268660 259431 249748 278469 293558 310437 327316
Como CO 291277 297782 308624 321884 356015 385634 425724 457434
Cosenza CS 321477 331603 340813 366911 400862 406225 436914 431691
Cremona CR 191500 193051 195638 225762 241840 259265 272418 286461
Cuneo CN 490679 490420 489988 502180 551790 578688 600043 597279
Ferrara FE 149144 143945 135280 132754 153698 161728 187354 199158
Florence FI 416676 440046 466645 508132 582828 639131 685041 696214
Foggia FG 218825 216641 216646 222633 250471 273209 293047 312885
Forl`ı FC 140890 142833 146073 163717 189285 200324 218981 224463
Genova GE 448487 461522 482655 554389 592271 626237 650143
Girgenti AG 211469 217608 224622 202945 225038 223506 245974 263880
Grosseto GR 31756 33767 41688 52358 60894 70674 77837 100626
Lecce LE 295882 302327 305645 323117 372838 403489 425735 447982
Livorno LI 52235 55063 60561 78516 89771 98040 105311 116811
Lucca LU 173785 175990 179664 188049 218950 243144 256974 256161
Macerata MC 155599 161854 172279 194757 208437 219541 232522 229626
Mantova MN 200609 205393 213367 233201 255307 254621 271268 284012
Massa Carrara MS 107522 108686 110191 99726 118408 135684 143494 140733
Continued on next page
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Table 3.8 – continued from previous page
Province Abbr. 1785 1791 1801 1821 1831 1841 1851 1861
Messina ME 223661 230154 237572 264647 312463 340554 375055 395139
Milan MI 550889 553754 558530 653176 703105 791334 888864 948320
Modena MO 197336 204718 185263 207408 223385 239363 254365 260591
Naples NA 652880 667912 662341 677389 757585 741204 804593 867983
Novara NO 430741 430683 430586 444220 516181 546458 569709 579385
Padua PD 265899 265899 265899 265899 273001 281878 314079 304762
Palermo PA 382772 393884 406579 443482 471634 461062 528885 585163
Parma PR 214675 217397 216129 237329 255302 259642 256029
Pavia PV 284589 287989 293654 313681 352896 370488 389863 419785
Perugia PG 336107 344719 359073 393774 420116 451644 489559 513019
Pesaro PU 146038 149542 155381 170880 184359 192826 209400 202568
Piacenza PC 194126 188965 186147 193911 206299 214726 218569
Pisa PI 115837 134611 146830 149434 173520 197852 222642 243028
Porto Maurizio PM 77326 84327 108537 117632 120187 123855 121330
Potenza PZ 349453 364061 372872 398758 447427 489666 502348 492959
Ravenna RA 125140 126867 129745 142610 159707 173876 184892 209518
Reggio Calabria RC 208954 213899 220779 239157 264321 281150 320106 324546
Reggio Emilia RE 142951 148823 149721 173147 186485 199823 213484 230054
Rome RM 590424 574591 548203 552264 602550 649544 685726 743025
Rovigo RO 129832 133347 139206 150924 157568 164408 175588 180647
Salerno SA 355852 371640 390998 438195 483154 490239 509247 528256
Sassari SS 196661 197238 198199 200122 199044 197483 208244 215967
Siena SI 113161 115114 124646 145218 161741 172723 184212 193935
Syracuse SR 182039 187324 193361 198180 239488 236532 247131 259613
Sondrio SO 80574 80887 81409 80496 86947 91453 98686 106040
Teramo TE 145515 150740 153545 165591 193469 204895 217478 230061
Turin TO 690242 689993 689577 709581 803955 839513 891859 941992
Trapani TP 137636 141632 146197 150721 173287 175411 198406 214981
Treviso TV 224894 225985 227802 231436 245555 262750 294894 308483
Udine UD 305924 306123 306454 307115 347428 397736 433486 440542
Venezia VE 265649 267770 271304 278372 277385 275267 284173 294450
Verona VR 246214 250232 256927 270318 279795 289968 308652 317855
Vicenza VI 252312 256631 263829 278226 292643 308865 326487 327724
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Figure 3.5: Provincial trends in population (thousands)
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